

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

COLUMBIA TODAY

June 1976

Columbia Law Symposium
addresses the question:

Can our freedom survive defense by the CIA and FBI?

"If publicity has become a necessary part of the cure, the disease must be pretty deep and serious," said Telford Taylor, Columbia's Nash Professor of Law.

"It is deep," commented Columbia Professor of Government Roger Hilsman, who was an assistant secretary of state during the Kennedy Administration, "and the cost to us has been enormous. Absolutely enormous. Not in money terms but in wasting one of the great assets we once had: the respect for our integrity and goals and methods."

"We have adopted the worst tactics of the Russians," agreed Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., who is the chief counsel for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. "Our government, in the belief that it was defending freedom, used the tactics of totalitarianism: unfair tactics, vicious tactics, tactics that are wholly outside the best traditions of the United States."

"The excuse for such operations has been that our national security required these acts," said Paul C. Warnke, '48L, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs under President Johnson. "I would suggest that this is a flimsy excuse. It suggests a degree of danger to our national security that does not exist."

The CIA and the FBI: Is the uproar over their tactics justified? How has the scandal affected the United States? What should we do to prevent future scandals?

These were some of the issues considered by the men quoted above as they participated in a panel discussion held this spring as part of Columbia Law Symposium, an annual event sponsored by The Columbia Law School Alumni Association. Professor Taylor, who moderated the discussion, introduced the other speakers, noting "their broad range of experience in the intelligence world."

Hilsman offers some praise. "This is a world of sovereign nation

states," Professor Hilsman pointed out. "We don't have a world government. Until we do, each nation must look to itself for its own security, and intelligence is part of that."

"And as intelligence agencies go, the CIA isn't a bad one. It has centralized our foreign intelligence gathering. It has done some simply marvelous jobs in technical fields—satellite photography and the U-2, for example."

"I remember Chester Bowles once saying: 'Thank God for the U-2. It showed us the Russians weren't as strong as we had suspected they might be.' If it hadn't been for the U-2, our defense budget in the Cold War would have probably been twice what it actually was."

"But the CIA's most important contribution has been the perfectly legitimate, perfectly overt, analysis of thousands and thousands of periodical publications. This has been very well done."

"All the armed services start their planning with the National Intelligence Estimates, prepared under CIA chairmanship. Consider what the last 20 years would have been like if, in addition to the interservice rivalry we have had, each of the services would have started with its own intelligence estimates. Consider what it would have been like if Air Force planning had been based on intelligence documents dictated by Curtis LeMay!"

Warnke agrees: "Good intelligence serves a number of very effective purposes. Certainly the national intelligence estimates have prevented gross miscalculations on the part of our defense planners."

"And if we did not have this tremendous intelligence capability, we would not have faith in the enforceability of disarmament agreements."

"Even intelligence on the part of the other side can be basically good for us. During the Six Day War in 1967, the Soviets were collecting data that enabled them to recognize the falsity of King Hussein's reports that the United States was participating in the air attack."

A case for covert action? "As long as it is a world of sovereign nations, there is a theoretical case for covert political action," said Professor Hilsman.

"For example, if you believe that World War II could have been avoided by the assassination of Hitler, then you have to admit that assassination is theoretically acceptable. I do not happen to believe that the removal of one man would do it."

"If you believe that it would have been possible to remove the Nazi Party in the mid-30s by encouraging a coup by the German General Staff, then covert political action must also be theoretically acceptable. I have grave doubts that even that would have been possible, though I concede the theoretical point."

"My own knowledge of covert political action is that it is of marginal value—that it has never worked except when the event probably would have happened anyway."

"For example, Allen Dulles used to take great credit for the removal of Mossadegh and the establishment of the Shah of Iran. My guess is that the change would have occurred even if the CIA had never existed."

"The covert actions in Chile were also marginal...and petty. What did the CIA do? They subsidized a newspaper. Does anyone really believe that one little newspaper caused the events in Chile? I don't. They subsidized the truckers strike. Did that make the difference between a strike and no strike? I don't believe so. Everything I know about covert political action comes to that. The CIA takes credit for something that, by and large, I think would have happened anyway, without CIA intervention."

Undeserved blame. Mr. Warnke pointed out that "covert activities have sometimes led to our being blamed for things we have not done."

"For example," he elaborated, "some Soviet officials now try to defend the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on the grounds that they were entitled to counter American subversion there—the same sort of subversion that we later carried out in Chile. It is an excuse that in my opinion is without basis."

"But in the court of world opinion, we are in a sort of pot and kettle situation. Covert activities have weakened our ability to influence world affairs, and have seriously eroded the credibility and good will that the United States has been able to assemble over the years."

And in the U.S.: "The main threat to liberty in this country has been the FBI," said Mr. Schwarz. "For 30 or 40

years, the FBI succeeded in convincing the American public that it was pure...that it was doing the right thing.

"And in the area of pursuing criminals, the Bureau has done, generally speaking, a good job. It is when it has crossed the line from surveillance of criminals to surveillance of dissenters—and to its subsequent actions against dissenters—that it has gone beyond what this country can tolerate under its Constitution.

"The Bureau has spent far too much money on dissent as opposed to its appropriate activities against crime. Even today, after certain cutbacks, it spends more than twice as much money on informers in the political community as it spends on informers in organized crime. This is a misallocation of resources. And under the Constitution it shouldn't be doing this at all.

"In the early 1970s, the Bureau covered all black student groups in colleges across the United States. Every single person who belonged to such a group was under surveillance and had a file created on him or her, regardless of whether or not that person—or that group—had participated in violent activities.

"The main violations of America's standards have occurred as part of the FBI's action programs, where they seek, as they put it, to 'neutralize, discredit, and disrupt' political groups.

"The targets of such activities have ranged from the famous, such as Martin Luther King, to the obscure. The King case is well known. Equally sad for our country have been the many, many people who were ordinary protesters—or who just associated with dissenters.

"One case that particularly sticks in my mind involved a 30-year-old woman in Illinois whose husband was active in the civil rights movement. The Bureau decided to write a fake letter to her, complaining about the husband's sexual relations with people in the movement. Totally false. And then you see in the files of a federal government agency the notation: 'We have had the great effect of breaking up the people's marriage.'

"Many, many Americans were attacked in this way—secretly and falsely."

Sharing the blame. The panelists indicated that responsibility for the illegalities committed by their agents does not rest solely with the CIA and FBI.

"The principal culprits have been the policymakers," said Professor Hilsman. "I want to hedge this by saying that if you give a very able group of people a lot of money, a secrecy label, and a very narrow responsibility, they

are going to come up with ideas. And they are going to advocate and press for their projects.

"Kennedy, for example, found himself under enormous pressure from Dulles and others to proceed with the Cuban invasion. That does not excuse him. He *could* have avoided it.

"So I am not saying that the CIA doesn't press Presidents. Generally speaking, however, it is the other way around. It has been the policymakers who have demanded that the Agency do something that it was either reluctant to do or not very enthusiastic about doing—or maybe enthusiastic about doing but not legally allowed to do. The people responsible for the Chile business were Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. It wasn't the Agency. Richard Nixon said, 'do something about this situation.' And they did."

Mr. Schwarz mentioned that Congress also "played a very negative role" in the intelligence picture.

"Congress knew what the FBI was doing to Martin Luther King—and did nothing about it," Mr. Schwarz declared. "Congress also passed the Smith Act, which has led to the Bureau's justification of most surveillance activities."

Congressional oversight. One remedy considered by the panelists is the creation of a Congressional oversight committee to monitor the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies. (The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recommended the creation of such a committee in its report issued in late April.)

"We need to return to the system of checks and balances planned by the Founding Fathers," said Mr. Schwarz. "When people can operate in secrecy, when they are subjected to the kinds of pressures that agents have been subjected to, and when they believe action is required, they will tend to operate against liberty; it's too easy. It's too hard to remember the restraints that are placed on power.

"We let the idea of secrecy, and the increasing power of the Executive, insulate from Congress and the American public—and the courts—the nature of the programs conducted in their name."

Professor Hilsman was skeptical: "Congressional committees, like regulatory agencies, get captured by the people they are supposed to oversee. I'm afraid that such a committee would become a powerful advocate and defender—and protector—of the agency."

Mr. Warnke also felt that "Congressional oversight committees would not be a really effective answer."

"I'm also very skeptical of suggestions such as advanced clearance of proposed covert action by a Congressional

committee," he continued. "To the extent that a Congressional committee shares the responsibility, it tends to take on the face of the regulated agency.

"Also, past experience with pre-clearance has not really been a happy one. Pre-clearance of covert activities smacks too much to me of a Tonkin Gulf resolution, in which the Executive comes to the Congress, secures a blank check, and then cashes it for a far greater amount than the Congress contemplated at the time the Executive presented it."

Banning covert activities. Some people who have testified before Congressional groups investigating CIA and FBI misdeeds have advocated that covert activities be banned entirely. Others maintain that such activities are justified in certain cases. McGeorge Bundy, for example, has suggested that covert activities would be acceptable to counter international terrorism or nuclear threats.

"I think I would preserve some sort of a covert action capability," said Mr. Warnke, "but I would do it on an ad hoc basis. I think there should be a presumption against it—a strong presumption. Only the most compelling of considerations ought to lead to the permission of covert activities.

"But there is no justification, under any circumstances, for covert *policy* or covert programs. Even if there is some justification for everyone not knowing how the government is trying to do something, everyone should know what his government is trying to do. Policies ought to be overt.

"This was demonstrated in connection with the Angolan debate, where at one point it was contemplated that we provide overt aid. And Secretary of State Kissinger, in a press conference, said no, we couldn't give overt aid because that would bring about a number of political and diplomatic problems.

"If we can't justify a program as part of an overt policy, there is no justification for doing it covertly."

Professor Hilsman suggested "legislation that flatly says 'no covert actions of any kind can be taken by the FBI and CIA.'"

"I would also contemplate a law limiting the term of the director of the FBI, so the person couldn't build up power—as J. Edgar Hoover did."

Warnke considers Ford's proposals. In February of this year, Gerald Ford announced new guidelines for U.S. intelligence agencies. His Executive order bans the use of assassination and sets some limits—considered ambiguous by critics of the plan—on the surveillance of U.S. citizens. A three-man Committee on Foreign Intelligence, headed by the CIA director, will supervise all foreign in-

telligence activities, under the direction of the National Security Council.

President Ford's plan also establishes an Operations Advisory Group, composed of top Administration officials, that will review and vote on all proposed covert operations.

Mr. Warnke is "not at all sanguine about the effectiveness of the Executive order. First of all, a problem develops when you try to legislate against just certain things. The things that are not legislated against acquire a degree of sanction that perhaps they did not have before.

"This is the problem that exists as a result of the War Powers Resolution passed in late 1973. That legislation gave the President, for the first time, the explicit ability to conduct a war for a limited period of time, subject to Congressional veto. Prior to passage of the resolution, I think a good argument could have been made that the President had no such power at all. So, while purporting to restrict Executive power, it in fact expanded the Executive's action capability.

"I think there should continue to be an executive interdepartmental committee to review intelligence agency proposals and make recommendations to the President. This sort of committee can work—but not if the National Security Adviser is also the Secretary of State.

"I also think there should be an overall intelligence czar—one who would not have direct operational responsibilities in any one of the agencies. Theoretically, that has been the role of the director of Central Intelligence, but because he has an individual agency affiliation, he has sometimes been in the position of a competitor rather than an overseer."

Legislating against leaks. Mr. Warnke also had some comments about the threat to intelligence operations of leaks:

"I don't think the disclosures are seriously interfering with our intelligence gathering. Even the disclosures of names of agents abroad, though obviously reprehensible and of extreme danger to the individuals involved, does not really interfere with the core of our intelligence-gathering apparatus.

"It doesn't seem to me that the kind of legislation that has been proposed—to make it unlawful to leak information that you lawfully have in your possession—is ever going to be effective.

"In many instances, leaks are officially inspired. I remember one leak that greatly troubled President Johnson. He even went so far as to have the FBI investigate my own little shop. And eventually, it was proven that President Johnson had leaked the information while talking to a New York

Times reporter.

"Some recent leaks of material gathered by Congressional investigators may have been done to show the unreliability of Congress.

"Leaks are often designed to effect a particular purpose. Back in 1968, someone—subsequent investigation indicated that four separate sources were involved—leaked the fact that General Westmoreland had requested an additional 206,000 troops be sent to Vietnam. There were those who felt that the President would not be able to turn down the request once it was made public. Others obviously leaked it because they hoped public furor would prevent the request from being granted."

Law is the key. "The purpose of all the remedies," summarized Mr. Schwarz, "is not simply to protect American liberties at home but to restore the good name of the United States, so that once more it can be the last and best hope of mankind—which it basically still can be, but not if it operates in the way it has far too often in the past.

"Law is the key. We have departed from the law in the intelligence community, which has often justified its actions on the grounds of 'the greater

good,' 'the higher good,' and 'national security.'"

Mr. Warnke believes that national security is "a flimsy excuse," suggesting a degree of danger that does not exist.

"There aren't very many threats to our security," he said. "The basic threat is the threat of Soviet military power. We aren't really in trouble as far as domestic insurrection is concerned. The Communist Party in the United States represents as trivial a menace as the mind of man could devise. And I don't believe we are seriously threatened by changes overseas...by alterations in foreign governments.

"To avoid future abuses, we must get away from the idea that we are a besieged outpost of freedom in a hostile world. We have friendly neighbors on both sides, and an ocean to the east and an ocean to the west.

"This doesn't mean that we can afford to become Fortress America or to be isolationists. It doesn't mean that we should forfeit our role in the world.

"But we should recognize that that role can be played usefully only through the exercise of our traditional American tolerance and by observing the civil liberties of both the United States and the rest of the world."

THE NEW YORK TIMES
26 June 1976

BUSH SAYS C.I.A. DROPS NEWSMEN

Refuses to Supply Names to
Press Council Aides

By DEIRDRE CARMODY

The Central Intelligence Agency is ending its association with all part-time correspondents affiliated with American news agencies abroad and will no longer hire them as agents, George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, has told representatives of the National News Council.

Mr. Bush and three of his assistants met Thursday with William A. Pusher, a member of the council and publisher of the National Review, and Ned Schnurman, the council's associate director, at the C.I.A. headquarters in McLean, Va. The meetings were held at the request of the council, a voluntary group that monitors the performance of the national press, to clarify the C.I.A.'s position on the employment of journalists.

C.I.A. Refuses Comment

The C.I.A.'s use of the part-time correspondents produced a controversy, Mr. Bush issued a statement in February saying that the agency would end any existing relationships and would discontinue the practice of hiring full-time or part-time journalists. But two months

later, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities said in a report that the C.I.A. intended to continue its employment of 25 part-time journalists. These part-time newsmen were not covered in Mr. Bush's February pledge, the report added.

A C.I.A. spokesman refused to comment on the Senate report yesterday or to explain the seeming discrepancy between Mr. Bush's statement and the report's disclosures. He said that it was not agency policy to "endorse or reject a report by a Senate Committee."

The report aroused reaction from news organizations. When the C.I.A. refused to name the individuals involved, news executives noted that the C.I.A. was casting doubt on the operations of all news organizations abroad without giving them an opportunity of defending themselves against any charge of

corruption of their news reports.

Lack of Definition Noted

Mr. Bush reiterated to the National News Council representatives his refusal to divulge the names of individuals who were working for or had worked for the C.I.A. Mr. Schnurman said, however, that C.I.A. officials had said that the agency was "terminating old arrangements in an orderly fashion and phasing them out." They refused to discuss how many journalists were involved.

One of the principal matters of confusion has been the exact definition of what the C.I.A. means by a part-time correspondent, or stringer. The agency officials said that any news executives, including publishers; stringers for American news organizations; foreign nationals working as newsmen for American news organizations; and free lance writers would be considered journalists.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 June 1976

CORRECTION

An article in The New York Times on April 2, 1976, stated that according to former C.I.A. agents a recipient of C.I.A. favors in the early postwar period was Matsutaro Shoriki, a deceased Japanese communications execu-

tive and government official. While the information did come from former C.I.A. agents, further investigation by The Times has led it to conclude that none of its sources are able to supply sufficient elaborating details to justify, in the view of the editors of The New York Times, the impression left by the article.

Los Angeles Times

Sat., June 26, 1976

CIA Agents on U.S. Campuses Alleged

Foe Claims Intelligence Officers Are Used Mainly to Recruit Others

BY WILLIAM TROMBLEY
Times Staff Writer

SANTA BARBARA—A leading critic of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency said Friday that the CIA has "one or two or perhaps several secret agents" on each of more than 100 American campuses.

Morton H. Halperin, a former member of the National Security Council, said his information was based on descriptions he has received of secret portions of the recent report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.).

Halperin told the American Assn. of University Professors, meeting at UC Santa Barbara, that the CIA agents are administrators, faculty members and teaching graduate students who "basically are recruiters."

"They try to spot students or faculty members who might be useful" to the CIA by gathering information at international academic conferences and the like, according to Halperin.

They also "look for other recruiters," he said, "either Americans or foreigners, people who will go back to their countries and be spies for the CIA."

Halperin named no institutions but said, "I assume it's concentrated in universities where there are a large number of foreigners" as students or visiting faculty members.

Campus agents generally are known only to the CIA and to themselves but occasionally their identi-

ties are known to one or more college officials, Halperin said.

Some are paid and others work "out of patriotism," he stated.

Once a recruiter spots a potential CIA agent he send the name to the agency, which conducts a security check, according to Halperin.

Halperin also stated, as did the Church committee, that some scholarly research has been secretly funded by the CIA.

The Church committee's report, released in late April, said generally that hundreds of professors, administrators and graduate students, as well as officials of private foundations, have had clandestine ties with the CIA, the FBI and other U.S. intelligence gathering agencies.

However, specific descriptions of these ties were deleted from the final report at the request of the CIA.

Halperin said his speech Friday was the first detailing of just how the CIA works on campuses.

He said his information came from "the secret version of the Church report" but said he had not seen the deleted material himself and would not say where he got the information.

"I am confident that what I am saying is true but I cannot tell you where I got it," Halperin told reporters after the meeting.

Halperin has devoted considerable time and energy in recent months to attacking the CIA for its undercover ties to journalists, academics and others in American life.

He has filed suit against Secretary

of State Henry A. Kissinger and former government officials because, he contends, his telephone was tapped for a 21-month period from 1969 to 1971.

CIA ties with academic figures were defended at Friday's meeting by Gordon D. Baldwin, professor of constitutional law at the University of Wisconsin and former counselor on international law for the State Department.

Baldwin argued that "foreign intelligence gathering is vital to our common good" and said that "in a majority of cases . . . there was no wrong."

He said if the CIA had received more academic input "we might all have profited."

He suggested that there is little difference between a law firm asking a faculty member to recommend a new employee and the CIA asking special campus agents to identify possible recruits.

Halperin replied that scholars should have the right to publish under CIA auspices if they wish but should acknowledge the source of their support.

He also said CIA agents on campus should identify themselves so their students and colleagues would know with whom they are dealing.

And he proposed that names of possible recruits should not be submitted to the CIA without permission of the individuals and that security checks should not be carried out without their approval.

WASHINGTON STAR

1 JUL 1976

Magazine Editor Barred in Britain

LONDON (AP) — The editor of an American magazine that has named dozens of alleged CIA agents around the world was barred from Britain last night, the Home Office reported.

A spokesman said Home Secretary Roy Jenkins ordered the ban on Perry Douglas Fellwock of Counter-Spy magazine because his presence in Britain would "not be conducive to the public good." Fellwock writes under the name Winslow Peck.

The Home Office said Fellwock arrived from West Berlin last night at London's Heathrow Airport, and immigration officials sent him back. The editor was reported on a speaking tour.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 1976

Soybeans Soar on Rumor of a C.I.A. Crop Study

By ELIZABETH M. FOWLER

The Central Intelligence Agency got into the action yesterday on the Chicago Board of Trade indirectly and unwittingly, and soybeans soared the daily limit.

July beans closed at \$6.55 1/4 bushel, up the 20-cent-a-bushel limit after an early-morning rumor that the C.I.A. had estimated Soviet grain output at 175 million tons, lower than the recent Agriculture Department estimate of 190 million tons. The Soviet Union had aimed at 205 million tons before drought began to hurt its crops.

The C.I.A. rumor, which was denied, was enough to send the market up under strong local buying by Chicago professionals. As prices rose, buy orders were activated in commission-house accounts held for the smaller speculators.

The Agriculture Department's estimate is crops would be down sharply, three hours so prices could

stimulated interest in soybeans and soybean meal. The department cut the soybean carryover estimate to 200 million bushels at the end of this crop year on Aug. 31 from its earlier prediction of a carryover of 230 million bushels.

Trading throughout the session was hectic because of the rumor and the lower carryover estimate, and traders reported a standing-room-only gallery of visitors watching the activity. One trader commented: "It was kind of hilarious, but we are all worn out."

Report Denied by C.I.A.

After the close, the C.I.A. firmly denied that it had made the estimate of a 175 million ton Soviet crop and added that it was coordinating its estimate with the Department of Agriculture.

Last year the C.I.A. was the first Government agency to make public that Soviet crop

a result, Soviet orders of grain from this country were high.

Corn prices moved up despite reports of good rainfall in growing areas. Wheat prices also rose, possibly because the rains have delayed some harvesting, which means that farmers have reduced sales of wheat.

A rumor that a fungus might have hurt some of the Alabama cotton crop was a factor behind a sharp cotton price rise.

July cotton, the current delivery month in which no daily limit applies, jumped to \$3.90, up more than 6 cents a pound. Other months were up the 2 cents a pound limit on change. Mill consumption has also been heavy.

Volume on the New York Cotton exchange has been so heavy that yesterday the opening of trading was delayed three hours so growers could

REGISTER, Des Moines
12 June 1976

World, media enveloped in sea of news pollution

By GILBERT CRANBERG

Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush refused to answer when he was asked, during his appearance as American Society of Newspaper Editors luncheon speaker Apr. 8, whether the CIA maintains "relationships" with journalists working for foreign news media. Bush said a response would reveal intelligence "sources and methods."

The question Bush ducked was answered two weeks later by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The committee reported that the CIA maintains ties to a number of persons associated with U.S. media organizations and "a network of several hundred foreign individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets."

The statement is italicized in the committee's report. A footnote explains that italicized material "has been substantially abridged at the request of the executive agencies." Even cropped and touched up, the picture of the CIA that emerges is of an agency ready, willing and able to employ a large-scale covert propaganda apparatus to pollute the news media.

And not only the foreign media. A former CIA official told the Senate committee: "There is no way in this increasingly small world of ours of insulating information that one puts out overseas and confining it to the area to where one puts it out. . . . If you plant an article in some paper overseas . . . there is no way of guaranteeing that it is not going to be picked up and published by the Associated Press in this country."

The CIA's propaganda activities include the use of "black propaganda" — propaganda that appears to originate from an unfriendly source. Because U.S. policy makers could be misled by these phony stories, "senior U.S. officials" are informed of their true source. But as the Senate committee noted, "no mechanism exists to protect the U.S. public and the Congress from fallout from black propaganda or any other propaganda."

Russian and other foreign intelligence agencies employ similar covert propaganda tactics. Does the KGB have American newsmen on its payroll planting stories in the U.S. news media? Conceivably it does, though a Senate committee staff member who is familiar with the CIA's covert propaganda operation said he doubted that the Russians are planting stories in this country directly through U.S. newsmen, because the number and variety of U.S. media outlets

would make it difficult to have an impact. He added that the Russians unquestionably have an extensive covert propaganda apparatus abroad.

An appendix to the Senate committee report, which apparently was contributed by the CIA, describes a KGB department that specializes in "covert action and deception," including the use of "disinformation."

Soviet "disinformation" and other covert foreign intelligence propaganda are as likely to be picked up and relayed to the American public as is the CIA's brand of false and misleading stories.

The Senate committee recommended that the CIA be prohibited by statute from subsidizing the distribution of material "within the United States" unless the source is publicly attributed to the CIA. Although the committee expressed concern that domestic fallout from the CIA's covert media operations abroad was "manipulating or incidentally misleading the American public," it refused to urge that the CIA quit its overseas covert propaganda program. The committee's attitude apparently is that since everybody is doing it, the CIA should, too.

If the CIA and the committee have their way, editors will be forced to continue to wonder whether they are printing CIA or KGB propaganda whenever they reprint articles from foreign publications.

The CIA should quit planting false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to protect all readers from misinformation. This government should not deliberately deceive foreign readers any more than it should deceive its own people.

Any unilateral disavowal by this country of "black propaganda" and similar media dirty tricks would leave readers here and abroad still subject to the covert propaganda activities of foreign intelligence agencies. If pollution of communications is to be eliminated, all of the polluters will have to be curbed.

Pollution of the oceans has been recognized as a worldwide problem requiring an international convention to abate dumping of pollutants into the sea. Worldwide pollution of the channels of communication by intelligence agencies merits the same kind of international attack.

A convention in which nations agree to place non-governmental media off limits to surreptitious manipulation by intelligence agencies may sound utopian, but those who deliberately foul the publications we read are no less a menace than those who foul the seas.

The U.S. media should be taking the lead in exploring the possibility of developing such an international anti-media pollution ordinance.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 June 1976

Un-Friendly bear

Hurray for enterprising journalists — especially one in Moscow. Alfred Friendly Jr., Newsweek's resident correspondent there, feels he has been slandered in the Soviet press and has filed a libel suit in a Moscow court against the alleged culprit — Literany Gazette, which says he is connected with the CIA. His

defense, presumably, is a public statement by CIA chief George Bush that the CIA has no connections with any full-time journalists.

Since both the Soviet media and the Soviet courts take orders from the Kremlin, it is hardly possible Mr. Friendly will get Western-style justice. But he has seized upon an ingenious way to tweak the tail of the Russian bear — and his fellow newsmen will watch to see whether and how much it growls.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 June 1976

Wiretap bill astir in Congress

Passage likely unless
election intrudes

By Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

If election-year politics do not intrude, Congress appears poised to approve this session a proposal that would prohibit government's spying indiscriminantly on Americans by wiretapping or other electronic means.

But that is a big "if," several congressional sources say, noting that historically Congress becomes preoccupied with politics by early summer in a presidential year.

Nonetheless, Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R) of Md., one of the proposal's prime sponsors, tells this newspaper he rates as "very good" its chances of becoming law this year. He notes that President Ford — who with At-

torney General Edward Levi proposed the bill — has indicated he will sign it. And he notes members of Congress are now strongly self-motivated to approve it.

There now is "proof," he says, that under recent administrations members of Congress themselves were wiretapped without court approval. "What more do you need?"

Had the current proposal been law, it would have made illegal or prevented entirely many of the questionable wiretaps by federal intelligence agencies over the past 30 years.

Approval required

The bill also would have made illegal the bugging by government agencies of such diverse targets as the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., members of Congress, members of the National Security Council, and several journalists.

The proposal would require the FBI, CIA, and other federal intelligence agencies to obtain prior court approval before wiretapping persons within the U.S. for national security reasons. To obtain that approval, the government would have to convince a judge that there was reasonable cause to believe the person it proposed to bug was acting as a foreign agent, and was engaged in "clandestine intelligence activities."

The proposal has been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and is being probed in hearings this week by the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence. Sponsors estimate it will be ready for consideration by the full Senate next month. The situation is similar in the House, where committees are also considering it at this time.

Compromise legislation

The legislation represents a compromise between broader, more stringent proposals to protect Americans' privacy — which sponsors have failed to enact into law in recent years — and the desires of many in government not to hamper the legitimate intelligence-gathering requirements of government.

The bill has some opponents, including Sen. John V. Tunney (D) of California, who says it would permit too much government snooping on American citizens who have broken no law.

Nonetheless, Senators Mathias, Edward M. Kennedy, and others hold that it is — as the Marylander told this newspaper — "a step forward" in protecting Americans' privacy.

But Senator Mathias, like others, concedes it is not his "ideal." He ultimately wants what he has been proposing vainly for two years: a law that would require court orders before government agencies use what he calls "the many forms of governmental surveillance — including mail opening; the entry of homes; the inspection of bank, credit, and medical records; as well as the use of bugs and wiretaps."

held to account for the F.B.I.'s lawlessness while superior officers, ultimately responsible for the program, go free.

... and Oversight

However effective criminal sanctions may be, they are only one of the means of curbing intelligence community abuses. Aggressive Congressional oversight and careful legislation are two others. The Senate's capacity and will to utilize those tools is being tested this week as the new Senate Intelligence Committee, exercising its concurrent jurisdiction with the Judiciary Committee, marks up the proposed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

This measure would impose for the first time a requirement that warrants be obtained from the Federal courts prior to installation of national security wiretaps. Though its purpose is commendable, the bill as now written has severe shortcomings. Among its more glaring defects is the fact that it permits electronic surveillance even if no evidence has been presented that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Moreover, key terms and phrases used in the act are so broad that they do not effectively limit intrusive intelligence activities.

In approving the bill over the lone opposition of Senator Tunney of California, the Judiciary Committee gave the intelligence community the benefit of doubts, as if nothing had been learned during the past half decade. The revelations of F.B.I. burglaries during the course of the Socialist Workers Party lawsuit against it and even during the Intelligence Committee investigation should impel the new Senate committee to examine the issues more closely than did Judiciary.

There is an even more sobering lesson for Congress. The Socialist Workers Party lawsuit is prying out of the F.B.I. files information that was in existence but was withheld from both of the committees expressly charged with investigating intelligence abuses.

Against that background of cynicism and irresponsibility, the legislation now before the Intelligence Committee does not appear to us to provide the protection which the citizens of this nation have learned so painfully they must have. The new Intelligence committee will have to make substantial improvements in the bill if the committee is to meet its first test successfully.

NEW YORK TIMES

2 JUL 1976

Burglaries, Lies ...

Just as the impact of the revelations of intelligence abuses had begun to fade, Americans have been provided with two jolting reminders that the issues are far from resolved. A subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has reported that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been derelict in meeting their responsibilities to the Warren Commission. Almost simultaneously, it was reported that the Department of Justice had begun a major investigation into burglaries undertaken by the F.B.I. since 1971, when, say Director Clarence M. Kelley and other officials, they thought such activities had ceased.

Though the lapses in the Kennedy investigation and the burglaries now under investigation occurred years apart, they are disturbingly similar. From all appearances, the C.I.A. withheld information from the Warren Commission because it did not want to reveal its assassination program against Premier Castro, while the F.B.I. withheld information about Lee Harvey Oswald because it wished to avoid embarrassment.

In the seventies, the F.B.I. had a national security mission to ferret out the Weathermen and other targets on the New Left. Contrary to assurances given by F.B.I. spokesmen to the Senate committee that all relevant evidence had been turned over, many secret files were not even reviewed by the bureau, presumably to protect the integrity of the burglary program.

In all of these cases the intelligence bureaucracies proceeded on the assumption that they had some purpose higher than both the missions and limits imposed by the appropriate authorities. Yet, to keep their secrets from Congress, they have attempted to cloak themselves in the presumption of regularity and responsibility.

The agencies cannot have it both ways. The only way for them to operate in a free society is to be responsive to higher authorities and the law. The fact that the Department of Justice is conducting a broad investigation into the burglaries is a hopeful signal, but the effort will be in vain if only low-level agents are

THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY
2 June 1976

The Intelligence 'Flap': Lies My Uncle Told Me

The subversive activities of the FBI, CIA and Department of Defense have seriously undermined the security of the Republic, within and without.

JANET KARSTEN LARSON

* ONCE UPON A TIME there was the frank and fearless liar — but sooner or later the facts would out, and make an end of him. Now we have the bureaucrat, mumbling and amnesiac; the master of plausible denials and institutionalized cover-up; the limited investigation and the interpretive memo; the document-shredders, the secrecy-stampers, the propaganda machinists. And it is no longer so easy to find them out. It took 15 months and \$3 million for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to unearth some of the things our masters of deceit were not telling us about — and to frame legal remedies for keeping our intelligence establishment more nearly honest and law-abiding in the future.

Now that the Senate panel chaired by Frank Church has released its censored final report, we can assess the findings of the most extended peek in our history into the baroque machinations of U.S. intelligence. Although the initial waves of outrage have subsided, our unhappy right to know has burdened us with large responsibilities for the future. Without strong public pressure, the Congress may be unable to sustain a critical posture toward the executive branch with its insistent claim that national security requires public trust in secret power. The House has already retreated, turning around from its aggressive inquiry into the spy establishment to compliant, worried investigation of itself. Nonetheless, what this past year's massive congressional effort has taught us we cannot afford to forget: that more than any House leak or Senate revelation, the subversive activities of the FBI, CIA and Department of Defense have seriously undermined the security of the Republic, within and without.

I

"This is a report that probably should never have been written," declares Senator Barry Goldwater in dissent from the Senate panel's final report. It has indeed caused "severe embarrassment" to the nation, as he laments, for the Senate investigation has laid before the public the elements of a terrible irony: that acts which are illegal and unethical for citizens to engage in at home are condoned, even aggressively pursued, by American law-enforcement officers and secret agents both at home and abroad.

Thus while FBI's COINTELPRO prying violated the civil liberties of Americans unjustly suspected of subversion, the CIA was conspiring to overthrow governments abroad, fix their elections, and assassi-

nate their leaders. While the FBI claimed it was hunting out terrorists and preventing violent acts, both CIA and FBI were inciting groups to violence, here and overseas. The FBI tried to smear student activists by linking drug use with "Red Chinese" narcotics plots to "weaken" our youth; the CIA and the army, meanwhile, were secretly spending millions for LSD experiments on unsuspecting persons, several of whom died, and shredding the evidence afterward. Responding to threats real and imagined — and the report documents both kinds of dangers — we adopted methods "more ruthless than the enemy," as a major 1950s policy statement advised, and our adversaries became ourselves.

No communist plot could have succeeded so well to undermine American values and institutions. Even more disturbing than the now-familiar horror stories about what government agents have done to protect America are all the report's examples of how little was done to protect us from them. The Senate Select Committee concluded that our system of checks and balances has failed to curb secret power. Six Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon, other top-level officials, and particularly the attorneys general "virtually abdicated their constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for intelligence activity." Second, Congress has exercised lax oversight, bowing to the will of the executive, and framed such vague, inadequate laws that the intelligence agencies have filled in almost, at whim the blank checks at their disposal. Although the Constitution requires disclosure of how public monies are spent, Congress has never asserted its right to know the extent of the financial empire which intelligence commands.

Third, the judiciary has been reluctant to intervene, even where laws have clearly been broken. As the ACLU's Christine Marwick writes, for years the Justice Department promised the CIA that

there would be no prosecutions for CIA illegalities if a trial would threaten to reveal classified information. And since virtually all information about an organization created for clandestine activities is secret, there were no prosecutions for illegal programs. As the Pike Committee observed, the CIA was not out of control, it was "utterly responsive to the instructions of the President." It simply appeared to the naïve outsider to be out of control because it was, in fact, beyond the law ["Reforming the Intelligence Agencies," *First Principles* (March 1976), p. 5].

In the intelligence "flap" as in Watergate, it has been the Fourth Estate — the press — that has played the most vigilant watchdog role, despite the CIA's

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and the FBI's devious efforts to co-opt or discredit the media.

During its investigations the Senate panel probed hard to find evidence of respect for law in the daily operations of intelligence. Certainly, honest and laudable officials are mentioned in the report. But an overwhelming number of cases turned up habitual, even institutionalized, disregard for law. Repeatedly inspectors general warned about "potential flap activities" — not crimes. FBI memos acknowledged illegality but authorized bugs and black-bag jobs anyway because they were "invaluable techniques" "necessary" for protecting the nation. The head of the FBI's Intelligence Division testified that he never heard anyone raise legal or ethical questions: "We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatic." How persistently officials maneuvered to elude the requirements of law is well documented in the report:

- Although COINTELPRO came to light in 1971 — with its disregard of First Amendment freedoms and its massive violations of federal and state statutes against mail and wire fraud, incitement to violence, extortion, and sending obscene material through the mail — the Justice Department did not look into the program until 1974, and even then it uncovered no crimes. Its report, only mildly alarmed, was based on misleading FBI-prepared "short summaries" of COINTEL incidents. That same year Justice also issued sweeping authorizations for more COINTEL-type FBI investigations of "subversives," potential civil disorders and "potential crimes."

- When President Johnson's Katzenbach Commission told federal agencies to halt covert financial relationships with "U.S. educational and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad," CIA sent out a field circular stressing stringent secrecy to prevent more exposés. "In simple terms," the circular said, "we are now in a different ballgame. Some of the basic ground rules have changed." Among the CIA's clever ruses was to shift the covert "ballgame" from institutions to the individuals within them. If CIA no longer funds the National Student Association, it uses exchange students (some hold government grants) to collect intelligence overseas. Even today the CIA is using "several hundred American academics" to provide leads, make introductions for intelligence purposes, and write propaganda "theme material." Some are used "operationally," and at most of the institutions involved, no one knows of the CIA link except the agent-professor.

The CIA was not the only agile partner in this little dance of "reform." Katzenbach testified that his commission was (in the report's words) "designed by President Johnson . . . to head off a full-scale Congressional investigation."

- In the past congressional oversight has all too often been no more sharp-eyed than Edward V. Long's hearings in 1966 on electronic surveillance. The senator allowed FBI agents to write his press release stating that the subcommittee had "conducted exhaustive research" and was now "fully satisfied" that the FBI had not abused its bugging authority. The "exhaustive" peek was a 90-minute briefing from the FBI which failed to disclose the

bureau's most serious misdeeds. Wrote one bureau official to the associate director afterward: "We have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee. . . ."

While the existing intelligence charters are vague, it can hardly be argued that the officials who systematically broke the law did not know what they were doing. A 1957 CIA memo called its drug experiments "unethical and illegal" six years before they were halted. While former CIA Director William Colby was publicly taking the line that the President has constitutional power to conduct covert operations, Colby himself had approved an internal CIA study which found that, prior to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, there were no legal or constitutional grounds for covert action without the advance approval of Congress. From 1969 on, CIA Director Helms sent warnings to the White House that CHAOS — the domestic spying scheme which came perilously close to giving us a secret "thought police" — had gone beyond the CIA charter. "I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper," Helms wrote in a study of "Restless Youth." The program — which was mandated to find proof that foreign elements supported the American peace movement (any kind of support, even "encouragement," "casual contacts" or "mutual interest") — was not halted until March 1974.

To compound the problem of questionable legal authority, only recently did Congress become fully aware that a "secret charter" existed for the nation's cloak-and-daggering — the accumulated classified executive orders issued over the years. While Americans could debate the overt reform proposals in President Ford's February order (see March 10 Century editorial, p. 211), we may never know the full content of Executive Order 11905, which merely hints that "in some instances detailed implementation of the Executive Order will be contained in classified documents." On national television Ford said that he trusted the American people to elect honest Presidents who would not abuse the powers of secrecy, and in his message to Congress he proclaimed that his plan for reform "places responsibility and accountability on individuals, not institutions." Long before the exposure of the CIA began, Richard Helms likewise maintained that the country had to "take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men."

Yet the American system is one not of persons but of laws. And in such a system, as Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in 1928, the "existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy" (*Olmstead v. United States*). In COINTELPRO, the Senate report found, "the bureau secretly took the law into its own hands," and the consequence was anarchy. If the FBI's own agents did not directly carry out murder plots, the bureau intensified the climate of violence in which black leaders were slain — just as the CIA set the stage for the kidnapping and then the shooting of General René Schneider in Chile and the bloody

overthrow of Salvador Allende three years later.

II

Within this atmosphere of deceit which clandestine work seems to require, the FBI still manipulates the American media and the CIA fuels an international propaganda machine—most likely the biggest covert operation of them all. Although for years the CIA has assured the media that it was planting no informers on their news teams, until February of this year CIA was using 50 unnamed American journalists and media employees for covert purposes. The CIA director pledged in February that the agency "will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." But the new policy permits the continuing—perhaps now expanding—use of at least two dozen journalists who are free-lance, unaccredited, unpaid, or rewarded by CIA "briefings" in lieu of money—as well as the use of American news executives who have been important "media assets" in the past.

On May 10 George Bush issued a further opinion—that the CIA "should not be precluded" from using part-time journalists who want to cooperate with the agency. The CIA continues its refusal to give out names of its media "assets"—especially not to American editors who want to clean house. In world news media the CIA is also using "*several hundred foreign individuals around the world*" who "*provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets*" (italics in the Senate report indicate agency censoring). In the past the CIA has maintained two "proprietary news services" in Europe, one of which served 30 U.S. newspapers, as well as regularly planting stories in the foreign press and frequently using Reuters, the well-respected news service which is considered fair game because it is British-based.

Because propaganda is aimed first at the intangible—the shaping of perceptions—its effects are hard to measure, especially when it comes from invisible sources. "The most important weapon of strategic propaganda" is the book, as one former Clandestine Service officer testified. CIA has been in the book business for several decades: before 1967 it "sponsored, subsidized or produced over 1,000 books," many of which were put out by CIA-backed cultural organizations whose subsidy was "more often than not" unknown to the writer. The CIA-commissioned *Penkovskiy Papers* (Doubleday, 1965) was a commercial success; the publisher never knew of the CIA link. When *Penkovskiy* was serialized in the *Washington Post* and 29 other U.S. newspapers, the Russians denounced the book as the "coarse fraud" it was, and, notes former Moscow correspondent Stephen S. Rosenfeld, they retaliated by closing the *Post*'s Moscow bureau for two years.

In 1967—a year of 200 CIA books, among them translations of Machiavelli's *The Prince* into Swahili and T. S. Eliot's works into Russian—the CIA

pledged it would no longer "publish books, magazines and newspapers in the United States." That same year, however, an agency order announced that "fallout in the United States from a foreign publication which we support is inevitable and consequently permissible." The CIA's leap in amoral logic was elucidated by testimony from E. Howard Hunt, in charge of the CIA's U.S. publisher contacts in the late 1960s, who said that domestic fallout "may not" (in the report's words) "have been unintentional."

The Senate report quotes a September 1970 cable summary during CIA's propaganda program in Chile to suggest that the agency regularly expected "fallout":

Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in *New York Times*, *Washington Post*. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance. . . .

Domestic fallout is "permissible" not only because it is inevitable but also because it is desirable—especially where the selective release of "facts" or the currency of agency-favored ideas serves an ideological line or stratagem. To some it may seem acceptable, if distasteful, for propagandists hired by our government to tell lies in order to protect American democracy. Yet the implication is that our government and way of life have a monopoly on truth—an attitude characteristic of totalitarian states, not one embodied in traditional American values. If Senate-approved treaties affirm our respect for the sovereignty of other nations, we cannot permit our government's undercover agents to mount attacks—military or verbal—that threaten the right to self-determination, no matter how misguided we may judge other nations to be.

Like most other questionable secret designs recently made public, propaganda is justified as counterweight to enemy propagandizing. Yet as the Senate report simply puts it: "The strongest defense a free country has from propaganda of any kind is a free and vigorous press that expresses diverse points of view"—without its credibility being jeopardized by our own covert propagandists. There are a number of stories in the Senate report which document an ingenious system by which propaganda is made to look like the real thing: CIA's domestic "plants" can legitimize "news" reprinted abroad, while domestic fallout gives credibility to stories planted initially in the foreign press. Besides polluting the free flow of ideas, manipulations such as these are nothing less than subversive: they undermine the United States and its institutions—universities, the press, charitable groups, foundations and the churches—by exploiting the legitimacy they may inherently possess, in order to gain for insidious designs credibility which the CIA would not otherwise be able to command.

When the Church panel found that the FBI too had been using "friendly" reporters at least through 1973, the bureau insisted that if names were published the reporters might "dry up" as sources of information—thus implying that the practice is still going on. Under Hoover the FBI's press liaison was

the head of the Crime Records Division, who disseminated to the bureau's "press friends" information to discredit the FBI's critics and targets and to disrupt their activities. The most massive FBI propaganda effort is now well known: the vicious campaign to take Martin Luther King "off his pedestal" by planting derogatory articles in the media, peddling secret tapes to journalists (such as Ben Bradlee when he was *Newsweek's* Washington bureau chief), and sending threat letters to King and his wife, Coretta. The bureau's specialty in covert propaganda has been forged poison-pen letters, such as those sent to sow fear and hate among rival black groups so that their members might be provoked — and some were — to kill each other off.

Hoover's propagandists aimed also at influencing foreign policy during the Vietnam years — leading policy-makers to believe that antiwar sentiment was communist-inspired and thus did not need to be taken seriously. Hoover asked for and got reports that judged communist influence in the civil rights movement "vitally important" even though his bureau had found it an "obvious failure." Nevertheless, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was hounded for 25 years, despite an early report noting the NAACP's "strong tendency" to "steer clear of communist activities." (In all, the FBI conducted more than a half-million investigations of alleged "subversives," yet was not able to prosecute a single individual or group for planning or advocating overthrow of the government.)

The most recent instance of an overt propaganda campaign has been the CIA's public-relations effort to discredit its critics in the congressional inquiries. In December when CIA's Athens station chief, Richard Welch, was ambushed outside his home and killed — after his name, along with those of other agents, had appeared in the offbeat magazine *Counter-Spy* — the CIA at last unleashed its secret weapon: the public hero.

According to Daniel Schorr's journal of those days ("My 17 Months on the CIA Watch," *Rolling Stone* [April 8], p. 92), the plane carrying Welch's body was timed to touch down at Andrews Air Force Base for live TV coverage on the morning news shows; the funeral and civilian Welch's special burial in Arlington National Cemetery — with full military honors and the same caisson that carried the body of President Kennedy — was elaborately orchestrated to impress upon Congress and the press the dire consequences of their reckless probes and leaks. Blaming Welch's death on the press was grossly unfair; and there are several good reasons to believe that Welch's "cover" may already have worn dangerously thin before his name was published. For one, his residence had been the home of the former Athens CIA chief; for another, counterspies could find good clues of our agents' identities in the State Department's own *Foreign Service List* (which ceased publication in March) and its *Biographic Register* (now published only on a restricted basis in order to protect State's employees abroad, according to the department's policy statement — which mentioned Welch's death).

When Daniel Schorr of CBS leaked the secret House intelligence report to the *Village Voice* in

February, accusations grew louder that Congress could not be trusted with oversight. The people believed. Writing in the *New York Review of Books* (April 1), I. F. Stone made an astonishingly persuasive case for the bizarre possibility that the CIA leaked the House report to an unwitting Schorr — a masterstroke which channeled public anger toward a virulent "secrecy backlash."

III

"It used to be that a person could live isolated from the world's problems," muses the "Peanuts" character Lucy, playing psychiatrist. "Then it got to be that we all knew everything that was going on. The problem now," she tells poor Snoopy, "is that we know everything about everything except what's going on. That's why you feel nervous. . . . Five cents, please!" Given the clandestine community's past record, now only tough legal restraints and congressional oversight — as well as genuinely independent review at the executive level and a special prosecutor for intelligence cases — can assure that intelligence will serve us. Otherwise, the American people will be short more than a nickel, we'll still be nervous, and we still won't know what is going on.

The Senate Select Committee asked for a new oversight panel to draft omnibus legislation to recast the National Security Act of 1947 and frame explicit intelligence charters. Two initial "reform" efforts — President Ford's February executive order and Attorney General Edward Levi's April FBI guidelines on domestic investigations — are not yet embodied in law. While many of the Church committee's 183

recommendations entrust oversight responsibilities to agency types, cabinet officers, and President's men who have been untrustworthy in the past, the Church plan taken as a whole attempts to put our check-and-balance system into better working order — not to tie the hands of intelligence but to enable it to serve a democratic society's needs without undermining its cherished principles. Some of the Church committee's key points of reform are these:

- The CIA, the National Security Agency, and the clandestine arms of the Department of Defense must stay out of the domestic arena. Only the FBI should conduct domestic security investigations which are aimed at acts that violate federal laws. Under restrictions which some senators believe are not stringent enough, "preventive intelligence investigations" are allowed in order to head off terrorist plots or counteract the designs of hostile foreign agents. Current bureau practices suggest that new laws, recommended by the panel, must be enacted to prevent COINTELPRO *redux*: the FBI still has a half-million domestic intelligence files and has budgeted for the current fiscal year \$7 million to pay domestic security informants — twice that spent for informants against organized crime. In remarks appended to the Senate's domestic report, Senator Philip A. Hart warns that laws should not be framed for times of national calm, but "for the next periods of social turmoil and passionate dissent, when the current outrage has faded and those in power may again be tempted to investigate their critics in the name of national security."

- A "comprehensive civil remedies statute" should be enacted to give American citizens clear claim for litigation against the government. The Justice Department is making efforts to notify COINTELPRO victims, and under the Freedom of Information Act citizens may succeed in finding out about intelligence activity directed against them (a local ACLU office can help).
- The CIA must get out of the covert publishing business in the U.S. While the "operational" use of American academics would not be banned, top university officials must be informed of CIA use. Laws are also recommended to prohibit the operational use of missionaries and media personnel. (In February the CIA announced it had "no secret paid or contractual relationships" with U.S. clergy, but said it would "continue to welcome information" from voluntary clergy-informants. Even when requested by the churches, former CIA Director Colby had refused to halt the use of missionaries; the CIA under George Bush still insists that there is no "impropriety" in its clergy and media use. The Senate report tells of a Third World pastor-agent who carried out covert-action projects, developed CIA "assets," and passed its propaganda to the local press. He or she was only one of 21 similarly cooperative clergy.)
- Covert activities, the Church panel says, should be employed only by the CIA and only when "required by extraordinary circumstances to deal with grave threats to national security"—a definition that would drastically curtail CIA's past habits. Going beyond President Ford's proposal, the senators would ban all political assassinations, fixing of democratic elections, and covert support for foreign police that systematically violate human rights.
- The senators have asked that the FBI director be limited to an eight-year term, and they have charted myriad bureaucratic changes to improve intelligence effectiveness and to create "paper trails" of accountability. Building on Ford's plan for strengthening the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Church committee would have the DCI prepare the budget and allocate resources for the entire clandestine community. His post should be separated from that of CIA head in order to avoid a conflict of interest.
- The central element in the Church plan is a powerful, well-informed Senate oversight committee with rotating membership, budgetary authority, legislative powers, and the right to receive advance notice of all "significant" covert operations. However the Senate's oversight apparatus will actually function—and that will be subject to some senatorial political machinations—is it well to keep in mind Senator Mike Mansfield's general warning against "a committee cloaked with only apparent importance, . . . in the end so impotent that it would itself become a creature if not an active conspirator within the community over which it must exert scrutiny."

IV

In an age of proliferating nuclear powers, it would be naïve to propose that we have no need for intelligence services. It would be equally naïve to trust the clandestine establishment as the sole, secret guardian of our national security. The Senate panel

has attempted to steer carefully between these twin naïvetés. It has envisioned comprehensive, if cautious, reform which we clearly need: yet for a number of reasons, it is altogether possible that we could get something considerably less.

First there is the nature of the Senate inquiry itself. Avoiding the House committee's adversary style and appearance of leakiness, the Senate panel strove to be a tight-lipped model for future oversight. The committee held most of its hearings in secret and worked closely with the administration, even deleting at its request 200 pages from the published text. Names are frequently missing, and, like the full House, the Senate panel voted at the last minute not to reveal the total intelligence budget. The concessions made to secrecy seem to have undermined the impact of the report—and even helped those forces which oppose strong oversight. Three panel members—Senators Walter F. Mondale, Philip A. Hart and Gary Hart—have warned that the report is "diluted" in important respects, and that the secrecy stamp has caused some of the report's "most important implications [to be] either lost or obscured in vague language."

In mid-May, however, the committee mounted an effective media strategy by steadily releasing a stream of 15 supplementary reports, which made the nightly news with graphic tales of abuse for several weeks. The strategy forced the directors of CIA and IRS to reply, and finally—after all this time—wring a down-in-the-mouth public apology from Clarence Kelley, the FBI head who has been under pressure from the ranks of bureau faithful not to confess Hoover's wrongdoing. While drama was needed to heat the debate up again, zeal for reform is likely to cool as the refinements of law are worked out in the coming year.

The times are also against reform. After the massive losses of Vietnam and Watergate, the intelligence debate is set at a historic juncture for U.S. international leadership and trust in American institutions at home. It is commonly realized that political agreement about covert operations has disintegrated. During oversight debate earlier this year, former CIA head John McCone urged that the cold-war consensus be rebuilt. World events, national politics—and covert propaganda somewhere?—seem already to be moving the United States toward a '70s version of that old consensus, in spite of lessons learned. This emerging climate of opinion could block the overhaul of intelligence agencies—without which, in Nelson Rockefeller's words, we would be "a sitting duck in a world of loaded shot-guns."

In times that tolerate such cold-war rhetoric (and a gargantuan new defense budget), security and national security have become common themes for an election year in which an ailing economy has further weakened a progressive national spirit. Campaign language everywhere betrays fears of the loss of American omnipotence—or rather that delusion of superpower, in the view of Frank Church, which dispatches squads of covert agents to police the world.

In this climate the intelligence "flap" is a non-issue. While big-government fears fuel the presidential campaigns, the real menace of Big Brother

government provokes from the major candidates nary a whisper. The perennial inanities of our national politicking are in part responsible for this omission. The intelligence issue is far too complex and abstract to lend itself to sloganeering and headline-length promises. We have heard more campaign yawp about abortion — an important issue but one with which Presidents have little to do — than about where each hopeful stands on civil-liberties issues such as Senate Bill One. Where would each candidate draw the line on covert activities? How would he see his role as chief of the most awesome system of clandestine power in the world?

Although intelligence reform is fundamentally a law-and-order issue which ought to appeal to conservative voters, this cautious election year augurs ill for reform in two additional ways. The widespread reaction against the 1960s makes it hard for many to sympathize with the victims of those years — with the single exception of Martin Luther King. The candidates know this. They are not about to champion the Socialist Workers Party, slain Black Panthers and New Left activists — although these are only the most outrageously maligned of the multitude spied upon, which included such sterling citizens as Eleanor Roosevelt and thousands of ordinary, tax-return-filing Americans. We are still, it seems, unwittingly suffering from the deceptions of COINTELPRO propaganda. It becomes difficult to picture those years other than the way we perceived them then — and in the collective consciousness of the electorate, it was all so long ago.

The test of vigilance which faces the American public comes in the year of our bicentennial when most of all we should, in the words of Tom Paine, "refresh our patriotism by reference to first principles." Yet the congressional probing of intelligence was inevitably anticlimactic after Watergate's daily drama; and the audience, given to ephemeral intensities, soon got tired of the show. There are other reasons too why our vigilance has flagged. In a *New Republic* interview with Oriana Fallaci, Congressman Otis Pike speaks about why House members have not rushed out to read the guarded copies of the intelligence report they had voted to keep to themselves:

Oh, they think it is better not to know. There are too many things that embarrass Americans in that report. You see, this country went through an awful trauma with Watergate. But, even then, all they were asked to believe was that their President had

been a bad person. In this new situation they are asked much more; they are asked to believe that their country has been evil. And nobody wants to believe that. . . . I was one of [those who believed the government]. It took this investigation to convince me that I had always been told lies, to make me realize that I was tired of being told lies [April 3, 1976, p. 10].

Perhaps it is hard to feel some personal animus toward typical bureau mumblings that defend the indefensible, like Clarence Kelley's apology for the FBI ("Power abused perhaps can be explained and possibly even be excused, but only when the explanation is truthful, contrite, and is accompanied by a well-defined plan to prevent a recurrence"). In the broadest of human terms it is no unique indictment that the average American citizen finds it hard to care very much about what the CIA has done. All of us like a personal world — we revel in gossip, in the Nixon of the bedroom and the White House chapel. We want *persons* behind the evil events of our times. The congressional inquiries did not raise up new national heroes or villains.

As the psychologist Ernest Becker has written, for the sensitive soul the impersonality of evil — the central fact of the contemporary world — is unbearable: it is, as he says, too much to believe. What has begun to seep into public consciousness is that the horror of the CIA — and in the end, all of intelligence, "theirs" or "ours" — is its impersonality, expressed in its bland, emotionless, mind-deadening prose. We know that its faceless agents are "out there" — though we do not know quite where even now — on missions that sacrifice persons to ideology, human relationships to "contacts" and "assets," hearts and minds to the gears of the propaganda machine. If the horror of CIA is its abstract impersonality, that is also its impenetrable advantage: for we cannot act against what is vastly beyond our power to see and believe.

Legal issues are abstract, and as the framing of new intelligence laws goes on through the rest of the year, most Americans will probably not be able to keep up with all the detail. The danger of partial, compromised reform is that it might create nothing more than a framework of loopholes — a set-up for CIA's vanishing acts. If Americans do not press for stringent intelligence laws in the emerging cold-war climate of Congress and country, even the news that reform has been done could turn out to be the biggest lie yet that my Uncle Sam told me. □

The Washington Star

Saturday, June 26, 1976

CIA and Newsmen: A Cleaner Break

NEW YORK — The National News Council said yesterday it had received assurances that the CIA will not hire reporters "affiliated in any way" with American news organizations, and that it was dropping those already on the payroll.

The news council said CIA officials, including director George Bush, told them in a three-hour meeting Thursday that the prohibition included news executives, stringers for American news organizations, and freelance writers "who could be interpreted in any manner as being journalists."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
28 June 1976

Bob Wiedrich

Soviet spies bore deep into U. S.

SOVIET BLOC spies have tried to recruit executive branch personnel of the American government as well as congressional staff members in Washington.

They have devoted special attention to Capitol Hill staffers with easy access to secret information, as well as code clerks, secretaries, and typists across whose desks intelligence vital to the Communist dream of world domination might flow.

They have hustled a wide cross section of other American citizens in the hope of developing undercover traitors or double agents and they have even attempted to influence the United States policy decisions by seeking to compromise informants at the highest levels.

THESE ARE SOME of the facts about Soviet spy operations in the United States by the two Russian intelligence agencies—the KGB and the GRU—that lie buried within the pages of the 12-volume report of the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Sen. Frank Church [D., Ida.]

They tick out a warning about the Soviet threat to the national security of this country with the subdued ferocity of a time bomb.

But they have been largely ignored by the media, possibly because they are buried between more controversial chapters bulging with critical appraisals of the American intelligence community.

In short, the Church committee did its job by inquiring into both American intelligence operations and the Soviet spy apparatus in North America. However, it was remiss in failing to dramatize the menace posed to our national security by the U.S.S.R. and its network of espionage agents here.

ACCORDING TO the Senate report, about a third of the 10,000 personnel currently assigned to Soviet installations abroad are actually members of the KGB, the Russian civilian spy organization, or the military espionage group known as the GRU.

Rigid Kremlin control of Soviet trade, business, and media agencies provides added cover for KGB and GRU agents.

And the FBI has identified scores of other Soviet spies planted behind the facade of the United Nations administrative structure and such UN auxiliaries as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Telecommunications Union.

Don't be content, however, to settle for that measure of the Soviet spy presence in the United States.

As the Church committee so accurately pointed out, many of the Russian intelligence officers are also responsible for many informants who carry out the wishes and objectives of their Soviet masters.

A MAIN OBJECTIVE of the Soviet spies is the recruiting of turncoats both in the United States and in those foreign

countries where there are U.S. installations of where American citizens live.

"Another objective is the recruitment and cultivation of 'agents of influence' or agents who can influence political events or decisions," the Senate report declared.

"Soviet intelligence also mounts technical operations against U.S. installations and personnel.

"Planting of microphones and installation of telephone taps is done on a massive scale in the U.S.S.R. and Soviet-oriented countries. The Soviets are more selective in the West, but they do conduct such operations.

"The primary targets are the offices and residences of U.S. ambassadors, senior foreign personnel, CIA officers, and defense attaches."

The committee reported there have been rare instances where the FBI has had reason to suspect that contacts between congressmen or high level executive branch officials with their Soviet counterparts might have involved the unauthorized [and presumably unwitting] disclosure of confidential information.

And, it reported, the FBI reported continued Soviet efforts "to penetrate" the American political system or devel-

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
29 June 1976

Bob Wiedrich

Soviet spies alert even at a funeral

UNLIKE THE AMERICAN intelligence services, Soviet spies know no restraints. Even the dead are not left unturned in the constant Communist quest for information.

Witness what occurred at the funeral of Richard Welch, the CIA station chief assassinated last December in Athens a month after his name had appeared on a list of alleged CIA operatives published in a Greek English language newspaper.

As his remains were being lowered into a grave at Arlington National Cemetery, two East European diplomats were discovered hiding among members of the press corps and snapping pictures of CIA officials present to pay their last respects to a murdered colleague.

The two diplomats, members of a host of Soviet satellite personnel diplomatically accredited to the United States but actually functioning as secret espionage agents for their Kremlin masters, were doing their thing—identifying CIA agents.

MEANWHILE, ON Capitol Hill, con-

gressional inquiries were taking the FBI and CIA to task for having done their thing while sometimes using techniques abhorrent in a free, democratic society.

THESE ARE FANCY words for treason by extortion or possible duplicity, but they nevertheless sound a macabre note for a nation that has just finished emasculating substantial segments of its own intelligence gathering apparatus.

Evidently, the FBI and CIA have enjoyed some success in positively identifying some of the KGB and GRU spies who pervade the American landscape. The so called "illegals" are another problem not so expeditiously countered.

The illegal is a highly trained espionage specialist who has been slipped into the U. S. with a phony identity. Some have been trained in scientific or technical fields to give them easy access to employment in sensitive areas.

Detection of such individuals presents a serious problem to the FBI because once they enter the United States with either true or fraudulent identification, they become lost among the swarms of legitimate emigres that have been arriving here in increasing numbers.

In 1972, there were fewer than 500 Soviet immigrants to this country. In 1974, the number rose to 4,000.

"Relatively undetected," the FBI told the Church committee, "they [the illegals] are able to maintain contact with the foreign control by means of secret writing, microdots, and open signals in conventional communications which are not susceptible to discovery through conventional investigative measures."

Hang around. We'll report more about this tomorrow.

gressional inquiries were taking the FBI and CIA to task for having done their thing while sometimes using techniques abhorrent in a free, democratic society.

The Welch incident, along with a wealth of other facts about the Soviet spy apparatus in the United States, is contained in the 12-volume report of the Senate Intelligence Committee that explored the reputed excesses of American intelligence last year. Chairman of the committee was Sen. Frank Church [D., Ida.]

The material is there to be read if one has the time and patience to find it.

Our only criticism is that the committee failed to give the data the same prominence afforded the indiscretions of the American intelligence community when it disclosed its findings last April.

Then the American people might have been provided a more balanced perspective from which to judge the actions of the FBI and CIA.

THE EAST EUROPEAN spies spotted at the Welch funeral were conducting the kind of operation that requires the U. S. to maintain a strong counterespionage

structure.

Officials say there are so many Soviet and Soviet bloc agents operating here they are literally tripping over one another while performing their duties behind a variety of facades.

The photographs were being taken for a very special purpose—the harassment of U. S. intelligence agents by publishing their names and pictures at a later date to end their usefulness as spies.

It is only one of scores of techniques employed by Communist agents here to disrupt American efforts to keep them from stealing U. S. secrets.

Because this is a free society practicing détente with a traditional enemy, our frontiers have been further opened to the encroachments of the two Soviet espionage organizations, the KGB and GRU, the civilian and military equivalents of our own services.

ACCORDING TO THE Church committee, the number of Soviets in this country has tripled since 1960 and still is increasing.

A counterintelligence specialist told the committee that the opening of deep water ports to Russian ships in 1972 gave Soviet intelligence "virtually complete

geographic access to the United States."

In 1974 alone, more than 200 Soviet ships with more than 13,000 officers and men aboard called at 40 deep water ports in the U. S. And each crew member was a potential spy with a practically unlimited license to steal vital information or to contact spies already in residence here.

Although the committee report avoids going into specific detail, it strongly hints at the measures to which American intelligence agencies must resort in attempting to protect a storehouse of U. S. information.

It is a secret and sophisticated war in which the stakes are high—the national security of this country.

And to achieve this goal, the intelligence services are constantly striving to penetrate the Soviet services with infiltrators as the best way of finding out if their own ranks have been penetrated.

"Conducting counterespionage with penetration can be like shooting fish in a barrel," a veteran CIA operative told committee investigators. "Conducting counterespionage without the act of penetration is like fighting in the dark."

IN COMBATING the Soviet intelligence services, the CIA and FBI have found the recruitment of a so-called agent-in-place as the most effective means of gaining an earloft within the KGB and GRU.

Stated simply, that means buying off or otherwise corrupting or compromising a highly placed and venal member of the opposition.

An operation like that can be extremely fruitful, the committee found, because the turncoat is already trusted within the Soviet service and "his access to documents may be unquestioned."

Jack E. Dunlap, who worked at and spied on the National Security Agency in the 1960s, is a well known example of a Soviet agent-in-place within the U. S. intelligence service," the committee reported. "His handler was a Soviet Air Force attache at the Soviet Embassy in Washington."

"Of course, a single penetration can be worth an intelligence gold mine, as were Kim Philby for the Soviet Union and Col. Oleg Penkovsky for the United States."

ry, Bulgaria, and East Germany — have Soviet intelligence advisers permanently stationed at their headquarters and the Russians have total access to all the data they develop.

"The CIA knows of operations against U.S. citizens and installations carried out by Eastern Europe intelligence services under Soviet guidance," the report declared.

Only the Romanians, Yugoslavians, and Albanians maintain a degree of independence from the Soviet intelligence services.

Using its own agents and those of European satellites is not the Kremlin's only bag, the committee reported.

The Foreign Tourists Department of the KGB works hard at recruiting as traitors the increasing numbers of American and other foreign tourists visiting the U.S.S.R. "through a large informant network" operating in hotels, restaurants, at campsites, and even service stations.

The GRU is no slouch either. Besides conducting electronic eavesdropping on the communications of strategic ground and air forces of the U.S. and its West European and Far Eastern allies, it also listens in on what the Red Chinese are saying.

And covert units stationed at Soviet embassies and trade missions intercept all manner of electronic communications, including coded messages and telephone calls.

Another of its duties is to train Africans, Arabs, Asians, and Latin Americans in the fine art of organizing underground nets and insurgent movements in their countries.

The training is carried out at camps and bases in the Soviet Union and, according to the report, the Central Committee of the Communist Party selects the individual students and political groups to be trained in subversion and terrorism.

BASED ON information compiled by American intelligence sources, the com-

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
30 June 1976

Bob Wiedrich

10,000 reasons why we need CIA

THE UNITED STATES remains the prime target of the Soviet intelligence services, détente notwithstanding.

The U.S.S.R. carries out espionage and covert action operations on a large scale against this nation because it considers it its "main enemy."

And, to achieve these objectives both in the U.S. and abroad, Russia utilizes not only the talents of its two spy agencies — the KGB and the GRU — but the intelligence and security services of its Iron Curtain satellites.

MAIN TARGETS of the Soviet assault on the national security of the United States are federal government officials, youth, journalist, and trade organizations, and the business, scientific, and political communities.

The Kremlin has upgraded Red China to almost the same status of the U.S. as an espionage target since Soviet-Sino relations soured.

However, the United States remains the priority target of the KGB and GRU, so Soviet spies view détente with mixed emotions.

For while it has afforded them greater opportunities to plumb the U.S. treasury of national security secrets, it has also enhanced the American capability as a counterintelligence threat by opening doors on both sides of the Atlantic.

The above are, among facts cited in the final report of the Senate Intelligence Committee chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), which explored

charges the American intelligence community had exceeded its mandate.

The committee also investigated the threat posed to the United States by the Soviet spy apparatus. It failed, however, to give equal emphasis to the depredations of the KGB and its sister services when it unleashed its criticism of the CIA and FBI last April.

Nonetheless, there are shocking conclusions to be found in the chapters of the Senate report dealing with the Soviet intrusion here if one will take the time to root them out.

"The espionage activities of the Soviet Union and other Communist nations directed against the United States are extensive and relentless," the committee found.

And, to carry out such operations against the U.S. and other Western countries, the Kremlin maintains a clandestine establishment estimated to total 10,000 personnel by the CIA.

In addition, it supplements this flying phalanx of professional spies with the resources of its East European stooges and is said by the CIA to effectively control Fidel Castro's Cuban intelligence service, the DGI.

"According to the CIA, counterparts of the KGB and GRU in Eastern European countries serve in varying degrees as extensions of the Soviet anti-United States intelligence collection and covert action operations," the Church committee noted.

It said eight of the Communist satellites — Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hunga-

TRIBUNE, Scranton
2 June 1976

Dallas Postscripts

mittee report drew a fascinating sketch of the organizational structure of the Russian espionage network directed at America.

The First Department of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, the civilian Soviet agency, is charged with U.S. and Canadian operations.

"Traditionally, the numerical designation 'First' has been assigned to the department that operates against the 'main enemy' of the U.S.S.R.," the committee reported.

"The United States has been that enemy since World War II; but the People's Republic of China has since been elevated almost to this status by current attitudes if not by formal organization."

WASHINGTON POST
7 JUL 1976

Friendly's Suit

MOSCOW — The Soviet weekly Literary Gazette, in its third attack in six weeks against three U.S. correspondents, said its editors were "quite happy" that Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek had filed a libel suit in the Moscow courts as a result of the charge that he worked for the CIA.

"The editorial board has at its disposal such materials . . . that we are certain will provide the basis not only for the public condemnation of the gentleman, but also for criminal punishment provided under Soviet law," it said. Friendly said it looked like an attempt to delay his suit.

Some students of American history, and various writers who researched and wrote on the subject, never accepted the general account of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, that it merely was the act of a disgruntled actor, John Wilkes Booth. Instead, theories were offered of conspiracies of one kind or another, including plots put together by Lincoln's political rivals and even people high in his administration.

Now, more than a decade after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, it seems likely that dissatisfaction will persist far into the future over the shooting down of the President in Dallas. Calls are heard for a reopening of the investigation, for reviews of the work of the Warren Commission and for deep examination of the conclusions that Lee Harvey Oswald alone conceived and carried out the assassination.


Pennsylvania's U.S. Sen. Richard Schweiker has become strongly identified in uncertainties and misgiving about the investigation of the assassination, particularly on the point of whether the Warren Commission was given all of the data it should have received from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Now a fiat accusation is made that the CIA and FBI did hide facts. A Senate committee that

investigated intelligence agencies said the commission did not consider the possibility that Fidel Castro arranged the assassination because the CIA didn't tell the panel about purported U.S. plans to kill Castro.

There are, of course, previous reports that the late J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, never told the commission that the FBI destroyed a threatening note Oswald sent to Dallas agents before the assassination and did not disclose 17 agents were disciplined for failing to recognize Oswald as a security threat. All this has led the Senate committee to note "the possibility exists" of a deliberate cover-up by senior officials of both the CIA and FBI.

Since the Warren Commission report was issued, there have been careful considerations of it and tests of many of its points, most of which have been resolved by the reviewers in favor of the commission. Even the Senate committee now accusing the CIA and FBI of not being fully candid says it has no evidence to overturn the finding of the conclusion that Oswald alone killed President Kennedy. It seems reasonable, however, that many will agree with Senator Schweiker that "there is no reason to have faith" in the Warren Commission's "picture of the Kennedy assassination." On that score there always has been doubt and it very well will linger.

WASHINGTON POST
20 JUNE 1976



NEW REPUBLIC
3 & 10 July 1976

Unlikely Assassin

Once again the "Cuban Connection" has been raised to explain the assassination of President John Kennedy. But this time it carries the imprimatur of the United States Senate. Senator Richard Schweiker released last week the report of the CIA subcommittee that investigated the killing of President Kennedy. The report is 106 pages long and deals with many of the current theories held by assassination buffs. I cannot deal with all of these, but want to shed some light on one raised by Schweiker.

Although the report comes to no clear conclusion, it does cite testimony, memos and material that raise the possibility that Castro might have ordered Kennedy's death in retaliation for CIA attempts on his life.

I do not want to defend or criticize the Schweiker report nor the various theories. I do want to put forth what Fidel Castro said about these theories. To my knowledge, in the last two years Castro has spoken five times about the assassination of President Kennedy—in July and September 1974, again in May and August 1975, and recently in April of this year when he proclaimed in a public speech in Havana that he had nothing to do with the killing of President Kennedy.

But his personal and private conversations during the 1974 and 1975 meetings are far more interesting and comprehensive, and reveal in greater detail his own thoughts and feelings, not only in the words but in the style and mood of the conversations.

In July 1974 Frank Mankiewicz and I spent four days with Castro, including 13 hours of formal interviewing in Castro's office, making a television documentary for CBS. During this interview and in private conversations, we talked with Castro about Kennedy and the assassination. We asked Castro point-blank whether John Kennedy was killed in retaliation for an attempt on his own life. Castro paused, reflected, puffed on his cigar and gave a clear and detailed answer—in part as follows: "I have not read this in any serious American publication . . . there are so many imponderables behind President Kennedy's assassination that it would be a good thing if this were known someday. I have heard that there are certain documents that will not be published until after 100 years and I ask myself why.

What secrets surround the Kennedy assassination that these papers cannot be published? . . . We have never believed in carrying out this type of activity of assassination of adversaries . . . and our own background proves it . . . we fought a war . . . we were not trying to kill Batista. It would have been easier to kill Batista than to have fought the Moncada. Why? Because we do not believe that the system is abolished by liquidating leaders, and it was the system that we opposed . . . it went against our political ideas to organize any type of personal attack against Kennedy . . . we understood what the implications were, and we were concerned about the possibility that an attempt would be made to blame Cuba for what had happened, but this was not what concerned us most. In reality, we were disgusted, because, although we were in conflict with Kennedy politically, we had nothing against him personally, and there was no reason to wish him personal harm."

In addition, Castro made another private point—one he repeated to Senator James Abourezk in August

1975. "We would have been foolish to harm Kennedy," Castro said, "because Kennedy was thinking of changing his policy toward Cuba. Kennedy's negotiators were in Cuba at the time of the assassination."

Castro was referring to a November 1963 visit by French journalist Jean Daniel who, before he traveled to Cuba, was personally asked by President Kennedy to transmit messages to Castro. Castro described the meeting to me: "As I was listening to everything Daniel was telling me about his conversation with Kennedy, the news broke over the radio that an attempt had been carried out against Kennedy's life. In reality, I tell you personally, and I think I speak for all my fellow revolutionaries—we all felt a reaction of pain, of great displeasure . . . it was really such a shame, such a tragic ending to Kennedy's life."

As indicated in his discussions of July 1974, Castro has been sensitive to the fact that some people might want to make a connection between the Kennedy assassination and Cuba as a result of activity in the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" and Oswald's application for a visa to Cuba. As Senator McGovern remembers the conversation, Castro "expressed dismay over a possible association and was frightened at the prospect of circumstantial evidence." In that conversation Castro said, "My God, if that [the visa application] had gone through, it would have looked terrible." In his conversation with me, Castro went into further detail: "It is very interesting that this man—Oswald—who was involved in the assassination, traveled to Mexico a few months prior to the assassination and applied for a permit at the Cuban Embassy to travel to Cuba, and he was not given the permit. We had no idea who he was. But I asked myself why would a man who committed such an act try to come here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if someone did not wish to involve Cuba in this, because I'm under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States, and that it was all a result of conspiracy."

"What I can say is that he asked permission to travel to Cuba. Now, imagine that by coincidence he had been granted this permit, that he had visited Cuba for a few days, then returned to the United States and killed Kennedy. That would have been material for provocation . . ." In a later conversation with Saul Landau, Castro added, "Luckily the bureaucratic process prevailed and our consular officer routinely denied Oswald's visa. We had never heard of him."

A look at the historical context seems to indicate that what Castro said has the ring of truth. Why would Castro kill Kennedy at the very moment that Kennedy had clearly indicated to personal messengers in Cuba on November 22 that the US wanted to start a new dialogue? At no time under Castro's rule has Cuba been accused of assassinating or plotting to assassinate its adversaries. During the fighting in the mountains there was never a reported Castro attempt on Batista's life. And lastly, why would a small country like Cuba attempt the assassination of the President of the United States, when discovery and proof of that act would have meant certain and clear military action and probably destruction of Castro's Cuba?

Kirby Jones

Kirby Jones is a free-lance writer in Washington.

THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, July 8, 1976 A 25

Anti-Spy Magazine Staff Split

By Cynthia Kadonaga
Washington Post Staff Writer

Political and personal bickering has split the staff of Counter-Spy, a magazine the Central Intelligence Agency partially blamed for the murder of an Athens agency official last December.

Although the magazine's office is closed and four of its seven staff members have resigned, those who remain said the magazine will continue to be published by a new staff.

The magazine gained national attention after former CIA Director William E. Colby said it contributed to the assassination of Athens station chief Richard S. Welch. Counter-Spy had listed Welch as a CIA official in its winter issue, and the information later was published in an English-language Athens newspaper.

Those who reject Colby's accusation point out that Welch lived in an Athens house traditionally reserved for the top CIA official. He was not operating under cover.

According to Harvey Kahn, a former Counter-Spy staff member, the split resulted partly from differences over how the staff should be organized.

"Some people, like me, believed that a collective was still viable," he said in a phone conversation. "But other people wanted to abandon the collective process and go into a more traditional, less democratic organization. Instead of going through a power struggle, we decided to quit."

Both current and former members said that personality clashes also contributed to the split. One member reportedly accused other members of being police agents, anticommunists, sexists and liberals.

Some former members gave other reasons for leaving, but Julie Brooks, who has not resigned, said in an interview that political and personal disagreements had been "prevalent" before the break.

Ellen Ray, a current member, said in a phone conversation that she is "positive about the reorganization."

Kahn said that although he hoped the magazine would continue, he thought the new staff probably

WASHINGTON STAR
25 JUNE 1976

Charles Bartlett

The Schweiker disclosures

The fresh disclosures on President Kennedy's assassination by Sen. Richard Schweiker, R-Pa., raise intriguing questions but they do not, as he suggests, vitiate the findings of the Warren Commission.

Schweiker's claim that his probings leave the nation with no further cause to have faith in the Warren Commission is an exaggeration. The senator has, it is true, found a gap in the commission's inquiry and he has somewhat laboriously woven a tapestry of assorted facts that point to Fidel Castro as the man behind Lee Harvey Oswald.

Kennedy assassination buffs will be stimulated to new frenzies by Schweiker's discovery that the commission did not prod the CIA or the FBI into extensive inquiries on the Cuban angle. There was more concern with Oswald's links to Russia than with his friendliness toward Castro. One member, former Sen. John Sherman Cooper, is quoted as saying that he doesn't recall any deep discussions of the Castro angle.

It is clearer now than it was then, even to members of the commission, that Castro had some cause to consider retaliatory measures against the American President. Richard Helms, then CIA director of operations, could have made the situation clearer by informing the commission that the agency had taken serious

steps, with presidential backing, to bump off Castro. But as Helms testified later, no one asked him about it and the agency had lots of license in those days to keep its secrets to itself.

But President Kennedy had not hidden his anxiety to see Castro out of the way. In his Miami speech four days before his death, he talked of Castro's small band of conspirators as the only obstacle to good Cuban-American relations. "Once this barrier is removed," he declared, "we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people." These words could have prompted the commission to consider Castro's reaction.

However, Schweiker seems to be stretching his case when he links the assassination to the CIA negotiations with AMLASH, a high Cuban official who was entreating U.S. support for a coup d'etat. Agency officials refused to give AMLASH the weapons he wanted or to have any part of his assassination plans until almost the same hour the President was shot. This sad irony makes it hard to believe that Dallas was a retaliation for the AMLASH dealings.

Similarly, Schweiker's case gains interest but little added weight from his fascinating description of J. Edgar Hoover's dog-in-the-manger dealings with the Warren Commission. Hoover's inclination to put the

FBI's reputation ahead of its duty to work closely with the commission does not seem as surprising now as it might have in 1964. The country has learned a lot about the kinds of games Hoover played.

But the FBI and CIA spared no efforts to establish the range of Oswald's contacts, and nothing in the Schweiker findings ties him any closer to Cuban intelligence. He brawled on the street and talked on the radio in behalf of Castro in New Orleans. He did not hide from his wife his frustrated attempt to reach Havana. This is not the behavior pattern of a man tapped for a secret mission.

Schweiker has turned up some question marks. It would be interesting to learn more about the two men who slipped into Mexico and flew to Cuba soon after the assassination. Perhaps more scrutiny should be given to Castro's unusual interview with an American reporter three months before the assassination. He warned then that American leaders would be in danger if they assisted any attempt to do away with Cuban leaders.

But the grim episode should not be stirred into another formal investigation unless there is new information which flatly refutes the conclusions by the Warren Commission. The Schweiker disclosures do not justify another inquiry.

THE WASHINGTON STAR
26 June 1976

A Lawsuit in Moscow

An American newsmagazine correspondent has taken on a Soviet newsmagazine which called him a CIA agent. In a gutsy move believed to be the first of its kind, Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek filed suit in Moscow demanding that the Soviet weekly Literaturnya Gazeta retract the charge. A doubtless surprised judge accepted the complaint and set a hearing date for next Friday. "I can't let a smear like that stand," Friendly explained to a correspondent for The New York Times, which also had one of its men in Moscow identified as a CIA spook. An Associated Press correspondent also made the Gazeta's list, and all of them vigorously denied any CIA association. The thinking among Kremlinologists is that the attack by the official Soviet magazine was either: A) retaliation for recent charges in the American press that some Russian journalists here are KGB agents, or B) a warning to Soviet citizens to keep shy of American correspondents.

VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Norfolk
25 June 1976

The Cuban Connection

The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy lends official substance to suspicions that are widespread.

The 106-page report says that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation withheld information material to the Warren Commission's investigation of the killing of President Kennedy in Dallas in 1963. Both the CIA and the FBI gave a greater priority to bureaucratic face-saving than to the pursuit of the truth.

Both the CIA and the FBI were concerned with keeping the Warren Commission's investigation focused narrowly on Lee Harvey Oswald (who was killed by Jack Ruby in the Dallas jail, a murder millions saw on television) and closing the case quickly.

Just four days after the assassination, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach sent a memo to the White House saying:

"The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial."

Furthermore, the Attorney General said that speculation about the motives of Oswald "ought to be cut off,

and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists."

Specifically, the report says that CIA Director Allen W. Dulles never told the Warren Commission of the CIA's involvement in assassination plots against Cuba's Fidel Castro. It details extensively the CIA's scheming to assassinate the Cuban Premier and notes the fears, ignored at higher levels in Washington, "that Castro would retaliate in some way."

Also the report says that Director J. Edgar Hoover was fearful that the FBI might be criticized for failing to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald thoroughly. Mr. Hoover viewed the Warren Commission as an adversary body, the report says, and concealed from its members the disciplinary action he took against 17 FBI personnel in the investigation's mishandling. (Some were not disciplined until the Warren Commission's work was completed in 1964.)

In sum, the Warren Commission's finding that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in killing President Kennedy was reached upon the basis of incomplete information and facts pertinent to the probe were kept secret. Second-

guessing the Warren Report has become a national pastime virtually.

The Senate committee stops short of suggesting that Oswald was part of a plot. The existing evidence is not "sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy," the report says.

Nevertheless, it notes that important leads were not pursued at the time and it hints strongly that there was a Cuban connection that might be corroborated by a new probe.

It may not be possible to establish the truth at this time. But the Warren Commission's findings are disbelieved widely and may be completely discredited by the Senate Select Committee's report. After he left the White House President Lyndon Johnson said that he thought President Kennedy was the victim of a Cuban plot. Senator Richard Schweiker, the Pennsylvania Republican who has been demanding that the investigation be reopened, says that there are "important new leads" to be pursued, some still secret. Senators Frank Church (D-Idaho), the chairman of the Select Committee, and Gary Hart (D-Colo.), who prepared the report with Senator Schweiker, wants a new probe too. Nothing less will be acceptable to a cynical public.

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
27 June 1976

A new JFK probe is justified

Speaking at a news conference on the release of the fifth and final report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Sen. Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania accused the CIA and the FBI of a "cover-up" and declared that "there is no longer any reason to have faith" in the Warren Commission's picture of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

We think Sen. Schweiker overstates the case.

The Warren Commission, it will be recalled, had concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, had killed President Kennedy. The Senate Select Committee report, in which Sen. Schweiker played an important role, concludes that there is no evidence "sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy."

This is not to say, though, that there is nothing to justify a new investigation of the tragedy, called for by Sen. Schweiker. For there is evi-

dence, as the Senate intelligence panel reports, that the CIA and the FBI not only failed to investigate thoroughly but did in fact cover up crucial information from the investigation and the Warren Commission.

The CIA, it is now known, was at the time of the assassination and in the months before actively working on plans to do away with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, and Castro knew quite a bit about what the CIA was up to. Yet the late Allen W. Dulles, CIA director, though himself a member of the Warren Commission, did not inform his fellow members of the CIA plots. And, as the committee report declares, senior CIA officials "directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts."

As for the FBI, the late Director J. Edgar Hoover withheld vital information, including the fact that Oswald

had sent a threatening note to the FBI's Dallas office—and that someone in that office destroyed the note two hours after Kennedy was killed. As the committee report put it, "The FBI conducted its investigation in an atmosphere of concern that it would be criticized and its reputation tarnished."

We doubt that a new investigation would change the central findings of the Warren Commission. We doubt that any investigation will satisfy the assassination buffs who are convinced that the lack of evidence is itself evidence of a conspiracy.

A new investigation might, however, satisfy reasonable citizens that all that can be done is being done to tie up the loose ends and fix the responsibility for the failure of U. S. investigating agencies to follow through on the most important job they ever had.

BULLETIN, Providence
11 June 1976

Has the CIA done its job?

Yet another report on the Central Intelligence Agency has issued forth from the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and in some respects this one goes more to the heart of the whole matter than any of its predecessors.

This study, a history of the CIA and its function, deals not with dramatic wrongdoing or secret weapons but with the basic question: how well has the agency done its principal job? If this job is to provide presidents with top-notch data on what is happening around the world, the agency (says this account) has fallen short.

Because of the anti-Communist climate that prevailed when the CIA was formed, the study says, the agency focused much of its effort on combating Soviet influence. This led naturally to a concentration on covert operations, says the report; intelligence gathering and analysis were given less attention than they deserved.

Moreover, the agency has tended to devote much time to preparing a daily intelligence summary while its much more important long-term assessments (known as national intelligence estimates) often have gone unread by presidents. Top-ranking policymakers, in short, too often have not paid close scrutiny to the intelligence data that has been offered.

purposes and pursuits. The Senate has achieved a responsible balance between the need for intelligence activity, and the need for congressional oversight and restraint.

But while the "other body" has proved itself capable of action, we in the House are in woeful disarray. Our attempts at investigating the intelligence agencies have been marred by wholesale leaks and internecine squabbles. This unhappy fact was all too often noted by our Senate colleagues when the possibility of a joint House-Senate intelligence committee was under consideration. The fact that the Senate decided so decisively to go it alone is, regrettably, largely of our own doing.

What the Senate has produced is of great merit, but it is too little by half. The mechanics of the legislative and budgetary process cry for a parallel committee in the House of Representatives. With responsibility for the intelligence community passing through the prism of several committees in the House, no single committee can make a judgment on the intelligence budget as a single entity. Spending bills will continue to originate in the House, only to be reviewed by a single armed committee in the Senate. That committee

For all its dry, social-science phraseology, this most recent appraisal of the CIA may be the most alarming. For its message is that the intelligence function has been distorted by bureaucratic infighting and that even when the CIA does its own job well, men at the top are not inclined to pay close attention. "Senior policymakers must actively utilize the intelligence capabilities at their disposal," says the study: the Director of Central Intelligence "must be constantly informed, must press for access, must vigorously sell his product and must anticipate future demands."

This is a sound formula as far as it goes; but it provides no remedy for the situation in which a President simply ignores what the CIA tries to tell him. As Former CIA Director William E. Colby recently observed, somewhat ruefully, you can provide the President with plenty of data, "but you can't rub his nose in it."

Despite the spotlight on the agency's doings in the past 18 months, little has been done toward a major redirection. The Senate now has a so-called "oversight" committee, but the House refused even this small step.

All the new laws, all the internal housecleaning, all the congressional "oversight" — none of this by itself will restore the CIA to effective performance of its major mission. The agency needs to keep its policy analysis function at the forefront of its concern, and its director needs to make every effort to see that CIA's long-term estimates get the President's attention.

will, in resolving legislative differences with the House, go to conference with several different House committees. Never has the need for a new House committee on intelligence been more obvious. Yet 22 intelligence-oversight bills have been introduced in the House and none has reached the floor.

The time for us to act in the House of Representatives is now. We should establish a committee of the House that would have similar responsibilities and powers to the one recently set up by the Senate. Most importantly, it should be mandated to work closely with the Senate in the delicate area of its responsibilities. Perhaps it is not vain to hope that as memories of the false starts and leaks of the past year begin to fade and the new House committee proves it can work responsibly in the national interest, the ultimate goal can be achieved: a joint congressional committee on intelligence patterned along the line of the Joint Energy Committee which has worked so well.

Meanwhile, if we can keep our eyes on the horizon of reform, perhaps what we one day will find is not a false vision or a handful of dust but the first sign of our willingness to change our own procedures for the common good.

WASHINGTON POST
15 JUN 1976

William S. Cohen

Toward Intelligence Oversight

This is not a happy hour in Washington. The hot breath of scandal hangs like summer smog over Congress. Charges of one member's private profit from his public office and another's personal gratification at public expense have electrified the House Ethics Committee into life, and this is as it should be; congressional abuse of power and public funds is a serious matter that cannot be permitted to go unchecked.

But an additional tragedy of the current controversy is that the balance of this session is likely to be spent attacking or defending congressional honor

The writer is a Republican representative from Maine.

while our larger accomplishments are obscured and our major tasks go unfinished. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the matter of congressional oversight of our hydra-headed intelligence community.

One accomplishment which should not go unnoticed was the Senate's overwhelming vote to establish a strong new oversight committee; this was no small accomplishment because it came over the strong opposition of committee chairmen who supposedly had been scrutinizing the intelligence agencies over the years. The Senate leadership fashioned a compromise that gained the grudging support of a good many conservatives as well as most Senate moderates and liberals. It is by no means perfect in its structure or composition. Nonetheless, the new Senate committee is not designed to be a paper tiger, toothless and eager to purr contentedly in the cozy executive lap.

The committee has exclusive jurisdiction over the CIA, formerly the sole preserve of the Armed Services Committee. It will share authority with Armed Services over the huge defense intelligence establishment, including DIA and the National Security Agency. Similarly it will be able to scrutinize the intelligence activities of the FBI—a major source of past abuses. It will, in addition, share jurisdiction over the State Department's small but important Bureau of Intelligence and Research with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

But the new Committee's most powerful tool will lie not simply in its power to look over the agencies' shoulders, but rather in its power of the purse. The new committee has the power to authorize appropriations of funds for the intelligence agencies, a power that it shares with other committees for all but the CIA. The power to authorize carries with it the power and the obligation to know the agencies'

TIMES, Chattanooga
26 June 1976

Unintelligent Intelligence

The truest statement in the Senate Intelligence Committee's final report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy is contained in its concluding paragraph.

Its work, the committee acknowledged, "undoubtedly will stir controversy . . . Conspiracy theories and theorists abound and the public remains unsatisfied. Regrettably, this report will not put the matter to rest. . ."

Not since the shots were fired on that sunny November afternoon in Dallas, ending the life of the young President, and not even after high level Warren Commission report was issued months later after an exhaustive investigation, has there been consensual agreement in this country on the events leading up to and including the tragic occurrence.

The Warren Commission came to the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald, a misfit with a background of Communist and Cuban anti-American associations, acted alone in the assassination.

The Senate committee does not refute that finding. Instead, it emphasizes "it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion there was a conspiracy. . ."

Yet it compiled instance after instance of failures within the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to follow up on obvious leads involving Oswald during their own probes of the crime, and to inform the Warren Commission of the existence of such in-

formation as they possessed about the assumed killer who himself was shot to death two days later.

This leads to the damning conclusion, based on evidence gathered by the committee, that the process by which the intelligence agencies arrived at the reports they gave the Warren Commission was impeached by their own actions or inactions. Their inquiries were "deficient and . . . facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided" the commission, the committee report said.

"Concern with public reputation, problems of coordination between agencies, possible bureaucratic failure add embarrassment, and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge of sensitive operations may have contributed to these shortcomings," it found.

What seems most probable at this point is that neither the committee's report nor any other that may follow is likely to pin down without the shadow of a doubt every detail that lay behind the Kennedy assassination. The good, if any, in this continued raking over old coals will be changes in programs and methods — for the better, we hope — of the nation's intelligence agencies. Since this can be accomplished on the basis of what already is known and what already has begun, we believe the time has come to cease lacerating old wounds and revitalizing old doubts.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUL 1976

SUIT IS WELCOMED BY SOVIET WEEKLY

MOSCOW, July 6 (Reuters)—

The editors of a Soviet weekly newspaper said today that they were "quite happy" that an American correspondent here had filed a libel suit over its allegation that he worked for the Central Intelligence Agency.

For the third time in six weeks, the weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta attacked the journalist, Alfred Friendly of Newsweek magazine, and two of his colleagues, Christopher Wren of The New York Times and George Krimsky of The Associated Press.

The latest article, made available in advance of publication tomorrow, referred directly to Mr. Friendly's action.

"We are quite happy with this abrupt step because the about the work of the Newsweek correspondent which, we are certain, will provide a basis

not only for the public condemnation of that gentleman, but also for the criminal punishment envisaged by Soviet law," it said.

THE WASHINGTONIAN
July 1976

CAPITAL COMMENT

HOTLINE

Spookwatch: David Phillips, a clandestine operative for the CIA for almost 25 years, chiefly in Latin America, is finishing the most ringing rebuttal yet to agency critics: His book, *The Night Watchman*, is on Athenaeum's fall list, and editor Chuck Korn says, "It's tough, and Dave comes down hard on Phillip Agee and the like." Agee worked under Phillips, and Agee's *CIA Diary*, published in 1975, accused the agency of broad misconduct in Latin nations. Phillips left the agency last year to form the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, intended as a counterforce to CIA critics. He lives in suburban Potomac.

WASHINGTON POST
8 JUL 1976

N.Y. Bar Seeking Intelligence Probe

NEW YORK, July (UPI)—The Civil Rights Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York today released a report urging appointment of a temporary special prosecutor to investigate possible crimes committed by employees of federal intelligence agencies.

At a news conference at the bar's headquarters, George M. Hasen, chairman of the committee, said there was evidence that, over a long period of time, senior officials in the CIA and FBI were involved in activities which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens.

Among these, he said, were the use of wiretaps and infiltration of such organizations of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

GENERALWASHINGTON POST
8 JUL 1976*George F. Will***Terrorists, Bullies and Self-Respect**

Israel has given the western world remedial instruction in how to deal with bullies. The Canadian government, as though to the manner born, has been acting the bully.

Israel responded with lethal boldness to the kidnapping of Jews by Palestinian terrorists. By killing the terrorists in the sanctuary provided by Uganda's President Idi Amin, Israel demonstrated that there are no safe havens for terrorists.

Communist China, a good customer for Canadian wheat, did not want Canada even to admit athletes from Taiwan. The government of Prime Minister Trudeau has met Peking halfway. Canada, which is the "host country" for the Olympics, has suddenly decided that Taiwan's athletes will not be allowed to compete under the name "Republic of China," and will not be allowed to fly their national flag or play their national anthem. When Canada was vying with Los Angeles for possession of the 1976 Olympics, Canada promised that it would obey Olympic rules, which forbid such political discrimination. Canada was asked, and gave specific assurances about, accepting the Republic of China, the name recognized by the International Olympic Committee.

Uganda's Amin having taken no trouble to conceal the fact (indeed, having been clever to the point of precocity at advertising the fact), it is no secret that he is not a statesman of advanced design. And it is unlikely that he has a capacity for mordant satire. So although he is a large man with a large sense of

mirth, it is unlikely that he was joshing when he said, plaintively, of the Israeli rescue attack on his airport: "I did all I could to help Israel, and Israel replied by doing me harm."

Actually Amin may have pioneered a new dimension in lawlessness by casting Uganda, a sovereign state, in the role of collaborator in, and perhaps instigator of, an act of international terrorism. According to the freed hostages, Amin embraced the leader of the hijacking gang; some terrorists were waiting to join the hijackers in Uganda; Amin's soldiers helped the terrorists guard the hostages, and even gave the terrorists weapons.

United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has weighed in with one of his predictably "even-handed" homilies deploring terrorism and those who resist it. He criticizes Israel for violating Uganda's sovereignty. It is, perhaps, too much to hope that Amin will take the matter to the U.N. But anything that hastens the decomposition of the U.N. is welcome, and the same is true of the Olympics. The Olympics are to sport what the U.N. is to government: a parody and, increasingly, a plaything of the world's lopsided majority of dictatorships.

The Canadian government, having shown its mettle by dealing sternly with Taiwan's 51 athletes, offered as an "explanation" the fact that Canada recognizes Communist China. Such comportment is becoming Trudeau's trademark. He chose to visit Cuba during Cuba's expedition to Angola, and missed no chance to abase himself before Cas-

tro, praising the dictator for his "intense rapport with the Cuban people."

The International Olympic Committee has protested Canada's decision. But it hastened to add that, although it deplors the injection of politics into the Olympics, it will not contemplate withdrawing its sanction of the Montreal games. That would be a jerk on the leash that Canada would understand.

In response to Canada's decision, the U.S. Olympic Committee made simpering sounds, threatening to withdraw from the games if the IOC withdrew its sanction of the games. But the IOC said that it has never "even suggested privately it would take such action."

In 1980 the "host country" will be the Soviet Union, which undoubtedly will edit the list of competitors. Will it ban Israel? Will it invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to send a team? Will this draw more than unhappy words from the U.S.? Such words were the only U.S. response when the IOC, at Moscow's behest, banned Radio Free Europe from covering the winter Olympics in February.

Speaking to his nation about the Nazis, Churchill growled: "What kind of people do they think we are?" It is easy to imagine what kind of people the Peking government thinks the Ottawa politicians are.

Israelis may be the only people in the West who still understand that it is dangerous to be hated but doubly dangerous to be despised. If Israel's policy of prickly self-respect is contagious, people who say that the West will preserve Israel may have things backward.

WASHINGTON POST
8 JUL 1976**Israeli Raid
Stirs Dispute
On Hijacking**

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

A major dispute over world law's impotence in coping with hijacking is developing over the Israeli commando raid into Uganda. Ford administration officials said yesterday.

The United States is in a dilemma over exactly what legal tack it will take in the upcoming U.N. Security Council debate, American officials acknowledged.

President Ford's decision Sunday to send a quick message of congratulations to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for the spectacular

rescue of hostages held in Uganda is arousing second thoughts among some administration officials because of its international legal and political implications, it was learned.

This does not mean that American officials are any less delighted in retrospect by the success of the dramatic Israeli rescue.

But in several departments of government, officials admit they are debating whether the United States' official, public action may rebound against it in the long run, especially in Africa.

The State Department overwhelmingly does not share these second thoughts, one administration source said yesterday. The President's message was sent with a recommendation by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and was reportedly

written in the State Department.

Inside the State Department, however, as in other agencies, legal experts are now researching the law to determine just how the United States will proceed in the upcoming Security Council debate now postponed to Friday, a spokesman said.

U.S. officials have two kinds of questions to decide, they acknowledge. One is whether a precedent has been set for use of major force to counter an aerial hijacking or other act of terrorism. Another narrower question for the United States is whether its law was violated by Israel's use of American-built military C-130 aircraft for the rescue mission.

Technically, the latter question is somewhat similar to the dispute over

whether Turkey violated U.S. law by using American weapons for its invasion of Cyprus in 1974. That controversy brought a congressional cutoff of U.S. arms to Turkey, a dispute still not fully untangled.

There is virtually no likelihood of a repetition of that reprisal action in the case of Israel, in any event. The Israeli raid has been hailed by most Americans, including the presidential candidates.

The larger question of international action against hijacking or terrorism, however, now looms with greater passion than ever.

In the process, the United States' own related unilateral actions are bound to be recalled. They include the Mayaguez incident of May, 1975, when the United States sent its planes, troops, and ships to recover a ship's crew seized by Cambodia,

and the November, 1970, unsuccessful U.S. commando raid at Sontay, in North Vietnam, which failed in an attempt to rescue American prisoners of the Vietnam war.

In explaining the U.S. view on Israel's latest action, Kissinger said in Chicago on Tuesday, and a spokesman yesterday repeated that:

"Clearly, the [Israeli] attack on an airport [Entebbe Airport, in Uganda] is an unprecedented act. But, equally, the hijacking of airliners, the holding of a hundred innocent people for ransom in a situation where the host government, at a

minimum, proved impotent to enforce any accepted international law, indicates that we face here a new international problem."

"We believe," Kissinger said, "that it is essential that some international arrangement be made to deal with terrorists, because it cannot be tolerated that innocent people become the playthings of international thugs."

While reiterating that position yesterday, State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth declined to say at this time what the American response is to the charge by Ugandan President Idi Amin that the Israeli raid was international

"aggression."

Funseth said, "Our position on these issues will be made known during the Security Council debate." State Department lawyers, he said, are still "working out our position" on this matter and on Israel's use of American C-130s.

Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, Funseth said, weapons supplied by the United States are to be used only "for internal security, legitimate self-defense, and to permit the recipient to participate in regional collective [defense] arrangements and measures consistent with the U.N. Charter."

In January, 1969, French

President Charles de Gaulle, furious over Israel's use of French aircraft in a damaging raid on the Beirut Airport in Lebanon, put a total embargo on French arm sales to Israel. As a result, Israel became almost totally dependent on U.S. weapons.

The real rebound potential that now troubles some administration strategists is this: although many Africans, as most American officials, may welcome the blow to erratic Ugandan President Amin, some U.S. experts are troubled that in the long run many African blacks nevertheless will conclude that the white nations are "pushing them around."

WASHINGTON POST

30 JUN 1976

The U.S.-Mexico Drug War Feud

By Marlise Simons
Special to The Washington Post

MEXICO CITY—The United States and Mexico are doing their best to avert—or at least postpone until after their presidential elections—a major public quarrel over the sensitive issue of narcotics.

Just last month, tempers were running so high that a top Mexican narcotics official indicated that several U.S. agents were about to be expelled from Mexico for "insolent and inept behavior" and for "acting against our will and behind our backs."

This dispute was smoothed over at a high-level meeting in Washington two weeks ago, when the attorneys general of the two countries pledged cooperation and President Ford received the Mexican delegation at the White House.

Although both sides now say publicly that their differences are patched up, sources close to the Mexican anti-drug drive fear that serious problems still remain and that new disagreements are almost certain to arise.

"There is a lot of pride and rivalry on both sides of the border," according to one of these sources.

An official in the Mexican attorney general's office asked, "How can we allow American agents to act as police here, to arrest Mexicans, to carry arms when they shouldn't, to make reconnaissance flights on their own and to do undercover work behind our backs?"

"It's rather like the situation in France five years ago when there was a lot of friction between the French and American agents about such things."

In public, American and Mexican officials stress the successes of their six-year-old joint campaign against the narcotics traffic from Mexico to the United States.

But in practice, effective cooperation is increasingly hampered by growing resentment and rivalry between the narcotics agents of the two countries.

In exchange for the public embraces in Washington earlier this month, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reportedly appeased the Mexican delegation with private assurances that controversial U.S. agents threatened with expulsion would be replaced shortly. There were also reportedly pledges of new U.S. equipment for the Mexican drug agents.

In turn, Mexican federal authorities dropped charges against an American drug agency "informant" being held for carrying out "illegal police activities" in Guadalajara. Instead, the man, Louis Eisner, was deported to the United States two weeks ago.

According to a police report, Eisner had held at gunpoint two Mexicans he believed were related to drug traffic and planned to hand them over to the authorities. The two Mexicans, according to the report, succeeded in getting the attention of passing patrolmen, who detained Eisner.

The report says Eisner, who called himself a doctor, confessed that he had been doing undercover work in the Guadalajara area for almost a year. For that purpose, the report says, he maintained contact with Joseph Gonzalez, the district director in Guadalajara for the U.S. drug agency.

Ironically, much of the growing rancor stems from the reorganization and new efficiency of the latest Mexican anti-drug drive, which was given strong political priority here last fall.

Under pressure from the U.S. government and with technical assistance from DEA, Mexico launched a campaign to destroy thousands of poppy fields by spraying them from helicopters with herbicides.

The Mexican attorney general's office, trained an entirely new and "clean" narcotics squad, and once into the campaign it set off tremors among federal police ranks by firing six commanders, 13 agents and three federal attorneys for "loss of confidence."

As the new Mexican campaign organizers grew more confident and effective, they began to demand more control over the DEA activities on their territory.

Officially, close to 30 DEA men are here to do liaison work with their Mexican counterparts. They are permitted to carry guns only when actually operating with Mexican agents.

Entrapment of drug-sellers, not against the law in the United States, is forbidden by Mexican law, which calls it provocation of crime. Mexican officials say U.S. agents break the law here when they buy drugs to catch the sellers.

In public, no Mexican official could admit to activities of U.S. agents on Mexican soil for fear of an outburst of nationalist indignation that could jeopardize the entire campaign. In private, though, Mexican agents are strongly irritated at their American colleagues.

In the border area, Mexi-

can legal authorities complained, U.S.-based agents have crossed the frontier and carried out raids on Mexican territory without permission from Mexico City.

In addition, Mexico City has had strong suspicions that some of the U.S. technicians contracted to service the U.S.-donated helicopters were CIA agents. Two such technicians, they said, recently worked in the Guerrero state for several months and often went out on routine flights with Mexicans over the Sierra Madre mountains behind Acapulco. These mountains have stirred a great deal of interest as the site of marijuana and poppy fields and of Mexico's insurgent peasants and rural guerrillas.

"We've got nothing to hide in our campaign," said a high anti-drug official here, "but if the CIA is snooping and spying on us, that is going too far."

[An official of the State Department, which administers the helicopter contracts under the Foreign Assistance Act, said there was "no possibility" that CIA personnel had been involved.]

On another point of friction, Mexicans consider highly exaggerated the DEA allegation that 90 per cent of U.S. heroin now comes from Mexico. Yet, the Mexicans say, the DEA has not shared its information on the type and size of U.S. seizures for Mexican evaluation.

"The Americans have deliberately withheld information from us, while in Mexico they get to know and do what they want," said an in-

telligence analyst in the attorney general's office.

After U.S. press attacks on Mexican corruption and inefficiency, Mexicans are responding.

"Drugs is dirty business," said a Mexican narcotics agent recently, "and there is plenty of dirty business among the American agents here also." The "dirty business" ranged from "simple things like two American naves being arrested for drunkenness in Acapulco to serious cases of fraud." He refused to disclose any details about fraud, and said the incidents had always been covered up "among colleagues."

Although U.S. officials say the results of such anti-drug programs as the assault on the poppy fields are not yet visible through a

shortage on the American market, drug prices here are up.

In Guerrero state, for example, around Acapulco, an ounce of crude opium that would fetch \$98 last fall was up to \$242 in March, halfway through the campaign, and now costs \$385.

Last year an ounce of marijuana was going for \$1.65 in the mountains behind Acapulco; this month the price is up to \$5.50.

Now that the first campaign is over, Mexico has published the balance sheet for the first six months:

- 18,500 acres of poppy fields and more than 17,000 acres of marijuana fields destroyed.

- 1,480 pounds of crude opium, 473 pounds of heroin and 330 pounds of cocaine seized.

- 2,559 persons, including 275 foreigners—some of them Americans—arrested.

More than 30 civilians related to drug traffic were killed in the six months, some by police and others in feuds between rival bands, while traffickers shot and killed four Mexican agents.

Last month three agents died when their reconnaissance plane crashed in the mist. Two of the three were American DEA agents, pilot James T. Lunn and agent Ralph N. Shaw.

Now that both sides have made up and the Mexican drug authorities have had a White House reception, officials here refuse to comment further on the differences with the Americans. DEA agents in Mexico are not available for discussions either.

Nevertheless, the anti-drug drive is moving onto slippery ground as a result of the recent squabbles. For several months, officials here have said they are tired of Mexico being blamed for U.S. inability to solve its drug problems at home.

"Americans always need a scapegoat for their drug disasters. First it was the Turks and the French, now it's the Mexicans," a high-ranking narcotics agent said.

A Mexican diplomat recently said, "There is a strong sense in the government that Mexico has done more than its share. We have been willing to use herbicides Americans don't use. We've spent twice as much money and lost more men."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1976

American Power and Foreign Policy

By Joseph S. Nye Jr.

The great debate on foreign policy this election year has focused almost entirely on the Soviet-American military balance. Yet Americans will increasingly face a new type of foreign policy issue: National security can be endangered by events outside the traditional military sphere.

A melting of the Arctic ice cap because of a three-degree rise in the earth's temperature, depletion of the earth's ozone layer, theft of plutonium by terrorist groups, ill-fated experiments with weather modification, a prolonged world population explosion—all these could threaten our future as seriously as many occurrences that could arise in the traditional political-military realm.

Moreover, the debate over the alleged decline of American military power tells us little about our future ability to control these new issues.

Power has always been an elusive concept in international affairs. Now the nature of the resources that produce power capabilities has become more complex, and the international power hierarchy more difficult to determine. When a good infantry was the crucial power resource, European statesmen could calibrate the classical balance of power by counting the populations of conquered and transferred territories. The industrial revolution complicated such calculations, and nuclear weapons, as a power resource too costly to use except in an extreme situation, further weakened the relationship between power measured in military resources and power in the sense of control over the outcome of events.

This is not to say that military force has become obsolete. Quite the contrary. Military deterrence will remain a central concern of our foreign policy.

But military force is difficult to apply to many of the new interdependence issues on the agenda.

The use of force is made more costly for major states by four conditions: risks of nuclear escalation, uncertain and possible negative effects on the achievement of economic goals, resistance by nationalistic populations in otherwise weak states, domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force.

Even those states relatively unaffected by the third and fourth conditions, such as Communist countries, may feel some constraints from the first two. On the other hand, lesser states involved in regional rivalries, and terrorist groups, may find it easier to use force than before. The net effect of these contrary changes in the role of force is to reduce hierarchy based on military power.

The erosion of the international hierarchy is sometimes portrayed as a decline of American power—as though the causes lay in our aging process. Admittedly, from the perspective of a policymaker of the 1950's there has been a decline. But American power in the sense of resources has not declined as dramatically as is often supposed. United States military spending was roughly a third of the world total in 1950, and after rising to slightly over half in the 1950's has returned to the earlier level.

Over the same period, the American gross national product declined from roughly a third to a quarter of the world total, but the earlier figure reflected the wartime destruction of Europe and Japan, and the current figure remains twice the size of that

of the Soviet Union, three times that of Japan, and four times that of West Germany.

To understand what is changing, we must distinguish power over others from power over outcomes. What we are experiencing is not so much an erosion of our power resources compared to those of other countries (although there has been some), but an erosion of our power to control outcomes in the international system as a whole.

The main reason is that the system itself has become more complex. There are more issues, more actors, and less hierarchy. We still have leverage over others, but we have far less leverage over the whole system.

Increased military spending will not be sufficient to solve this problem. In such a world, multilateral diplomacy, often through international institutions will become more important because much of the agenda will be concerned with organizing collective action.

Our foreign policy debate should pay more attention to the problem of organizing international leadership where there is a tight interconnection between domestic and foreign policy, and we will need to think more imaginatively about the relations of our institutions to international institutions.

Joseph S. Nye Jr. is professor of government at Harvard University. This article is adapted from one that appeared in the periodical *Foreign Policy*.

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST

30 JUN 1976

Communism's Problems

EDWARD GIEREK, who came to power in Poland in the wake of food-price riots six years ago, raised food prices 30 to 100 per cent the other day and was forced by worker resistance—the tearing up of railroad tracks and the like—to rescind them in 24 hours. It was a political humiliation for him and an economic debacle for his country. The Poles still have to figure out how to pay for their world-priced Russian oil, for their rising imports from the West (though world recession cut the value of their exports), and for the higher living standards with which the Communist Party appeased rampaging workers in 1970. In fact, Poland has the worst of both worlds: capitalism's cycles and socialism's constraints. Mr. Gierek, a non-ideological national-minded "goulash Communist," in an old Khrushchev phrase, may be on the ropes.

A more embarrassing introduction to the European Communist summit in East Berlin could scarcely have been contrived. For one principal reason the Kremlin had wanted a summit was to demonstrate that communism is the wave of Europe's future. In fact, Poland's misfortunes underline the fact that communism is not a system with the answers—it is merely a system by which one clique monopolizes political power. The Russians' second reason for wanting the summit was to have Europe's other Com-

munist parties pay tribute to them. But the Italian and French parties, among others, needing to show their independence of Moscow to make their parliamentary way at home, are reinforcing the traditional Yugoslav-Romanian emphasis on home-directed national communism. It is a major setback for Moscow.

Gloating is foolish. Poland's travail, in particular, is no boon for the West: Hard times mean Poland will shop less abroad and perhaps turn "east"—meaning tough and narrow—in its domestic policy. The West has no reason to wish communism well, but it does have a strong long-term economic and political interest in the welfare and relative independence of Poland and the other East European nations. In the future public disintegration of the European Communist "movement," however, lies a considerable opportunity. The more that West European Communists can be separated from Moscow and drawn toward the Western mainstream, the better off the whole Atlantic community will be. The Ford-Kissinger policy of toughness—putting pressure on West Europe's Communists to prove they're not Soviet stooges—has paid off pretty well so far: Witness Moscow's discomfiture at the East Berlin summit. As those parties thin their ties to Moscow, however, they deserve some political credit for it.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
28 June 1976

THE CRACK IN POLAND

POLAND'S WORKERS' successful defiance of their Government's draconian price increases came as an answer to a prayer just while Dr. Kissinger, in London, was telling the West that Russia had her troubles too. By contrast, the news from Poland could not have been more inopportune to Mr. Brezhnev, preparing to leave for East Berlin for tomorrow's European Communist party "summit" that he has been striving for two years to bring about. No wonder the Polish Government caved in immediately, completely, even abjectly, without any of the shooting that took place when the Polish workers last went on the warpath in 1970. Mr. Brezhnev must be asking, with some acerbity, why Mr. Gierek had to let the cat out of the bag just now.

But, apart from timing, the need for sudden price increases of this order must have been critically urgent for the Polish Government to try to impose them on its notoriously explosive citizens. It blows sky high the Communist propaganda line that, while inflation has brought the capitalist West to the verge of collapse, in the Soviet countries State planning has achieved stable prices and unimpeded economic progress. Official Polish figures claim that over the past six years wages have risen by a total

of 40 per cent, while the cost of living has increased by only 15 per cent, owing to a freeze on the prices of increasingly heavily subsidised basic foods. What happened in reality was that high-protein foods such as meat and butter became increasingly scarce at the official prices, with the result that more and more items had to be bought on the black market at high prices. In addition, Poland is buying from the West great quantities of modern machinery that is not available in the Eastern bloc. Prices have soared with Western inflation. At the same time recession in the West has hit Polish exports.

The situation is similar throughout the Soviet empire, and also in Russia herself, where living standards are lower. Belt-tightening is going on everywhere. Mr. Gierek will have to enforce his drastic cuts in consumption somehow. No doubt he will start by weeding out the ringleaders and tightening police control. But there is clearly a nation-wide mood of determined resistance. The present case is a clear one of the Poles' resistance to the ruining of their economy by the Russian-imposed Communist system. Yet Dr. Kissinger has said that the greatest risk of war lies in a possible challenge to Russian domination by a satellite. For all Dr. Kissinger's assurances about Western strength, Russia has a great military preponderance at the key points. The cost of this is the other reason for the economic strain on the Soviet empire.

WASHINGTON POST

9 JUL 1976

That Russian Radiation

THE ATTITUDE of the State Department toward the continuing and possibly harmful microwave radiation that the Russians have been beaming at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow defies belief. One would think the department would have demanded long ago that this nerve-racking threat to the health of Americans—its own employees, after all—be terminated. But no. The radiation has gone on for years. In the months since it became public knowledge, the department has pussyfooted inexcusably. The other day, for instance, a department spokesman contended that radiation at the present reduced level poses "no cause for concern." He reported, however, that a \$300,000—yes, \$300,000—study had been commissioned of embassy medical records. A light slap on the Russians' wrist was delivered. Negotiations will continue, it was declared.

The radiation is, of course, not only a health hazard of uncertain dimensions but a continuing affront to the national dignity of the United States. Why does the State Department take this double blow so mildly? What is there to negotiate? Evidently the Russians are directing the beams at American electronics

equipment on or in the embassy building; diplomats and their families live on the lower floors. But the United States, or so it is contended without Soviet denial, does not try to interfere with or counter Soviet electronics equipment on the Soviet embassy building in the same way here in Washington. Does the United States, which pokes its electronic beams all around the globe, fear that a strong protest against Russian radiation will elicit or legitimize other countries' protests against American radiation? If this is so, then it ought to be conceded directly, so that there can be a reasoned public discussion of the whole problem as it affects foreigners as well as Americans.

Meanwhile, the physical and psychological well-being of American personnel in Moscow deserve to be served by whatever measures are necessary for that purpose. In the absence of conclusive medical evidence to the contrary, it has to be assumed that the Russians are endangering the health, not to say the lives, of American citizens, and they should not be allowed to continue doing it.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 July 1976

SOVIET DIMS BEAM AT U.S. EMBASSY

But Kissinger Aide Wants
the Microwave Radiation
Eliminated Altogether

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 7—The United States said today that Soviet authorities in recent months had sharply reduced the level of microwave radiation beamed at the American Embassy in Moscow.

But in its first detailed public account of the situation, the State Department nonetheless rebuked the Russians for continuing the radiation even at the current insignificant level. It said this showed "a lack of concern for living and working conditions of our people in Moscow."

Robert L. Funseth, the department spokesman, said at his regular news conference that as a result of official discussions "the strength of the signal beamed to the embassy in Moscow has been greatly reduced from previous recordings, which were themselves

well below established United States safety standards."

According to Mr. Funseth, the level of radiation aimed at the embassy was now less than two microwatts per square centimeter. The installation of aluminum screens outside the embassy earlier this year has further cut the level to less than one microwatt, he said.

The New York Times reported on May 2 that the level late last year had gone as high as 18 microwatts.

American industrial safety standards, Mr. Funseth said, permit as much as 10,000 microwatts per square centimeter. The Soviet Union's stricter industrial standards permit only 10 microwatts.

Mr. Funseth, while providing technical details, refused to comment on why the Soviet Union was beaming the rays, a practice that officials have said began about 16 years ago.

Soviet officials have justified the beams as necessary to curtail American electronic listening devices on the roof of upper floors of the embassy building, situated on Tchaikovsky Street in downtown Moscow.

American officials have privately conceded that these devices exist to monitor Soviet radio and telephone transmissions. They have also said that the monitoring effort was being impaired by the jamming waves.

What has irritated American

officials was that the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street in downtown Washington also carries out similar interceptions of radio and phone conversations but has not been subject to the countermeasures because of concern for Americans working in the area.

The beaming of radiation against the embassy in Moscow was known only to a few American officials until last February when Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel Jr. briefed his staff on the situation. News of the briefing was leaked to the press.

The briefing was held because State Department medical officers feared that the radiation might pose a health hazard over the long run, either to the eyes or to the genetic or nervous system.

Officials have stressed that there was as yet no evidence that the microwaves had been responsible for any illnesses, past or present.

Microwaves are unlike X-rays and are not ionized. X-rays in excessive amounts can cause cancer, but no connection has been made between microwaves and cancer.

The decision to release information on the embassy situation came after news reports that two young children of embassy employees had been sent to the United States for examination of unusual blood samples; one has since returned to Moscow.

Mr. Funseth said the discus-

sions with the Russians were aimed at ending the microwave signals.

"Frankly, we regret that the Soviets have failed to turn off the transmissions completely, and thereby, in our judgment, demonstrating a lack of concern for the living and working conditions of our people in Moscow," he said.

The spokesman was asked why the Russians were being rebuked if in fact they had cut the level below the risk level and he said the continued beams caused a psychological problem.

He also said no concessions were made to the Russians in return for their reduction in beams. The microwaves are said to come from across the street from the embassy. There are said to be two such beams aimed at the embassy.

Mr. Funseth said the State Department had signed a contract with Johns Hopkins University to conduct a survey to see whether there has ever been any correlation between the microwaves and the health of past and present embassy employees.

Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST

9 JUL 1976

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

NATO's Tragic Confrontation

A Turkish government vessel equipped with new seismic devices for underwater oil exploration is about to leave its berth near Istanbul for "research" in northern Aegean waters claimed by Greece—a disaster-prone voyage that dramatizes the tragic decline of the Western Alliance.

Passage of this ship, recently rechristened Sismic, will add another bitter chapter in the hostility between Athens and Ankara once the unified center of NATO's eastern flank. Far worse, precautionary measures being taken by both sides against possible Greek interference with the ship point to a real threat of shooting inside the disputed waters.

Thus, the Sismic's scheduled sailing—delayed several weeks partly because of Washington's ardent persuasion—is now to coincide with Aegean Sea naval exercises planned by both Greece and Turkey. The Aegean Sea, with massed Greek islands stretching close alongside the Turkish coast, will then be a lethal cockpit.

This dangerous confrontation poses further risks to the diminished integrity of Western defenses against the Soviet Union, the new power in the eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the U.S. is virtually powerless to do anything but counsel delay in the ship's sailing. The remote possibility that the Sismic could indeed trigger a shooting war between Greece and Turkey finds Washington fully as impotent as it has been for 15 months of Lebanon's tragic civil war.

Furthermore, as we have reported, U.S. powerlessness to influence events

anywhere in the eastern Mediterranean basin raises other difficult questions, such as homeporting facilities for the U.S. 6th fleet and even shore leave stations for American sailors.

The pending Turk-Greek confrontation would come in Aegean Sea waters claimed by both countries in one of the world's most bitter disputes over territorial waters today. Greece, claiming that its close-to-Turkey islands have their own continental shelf, has threatened to blow up Turkish ships seeking underwater oil there.

Turkey, which perceives the fabled Greek Isles as "floating" islands with no continental shelf of their own, claims the disputed waters lie over the Turkish continental shelf, to which Turkey has sovereign rights.

Behind Ankara's decision to challenge Greek claims in the Aegean Sea lies an ever-worsening dispute with the U.S. It began with the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus in reaction to the attempted takeover there by the then Greek military dictatorship. Ever since, the Ford administration has been pleading with the Democratic Congress—most receptive to the Greek lobby—to lift the arms embargo and thus end one-sided punishment of Turkey.

That effort now turns on the fate in Congress of the four-year, \$1 billion U.S.-Turkish aid agreement signed March 26. The agreement would restore U.S. rights to intelligence bases, aimed at the Soviet Union, that Turkey closed last July.

The Turkish government has been informed by the administration that Congress will approve the agreement this

year. In fact, as of today there is no chance of that.

Democrats want to wait for a new Democratic administration; Republicans perceive political misery in voting for Turkey just before the election.

That the \$1 billion agreement now seems dead for this year is extremely hard for the Turkish government to swallow. Contradicting the honeyed talk in Washington when the agreement was signed, this means Turkey's eligibility to buy U.S. arms is limited to only \$125 million in each of the next two years.

The resulting sense of betrayal now becoming manifest is likely to make Turkey even more adventurous in confronting Greece over the Aegean Sea. Unable to see progress in its bitter struggle with Washington, Ankara is not held back by U.S. admonitions.

When the Greek government privately urged the U.S. and NATO to dissuade Turkey from using the Sismic in disputed waters, it stated flatly the ship "will be sunk" if it shows up. U.S. persuasion delayed the Sismic's departure for two weeks, but it is now expected to sail in mid-July.

Some diplomats here believe the sailing will trigger not torpedoes but only a dangerous game of chicken. Realists disagree.

"The hotheads on both sides are spoiling for a fight," one diplomat told us. "And if it starts in the Aegean it could spread overnight to the border in Thrace." There the two NATO allies face each other with imposing military power, and there the U.S. could no more halt hostilities than it can end civil war in Lebanon.

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WASHINGTON POST

9 JUL 1976

U.S. Army Found Weak in Europe

The Army has managed its units along the NATO front so poorly that their inability to go to war in a hurry has been impaired, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) said yesterday in releasing portions of a new General Accounting Office survey of military readiness in Europe.

The GAO found that one unit of the U.S. 1st Armored Division had no keys for unlocking its ammunition storage bunkers, said Humphrey in citing one example of what he called "serious mismanagement and inefficiency in our European forces."

He added that the administration had dipped into the NATO reserve to obtain tanks and other armored vehicles to sell to foreign nations. The reserve was "substantially reduced between 1973 and 1975" and has not been restored, Humphrey said.

The GAO found many armored units on the NATO line short of key personnel and experience, said Humphrey in commenting on the report, dated June 30, 1976. But this lack of readiness is not always brought to commander's attention because the reporting requirements

"have been relaxed to the point where units can almost always report themselves as combat ready," Humphrey said.

Humphrey's office said he asked for the report a year ago.

Senate aides said the Pentagon would release only a small portion of the GAO study to the public. Part of the released report said that the Army "is actively and positively pursuing" many of the problems the GAO spotlighted.

Humphrey asked for the study in his capacity as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee of Con-

gress and of the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Now that the report is in hand, Humphrey said he has asked the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to call Pentagon and State Department officials to appear before the committee to answer questions on readiness.

Declaring that the United States is spending about \$40 billion annually "to keep up our end of the NATO military alliance," Humphrey said "what is needed is not bigger budgets, but better management."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 JULY 1976

West German intelligence agencies: how coordinated?

By David Mutch
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

It can be argued Guenther Guillaume, the East German spy, whose arrest led to Chancellor Willy Brandt's resignation, did one big favor for West Germany.

The political stir caused by Mr. Guillaume's penetration of the Brandt chancellery made it possible to strengthen and coordinate the control over the government's three intelligence agencies.

"The great change that was needed was more coordination," said Manfred Schueler, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's right-hand man in the chancellery, "and the post-Guillaume climate enabled us to make that change."

The problem of controlling intelligence agencies is different in West Germany than it is in the United States. There are several reasons why.

One is that the government here is in effect a "committee" of Parliament, whereas in the U.S. administration and Congress are separated formally by the Constitution.

This tends to make investigations by Congress tougher than are parliamentary investigations here.

Another reason is that the most prominent problems here for the intelligence agencies are spying and terrorism, whereas in the U.S. the most prominent problem has been political.

And West Germany as a "middle power" does not put the same resources into intelligence gathering as must the U.S. as a super power.

BND

Until 1968 West Germany's "CIA" — the federal information agency (BND for Bundesnachrichtendienst) — was under the almost autonomous control of Gen. Richard Gehlen. He was a

THE NATION
3 July 1976

KILLING IT TO SAVE IT

THE U.S. IN ITALIAN DEMOCRACY

REP. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

Washington

Indications are that the United States has been covertly intervening in the Italian political process during these past weeks and months, as the official American attitude toward possible Communist gains in the current elections there has approached hysteria. The position of the administration toward the political crisis in Italy demonstrates the difficulty of breaking our old habits of arrogance about the democratic processes of other nations.

The corruption of postwar Italian politics by American official and nonofficial institutions has been pervasive. We now know that the great multinational corporations, most of them American, have made substantial payments to Italian politicians and parties. Lockheed's largesse

Michael Harrington represents the 6th District in Massachusetts and was formerly a member of the House Select Committee to investigate intelligence operations.

top intelligence man under Hitler who later found favor with the U.S. Army. And his post-war intelligence work was made official by a Cabinet decree by Chancellor Conrad Adenauer in 1955. Mr. Gehlen retired in 1968.

During the Guillaume investigation in 1974 it was found that the BND had built unauthorized files on people in West Germany, including some journalists.

Never set up under law, the BND continues to exist by government decree. But there is a measure of consensus that with new leadership and other control measures, the agency is in hand.

Another key intelligence agency is the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, comparable to the FBI. It watches over internal security, and it has a good record of detecting and apprehending spies and of finding wanted terrorists.

Gentleman's agreement

Then there is an intelligence agency for the military. The control over these last two agencies exist both in Parliament and in the chancellery. These two agencies report to a different committee in Parliament. They are coordinated through two government ministries.

Parliament's main control arm is what can loosely be translated as a board of trustees. This exists under a gentleman's agreement between the chancellery and Parliament.

It consists of members from all parties in Parliament, meets regularly, and can question activities. But it has no legal basis to "demand" answers.

The Chancellery has perhaps the key watchdog function — it must coordinate all three agencies.

It was lack of coordination that permitted Mr. Guillaume to rise so high, since there were files on him and suspicions about him for years. But no one put it all together until after he had reached the chancellery.

In 1974 Mr. Schueler, on orders from Mr. Schmidt, increased from 6 to 20 the chancellery's "intelligence watchdogs" and sought to make sure jealousies and rivalries between the agencies do not supercede security needs. This was the "great change" Mr. Schueler said was necessary.

A great deal of mutual trust goes into the West German system of managing the intelligence agencies. The Guillaume affair did not politicize the question as much as Watergate did in the U.S.

A parliamentary committee on constitutional reform may make recommendations to formalize some present relationships. But this is not a leading public topic now in West Germany.

evidently included an Italian Premier in the 1960s who was bribed to further the sale of fourteen Hercules C-130 cargo planes. Since the three men who were Premier in that period are now President, Premier and Foreign Minister, the identification of "antelope Cobble," as Lockheed called him, will necessarily have a major impact on the Italian Government. In addition, Exxon paid between \$46 million and \$49 million to Italian political parties in 1963-72; Mobil Oil payments to Italian parties averaged \$500,000 a year from 1970 to 1973; and British Petroleum and Shell Oil paid \$6.6 million to the parties between 1969 and 1973 (the fact that the British Government owns 70 per cent of B.P. stock has been of some embarrassment in London).

At the same time that the multinational corporations were making these large payoffs, the CIA was supplying

official U.S. dollars to the same parties. According to the final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, the agency gave \$75 million to Italian parties and politicians between 1948 and 1972. Of this sum, \$10 million was spent in the 1972 parliamentary elections. The evidence is that again in 1976 CIA moneys helped finance the campaigns of anti-Communist candidates and parties. Indeed, *The New York Times* reported in January that on December 8, 1975, President Ford approved a \$6 million CIA expenditure for anticipated Italian elections.

This latest CIA installment in Italy, must be seen in the context of official U.S. reaction to Italian developments. Ever since Harry Truman decided it was necessary to "scare hell out of the American people" to get public support for aid to Greece and Turkey after World War II, public hysteria by Secretaries of State has become a routine feature of the foreign policy process. The incumbent Secretary of State is no exception. The prospect of Communist participation in the Italian Government has triggered Kissinger's world-historical pessimism about the struggle between Western civilization and Communist "barbarism." At a London convocation of our ambassadors to Europe last December (a few days after President Ford approved the \$6 million) Kissinger defined the issue as a threat to our values rather than our tangible, economic and strategic interests:

The Western alliance has always had an importance beyond military solidarity. The United States would be alone and isolated in a world in which we had no relations by values to other countries.

If the United States were to become an "island in its own values," he felt we "could probably survive this situation, but only through the use of a ruthless balance of power policy." Such a policy would, presumably replace the benign search for world order that has prevailed under Mr. Kissinger's leadership. The process by which the United States could become an island of virtue is a strikingly familiar one. Mr. Kissinger went on to say:

I believe that the advent of communism in major European countries is likely to produce a sequence of events in which other European countries will also be tempted to move in the same direction.

In other words, United States policy is guided by a belief in the moral superiority of American values and the conviction that our allies will fall like dominoes if the Italian Communist Party participates in the next Italian Cabinet. The formula for American foreign policy remains the time-honored cold-war response: scare hell out of the American people and use the CIA to give our friends a secret advantage.

The administration's response to *The New York Times*'s revelation of the authorized \$6 million covert action money was to deny the story while attacking Congress for leaking it. Director Colby said the CIA had "not spent a nickel in Italy" in that period and the White House issued a statement that the President was "angry" and that the leak "undermines our capability to carry out our foreign policy." Colby's denial was true only because the director's contingency fund from which the expenditure was to be drawn had been emptied by the Angola operation, and the agency had a temporary cash flow problem. Presumably the \$6 million—and in all likelihood more—has been spent since January.

Nor has the private sector been inactive in this Italian election. In May, immediately after the Italian parliament was dissolved, John Connally of Texas founded

a group called the "Citizens Alliance for Mediterranean Freedom" to "raise American consciousness about the deteriorating situation in southern Europe, the Middle East, and northern Africa," and to warn the Italians "not to become beguiled by the unfulfilled promises of communism." The group has been funded out of money raised by a "Texas Salute to John Connally" dinner, held last summer to celebrate his acquittal on charges of bribery. The organization is hoping to alert the public in both the United States and Italy to the dire consequences of the "loss of Italy," and "encourage the peoples of the Mediterranean nations in their efforts to preserve their freedom." Connally concedes that this "probably is meddling" in another country's internal affairs but, he says, "I don't think we should be criticized for doing just that. We meddled in them [sic] thirty years ago." The Connally group has a like concern for the "future of freedom" in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel and Libya.

It is impossible to know whether, or in what degree, the Connally organization and its activities have been coordinated with U.S. foreign policy or intelligence officials. Connally, however, is a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a body of private citizens that is supposed to give the President independent, objective advice about foreign intelligence operations. Connally says he sees no conflict between his PFIAB job and his position as chairman of the "Citizens Alliance"; but, especially since President Ford's reorganization in February of the intelligence agencies assigned to PFIAB a new and presumably more powerful responsibility to keep the agencies in line, it is clearly improper and alarming that Connally should sponsor private intervention in Italian domestic politics and endorse "meddling" as a proper course for Americans.

It is ironic that, during our Bicentennial celebration, and during a Presidential election of our own, this country should once again interfere with the free democratic processes of a friendly country. It calls to mind the Vietnamese village of Bentre, which the U.S. Army found it had to destroy in order to save. We cannot save Italian democracy by destroying it, and nothing is more destructive to democracy than secret corruption. Also, we cannot preserve or promote our political system and its values by denying them. The essence of the democratic process is that the people, through free exercise of the vote, can turn out the top political leadership, and that such leadership will keep faith with the people by going quietly, in the hope of regaining the voters' confidence. As Woodrow Wilson observed, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries is a corollary of democracy. The two are inseparable in theory and in practice.

Nowhere is this more evident than in Italy where much of the difficulty in which the Christian Democratic Party finds itself stems from widespread evidence of its corruption. We contribute little to the revitalization of non-Communist forces in Italy when we contribute to corruption by CIA clandestine support or by tolerating American corporate bribery of foreign officials. As one self-described "dyed-in-the-wool pro-American" Christian Democratic politician put it after *The New York Times* revelations in January, "If I'd been planning a trip to the United States, I would cancel it for fear people would think I was just another 'bought' politician."

To me it seems elementary that the best way to support democracy in Italy is to trust it. If left-wing or right-wing groups do attempt the dismantlement of democratic institutions there, we will be in no position to object.

if we have also violated them and tolerated their violation by American private groups and corporations. As a result of my deep concern about the damage that can be done to democracy by the policies of this administration I introduced a "resolution of inquiry" in the House of Representatives on June 11. This resolution would require the administration to answer a number of questions about U.S. policy toward Italy: are U.S. funds being channeled to any Italian party or politician? Are U.S. funds subsidizing Italian media outlets? Are U.S. Embassy personnel involved in any such transactions?

There is one point above all which is paramount in this foreign policy debate: the American public will not

long support any foreign policy that is made and carried out in secret, and no foreign policy that cannot stand up to public scrutiny can be successful. Obviously there can be no public debate or scrutiny without information. The policy toward Italy, its assumptions and presumptions, have enormous significance for the future of this country's relation to Western Europe. To call for disclosure and open debate is not a prurient desire to expose state secrets, as the administration would have us believe. It is to affirm the most fundamental features of our democracy. We cannot long remain free and democratic ourselves, let alone help the Italians to be free, by denying democracy at home and abroad. □

WASHINGTON POST.

Sunday, June 27, 1976

Joseph Kraft

The Fallout Of Italy's Elections

ROME—At Communist Party headquarters here in Rome the other day I had successive appointments with an old party militant, Giancarlo Pajetta, and a young economist, Luciano Barca. "Ask Barca," Pajetta said as I left his office, "if he has become minister of finance yet."

That confident little gag announces the true results of the Italian elections last week. The Communists won big—so big that they are virtually sure to enter the government sooner or later, thus posing problems, and presenting opportunities, for the U.S. and its NATO allies.

The size of the Communist win can best be gauged by measuring it against the celebrated comeback of the Christian Democrats. With 38.7 per cent of the vote for parliament, the Demo-Christians made a gain of 3.2 per cent over the regional elections last year, while standing just where they were in the 1972 legislative elections.

In contrast, the Communists, with 34.4 per cent of the vote, registered a gain of 2.5 per cent over the 1975 elections, and 7.3 per cent over the 1972 elections. The 7.3 per cent gain was the biggest they ever made between one parliament and another and brought them to a new high in national elec-

tions.

They gained 48 seats in the National Assembly, as against a loss of one by the Demo-Christians. They added to their fiefdoms large areas south of Rome which they had never held before. Around Naples, for instance, they won 41 per cent of the vote as against 28 per cent in 1972.

Of course, the Demo-Christians, as the largest party, will take the lead in forming a government—probably without the Communists, but with the Socialists and three smaller parties. The Socialists will not join, however, unless there is first a dialogue with the Communists and agreement on a program of urgent action.

The Communists are in excellent posture for such a dialogue. In the past few years, under General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, they have junked a load of ideological baggage, and come across as the defenders of the Italian lower middle class, which is the majority, not of the proletariat which is a small minority.

Their plans for urgent action center around a program for arresting inflation. They would limit the government deficit by putting a ceiling on government spending. They would cut both jobs and payments in government programs and enterprises (many of them now Demo-Christian fiefs) the better to acquire money for investment in agriculture, housing and transport.

That is plainly an appealing and sensible program. If the Demo-Christians accept it, the Communists will almost surely enter power to help in the execution. If it is refused, the Communists will be in position to win the next election.

But what about the U.S. and its allies who have fought the Italian Communists so hard for foreign policy reasons?

Well, there is a temporary breathing space after the election—which is a piece of luck.

For the Italian Communists have come more than halfway toward the accepted canons of the West. They have shown a willingness to abide by democratic rules. They have turned their backs on expropriation of property.

They have criticized Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and the Communist effort to take over Portugal. Until assured last week that their principles of independence would not be compromised, they resisted Russia's call for an international meeting of Communist parties. Finally, in a pre-electoral development which went almost unnoticed in the U.S., Berlinguer practically acknowledged that the Italian Communists depended upon NATO protection against Soviet pressure.

Nobody can be sure that these are not merely tactical changes made for electoral purposes. The more so as the Italian Communists have voted against defense budgets, and supported Russia in most international confrontations with the U.S.

But clearly the present breathing spell provides an occasion for reviewing the automatic NATO hostility toward the Italian Communists. If they continue to show an aptitude for change in such matters as defense and foreign policy, then the Italian Communists should be taken up with a vengeance. For it is in the highest Western interest to nurture and protect an Italian party which can foster a kind of Euro-communism that is as split off from Moscow as Chinese communism.

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Near East

WASHINGTON POST

6 JUL 1976

Diplomat's Death Cloaked in Secrecy

Britons Question Whether Iranian Ambassador Committed Suicide

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON—On the night of June 4, an Iranian diplomat noticed that the lights were on in the Kensington home of Mohammed Reza Amirteymour the newly recalled ambassador.

Since Amirteymour had said he was going away for the weekend, perhaps his last in England, the puzzled diplomat rang the doorbell. There was no reply. The diplomat went around to the back, peered through a kitchen window and saw two feet.

He called the policeman on duty at the embassy nearby, and the officer forced open the kitchen window. On the floor, staring lifelessly at the ceiling, was the body of the 55-year-old Amirteymour.

The embassy's first secretary, Morteza Kakhi, told reporters the next day:

"He died from natural causes. The doctor who examined him and the police are also satisfied."

This was untrue.

British and Iranian authorities have now disclosed that Ambassador Amirteymour took his own life. A note in Persian is said to have been found by the dead man's body, addressed to his daughter and begging her forgiveness.

In the weeks that have passed, however, at least some intelligence sources here are not wholly convinced that Amirteymour was a suicide. The fact that the Iranians declined to let a British coroner conduct a

post-mortem has left a cloud of suspicion.

An extraordinary veil of secrecy has been cast over the whole affair. The British look on Iran as a multibillion-dollar customer for everything from arms to new towns, from Concordes to machine tools. London does not want to cross Tehran for the soundest of commercial reasons.

First Secretary Kakhi's false statement has not increased confidence in the handling of the case. The new ambassador, Parviz Cambran Radji, who arrived the very day Amirteymour died, said in an interview that he has rebuked Kakhi for his tale-telling.

Why should Amirteymour, a distinguished diplomat who had represented Iran in Moscow before coming to London, commit suicide on the eve of his recall?

Several sources suggested that he feared he was going home to disgrace. He is said to have been, in the words of one well-placed aide, "a compulsive gambler" who had run up debts of perhaps \$175,000 in the clubs here.

In addition, Amirteymour is thought to have offended Empress Farah when she came here in April to open the World of Islam festival. The precise nature of the offense is not known, but she is said to have been disturbed by his arrangements.

Radji, the new ambassador, will talk only of "rumors" to explain Amirteymour's possible "disgrace." But he denies that his predecessor had gotten into the bad books of

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi or the empress.

"I would rule out any possibility of a political reason" or "his majesty's displeasure," Radji said, "because I know it would not be true."

There is no doubt Radji, whose posting here began with the tragedy, is well enough connected to know the shah's mind. He has the prized London embassy at the tender age of 40 and previously he had been key adviser to Premier Amir Abbas Hoveyda. Radji said he had an interview with the empress just before he left.

On the British side, only the policeman on duty at the embassy, the police surgeon he called, who certified the death, and an officer from the coroner's office appear to have looked at the corpse. Scotland Yard has been ordered to tell the press as little as possible and stress that the Criminal Investigation Division was not called in.

The CID, however, could not be called in once diplomatic immunity was claimed. Radji made the claim as soon as the coroner's man suggested an autopsy.

Radji, who was summoned to see the body on the fatal night, said that there was no blood or sign of struggle, and that the only evidence of pills was a bottle of antibiotic capsules. Now, the putative suicide killed himself remains a mystery.

Why did Radji claim diplomatic immunity, thereby preventing any determination of death?

He did it, he said, out of consideration for his colleague's family.

According to the ambassador, a cable was sent to the Foreign Ministry in Tehran, which queried the dead man's aged father. The ministry cabled Radji that the father had refused permission for an autopsy and asked that the corpse be sent home, the ambassador said.

Even if Amirteymour had returned alive, his future was uncertain. Ambassador Radji said that his eminent predecessor did not have a new assignment at the time he died.

The many question marks around this affair have led some intelligence officials here to think that the dreaded SAVAK, or state security and intelligence organization, had a hand in it. SAVAK agents operate from the embassy in London, as the Sunday Times disclosed two years ago.

This is hardly surprising, since SAVAK was reorganized and trained by the CIA nearly 20 years ago, and the CIA invariably has sizable station complements at major embassies.

If Amirteymour was marked for death, why was he killed in London, on the eve of his return? Would it not have been easier to dispose of him in Tehran? His death there, however, might have aroused unpleasant talk. At any rate, he does seem to have died on Iranian soil, his Kensington house, which is diplomatically immune from the inquiries of a coroner or Scotland Yard.

WASHINGTON POST

1 JUL 1976

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A PLO Ploy

On the U.S. Evacuation

A dangerous last-minute hitch in plans to evacuate Americans from Beirut 10 days ago resulted directly from efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to send bag Washington

into using its power to accomplish the key PLO war aim of opening the Beirut airport.

With the PLO and the U.S. communicating indirectly through the British embassy in Beirut, the PLO's attempt to

use the evacuation as a cover to enhance its military position finally failed. But the mere fact so blatant an attempt was made shows how far U.S. influence in the Middle East—particularly inside war-torn Lebanon—has declined in the past year.

The PLO's plot to strongarm a world superpower, understandable in terms of its desperate need for medical and other supplies for besieged Beirut, contained these simple elements:

By declaring the overland route from Beirut to Damascus unsafe, the PLO could force the Americans to choose the air route as the only way to get out of Beirut. That would bring pressure

from Washington on the Syrian government to let the airport (closed by Syrian troops) open for the evacuation.

Having then opened the airport on behalf of fleeing Americans, the PLO believed that the Syrians would not dare close it to medical supplies desperately needed by hundreds of gravely wounded Palestinian Arabs.

This plan required the U.S. to brush aside major contradictions. Even though the British and the French had sent land convoys safely to Damascus on the four days immediately preceding the planned June 20 American exodus, the PLO quietly notified the British embassy in Beirut to inform the U.S. that the route had suddenly become unsafe. Yet, on that very day, June 20, non-Arab civilians made their way with utter safety through the war-littered region surrounding Beirut, up the mountain passes and into Damascus.

Thus, the White House reacted with immediate suspicion to this PLO play for U.S. pressure on Syria for air evacuation. Even before the land-route option was closed off, President Ford had been criticized for using the evacuation to promote himself as presidential crisis-manager on the eve of the important Iowa Republican state convention.

Such criticism was deepened by the

all-night White House meetings to find a new evacuation route (just after the overland evacuation of British and French nationals had worked without any trouble). Angered though they were by the PLO's sudden warning, Mr. Ford and his top military advisers could not prove the PLO was wrong and dared not risk finding out.

So, to avoid playing the obvious PLO game and taking to the air, Mr. Ford ordered evacuation by sea. Washington was determined to force the issue with the PLO, privately sending word through foreign embassies that a U.S. Marine assault battalion would be put on the ground in Lebanon if needed to safeguard the short land route from Beirut's Riviera Hotel to the docks.

Only then, threatened with U.S. force, did the embattled PLO admit it had lost the game to impose its will on Washington's crisis diplomacy. With the admission came fast and complete cooperation.

What is so disturbing about this sequence of events is its lessons for wider U.S. interests in the Middle East, as well as the immediate future course of this nation's diplomacy in Lebanon. The truth is that Washington has now become spectator to passions unleashed by the Mideast's bloodiest civil war in

generations.

The U.S. has been unable even to tell the truth publicly about its private support for Syria's intervention in that civil war (first to help the PLO, then to save the beleaguered Christian Arab minority). Nor has the U.S. been able to impede the breakup of Arab unity, particularly between Syria and Egypt, that followed the second-stage Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and severely threatens Mideast settlement prospects.

Some experts here trace the tragedy of Lebanon's civil war directly back to U.S. refusal to insist that Israel start long-overdue negotiations with the Palestinians—or with Jordan—over the Israeli-occupied west bank of the Jordan River two years ago. Instead the U.S. allowed Israel to make a second-stage Sinai withdrawal agreement with Egypt, leaving the Palestinian problems both on the west bank and in Lebanon ripe for exploding.

Washington's inability 10 days ago to arrange a simple evacuation of its own citizens without being sandbagged by the relatively puny PLO is stark testimony to the truth. As of today, the U.S. seems to have no hand left to play in the bloody Middle East.

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WASHINGTON STAR
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PLO

THE NEW IMAGE

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

It has become a fact of life in the Middle East arena that the Palestine Liberation Organization has gained acceptance and status with the United States that is normally accorded only to nation-states.

"What else would you say about the PLO after it joined forces with the American Navy to stage an amphibious and military operation such as the evacuation of foreign refugees across the beach in Lebanon last week?" asked a knowledgeable U.S. official. "We don't recognize the PLO *de jure* but we sure as hell have *de facto* dealings with it."

Its new standing, another American policy-maker said, is generally parallel to what the Israelis did in their war for independence and international recognition that ended in 1948. "The Israelis made themselves a fact and a reality that could not be ignored when they fought six Arab nations, won their battle and finally were admitted to the United Nations," he said. "Before that, the Israelis were — as the PLO is today — a collection of armed guerrillas like the Palmach, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang and not a nation at all."

U.S. OFFICIALS, who did not wish to be identified, say the relatively new role of the PLO as a moderate force compared with the splinter rejectionist-front Palestinian groups almost certainly carries with it a *quid pro quo* for the United States. "Let's face it," said one informed official, "they are acting responsibly

and cooperatively with the U.S. in the Lebanese chaos and this is a bill that will come due and will have to be paid."

Exactly what price tag the PLO has put on its services is one of Washington's most closely held secrets. The price that seems most likely is some form of official U.S. recognition that the PLO exists. Further, it appears possible that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger or his successor will adopt the policy that the PLO merits a place at any Middle East peace conference.

If all this seems unreal, coming a relatively short time after PLO leader Yassir Arafat appeared at the United Nations wearing a pistol holster and after years of American refusal to deal with the PLO on any terms, it is undeniable that the PLO is reaching a crossroads in its relations with the United States. In the

view of many, the PLO has come closer than any other entity to organized and responsible conduct in strife-torn Lebanon.

OFFICIAL pronouncements from officials from President Ford and Kissinger on down continue the fiction that Washington has no dealings with the largest group of Palestinians, the PLO. While it may be true that there are no direct dealings, there are indirect dealings aplenty. Kissinger has said that the evacuation last weekend, something less than a dramatic affair as it turned out, was arranged with the PLO through third-party inter-

mediaries — such as certain unnamed Arab nations and the British.

The evacuation could not have been attempted at all without the consent and help of the PLO. Furthermore, the PLO now reportedly has custody of the rejectionist front terrorists who murdered Ambassador Francis E. Meloy Jr. and economic adviser Robert O. Waring. The PLO says it arrested the killers and intends to hand them over for punishment to the small Arab League peace force slowly assembling in Lebanon.

For many years, the PLO and other Palestinian guerrilla organizations stung Lebanon and Jordan, where they had taken refuge after the 1948 Israeli war of independence. Every raid across the Lebanese border, brought swift retaliation from the Israelis. The Black September movement of fight-to-the-death Palestinian radicals came into being when the Palestinians attempted to conquer Jordan's King Hussein in head-on battle in 1970.

But now the equations have shifted dramatically. The PLO is in tight with moderate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, once abominated because he made two separate disengagement deals with Israel. The organization is on good terms with the Syrian re-

gime of President Hafez Assad. The PLO has always been dependent on the conservative Arab peninsula oil states of Saudi Arabia and the various sheikdoms for financial and political support.

Now it is Syria which is at ideological sword's point with its fellow Baathist regime in rejectionist Iraq. The Iraqis, Libyans and Algerians, who are the hardliners against Israel, are essentially irrelevant to the Palestinians' *raison d'être*: an independent state of their own in territory now occupied or included in the U.S.-supported nation of Israel.

Most analysts say there is nothing the rejectionists can do to give the Palestinians a homeland. That decision essentially depends on Israel, which is insisting it will never tolerate an independent Palestinian state on its borders. In turn, Israel is utterly dependent on the United States and only Washington, by pressure and persuasion, can cause Israel to change its mind

about permitting existence of a new nation of Palestine.

KISSINGER often has said that Israel has no obligation to accept a Palestinian state so long as the PLO insists on the total destruction of Israel. He has been less clear on what the U.S. view would be if the PLO abandons that all-or-nothing policy and indicates it would settle for a state of its own on the West Bank-Gaza lands.

Indeed, the United States and Israel acknowledge that there can be no peace in the Middle East until the aspirations of the Palestinians have been met in some way.

Lebanon, a U.S. official pointed out, has become to all intents and purposes a Palestinian state with the disappearance of all government there and with the PLO the strongest of the Moslem Arab factions. And whether by design or merely because everyone is too busy at fratricidal warfare in Lebanon, the Israeli-Lebanese border has sel-

dom been more tranquil.

The whole Lebanese civil war, in several other ways, has represented a foreign policy disaster for the Soviet Union and a triumph for the U.S.-Israeli allies even if the causes of the internecine strife were self-generated within hapless Lebanon with no instigation from Washington or Jerusalem.

AMERICAN diplomats are quick to point out that almost every Soviet initiative in the Middle East in the past two Arab-Israeli wars has been an expensive debacle for Moscow. They paint a picture of Moscow's clients raining Russian weaponry on one another, their fellow Arabs, and paying little heed to the Soviet presence on their side except to draw up new shopping lists for arms.

It may be no wonder, then, that the PLO may be casting around for a better relationship with the United States in the hope that Washington may be able to

get for them by negotiation the homeland that they have never been able to win with Soviet arms.

Some U.S. policy makers believe the Israelis see the diaphanous American-PLO connection growing more substantial and more workable. The Israelis are understandably suspicious, alarmed and wary, but Israel is in a weak position to defy its only important supporter. If the PLO and the United States find that they can work together over the long haul, no one in the State Department would be surprised if this administration or the next one comes forth with an offer Israel cannot afford to refuse.

Should this relationship prosper, the assessment is that one day Washington can propose that the PLO be represented at the Geneva peace conference, along with Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Soviet Union, or some other negotiating forum. This could happen sooner rather than later if the PLO gives up its dedication to Israel's destruction.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 June 1976

U.S. IS APPROVING MIDEAST JET SALE

Craft Meant for Egypt Are
Going to Iraq and Syria

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28—The State Department has given tentative approval to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the sale to Syria and Iraq of civilian versions of the C-130 military transports already approved for sale to Egypt, officials said today.

A State Department official insisted that any sale of the planes, designated L-100s, would be strictly commercial and that because the L-100s were designed differently from the C-130's, they would be less useful militarily.

Despite the Government's efforts to minimize the military significance of such a sale, Israeli Embassy officials registered their concern with the

department last week over any increase in American technology to Israel's adversaries.

The Israelis made a major effort to oppose the sale earlier in the year, of six C-130's to Egypt and won a pledge by the Ford Administration not to sell any additional military equipment to Egypt this year.

Air Defense Sale to Taiwan

A Congressional source said he had been told that Lockheed planned to sell two L-100's to Syria and two to Iraq, with an option to sell two more to each country, making a total of eight.

In another development, a State Department official said that approval had been given for the sale by the Hughes Aircraft Corporation of a \$34 million air-defense system to the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan. Of the \$34 million, a third would be financed through United States Government-backed foreign military credits and the rest would be arranged directly between Taiwan and the Hughes concern.

The official said the sale was consistent with American policy of helping Taiwan defend

itself under the mutual security pact between the two governments.

The sale of the electronic air-defense equipment comes at a time when the United States is gradually phasing out its own military presence on Taiwan, consistent with commitments made to the Peking Government in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972.

Last week the State Department said that the last American military advisers on Matsu and Quemoy, the Nationalist-held islands off the China mainland, had been withdrawn. There had been one officer and two enlisted men on each island.

A department official said that at the moment about 2,100 American military men were still on Taiwan, most of them doing communications and intelligence work. Of that number, about 60 were assigned to the Military Assistance Group.

Political Aspect Stressed

The possible sale of L-100's to Syria and Iraq was viewed by State Department officials as more politically than militarily significant.

Both Middle Eastern countries have relied almost exclusively on the Soviet Union for their aircraft, but recently the Syrians have been seeking to expand their contacts with Western countries.

The United States recently praised the Syrians for their efforts to bring about a balanced political solution in Lebanon and has begun a modest

program of about \$100 million in economic aid, some of it food assistance to Syria.

Ties with Iraq are minimal. Diplomatic relations were broken off following the June 1967 war, when most Arab countries severed relations with the United States for aiding Israel in the war.

A Civilian Hercules

The L-100 was developed in the mid-1960's as the civilian equivalent of the highly successful type of the C-130, known as the Hercules, a mainstay in the Vietnam war. It is a heavy transport with four turboprop engines.

The plane under discussion with the Syrians and Iraqis is the L-100-30, which is 15 feet longer than the C-130.

The State Department official said the L-100 is less maneuverable than the C-130, lacks a rear door to allow drops of military equipment by parachute and lacks doors for paratroops. It also has been designed primarily for cargo and has electronic equipment such as radios and radar for ordinary commercial flying, not military missions.

A Lockheed official in Washington said today that the talks with Syria and Iraq were still tentative and no contracts had been signed. He said the cost would run to about \$6 million to \$10 million each for an L-100.

The State Department would have to approve the export license for the L-100s, but Congressional approval would not be necessary.

Africa

WASHINGTON POST
1 JUL 1976

U.S. Props Up a Beleaguered Mobutu

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

KINSHASA—One winter morning a European resident of Kinshasa awoke to find his Zairean cook jumping up and down with joy.

"The president is through—there's been a coup d'état," the servant exulted. "Finally we will have enough to eat."

The servant proved wrong. The shots he heard and took for a revolution in fact were fired by troops searching for common criminals who had escaped from a Kinshasa prison.

But his reaction within the privacy of his employer's house—and the average citizen's indifference in public—typified a mood.

More than 10 years after he seized power—much to the relief of his fellow-citizens, who were sickened by the former Belgian Congo's first years of almost-constant civil war—President Mobutu Sese Seko is an increasingly lonely and discredited figure.

His strongest card is his lingering reputation as the man who ended the chaos of those early years of independence.

A common attitude is that summed up by a disenchanted, if resigned, taxi driver who said: "We might as well keep him because the next man almost certainly won't be any better."

That, too, seems a view shared by the Ford administration, which appears to shore up an old ally who recently returned to the fold after disastrous radical economic measures, apparently inspired by official trips to North Korea and China.

Mobutu's falling popularity is a function of the normal attrition of power coupled with a major political and military setback—his disastrous intervention in Angola—and the economic mess born of neglect, falling copper prices and wasteful prestige expenditures.

In a speech in May, Mobutu went a long way to

ward confessing to the country's gradual, but unmistakable decline since independence in 1960.

"Let's make an effort to get away from the mentality that we used to have during the colonial period," he exhorted his fellow-citizens. "We are an independent people. Forget about the golden days that you used to have during the Belgian presence here."

Zaireans cannot be blamed for indulging in nostalgic selective memory. Once the most prosperous colony in black Africa, the country has now gone back to a subsistence economy in many regions.

Mobutu completed the effect of natural neglect by forcing out the Greek, Portuguese and Pakistani traders who kept the bush marketing and distribution system functioning.

Farmers no longer can get their produce to market over washed-out roads and are no longer able to buy textiles, kerosene, and other staples. Farmers have either stopped planting for want of incentives or have taken to smuggling their produce abroad. Coffee, tea, gold and diamonds are among Zaire's riches that now show up as exports for neighboring countries.

The telephone service in Kinshasa has become so precarious that the government's inner circle communicates with each other by walkie-talkie, the ultimate status symbol. Private firms' shortwave radios have replaced the telephone, telegram and telex as the only sure communication systems in a country as large as the United States east of the Mississippi.

Mobutu has taken to blaming others for his troubles. The civil service has undoubtedly undergone a steady erosion. "In what

other country in the world have you seen the whole population in business," he complained. "Some work for the government and still run a shop and don't pay taxes."

"Everybody is saying prices have gone up. What is Mobutu doing? The roads are in bad shape. What's Mobutu doing? Not enough buses in town? Don't look at Mobutu because Mobutu is working 24 hours a day," he said.

So difficult has it become for average Zaireans to make ends meet—inflation is running well over 30 per cent annually and Mobutu himself admits that 90 per cent of imported goods never get outside the capital—that they are no longer satisfied with confessions, catalogues of shortcomings and exhortations promising instant change.

"Everyone wants to buy a Mercedes overnight," he lamented.

"If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way," he instructed his listeners. "But if you steal too much to become rich overnight, you'll soon be caught."

Mobutu, known as "the president-founder" of the country's only political party, or more simply as "The Guide," has yet to include these quotations in his Mao-like thoughts published in the government-controlled press.

But there is an acute awareness in Zaire that Mobutu has surrounded himself with men from northwestern Equator Province who are involved in many of the juiciest, if questionable, government-run offices and projects.

South African goods—especially foodstuffs—are regularly flown in aboard airplanes belonging to a Zaire state trading company. No Zaire official seems embar-

assed by such overt trading with a country Zaire criticizes for its apartheid policy or by the fact that identical fruit and vegetables not so many years ago were available in ample supply from the Zaire's own Kivu area.

Diplomats are convinced that South Africa purposely offers Zaire cheap credit and advantageous exchange rates—no small asset for a recently devalued currency.

With the Benguela Railroad across Angola still out of order and the Mozambique line cut, Zaire now ships much of its copper exports through Rhodesia to South African ports.

Mobutu often complains about his fate, but he has no intention of quitting. "I've been in the front lines for 16 years and that's where I enjoy being," he confided in a recent interview.

Now that the United States shows sign of helping him out, he seems in better spirits, especially since Zaire's massive government and government-guaranteed foreign debt was recently rolled over by Western creditor nations.

The United States seems determined to place its faith in Mobutu's 55,000-man army, just as it did in the last decade. That army proved unable to end the rebellion in the 1960s without help from white mercenaries and Belgian paratroopers transported in U.S. Air Force planes.

And in the Angola showdown the Zaire army abandoned massive amounts of arms, ammunition and other material in its headlong flight from the battlefield.

The apparent U.S. government calculation is that a contented army will help keep Mobutu in power until Zaire experiences better days.

WASHINGTON STAR
27 JUN '76

William F. Buckley

The U.N.'s double standard on violence in Africa

The figures are not all in on South Africa, and it may be that, like the figures involving the rioting Mexican students of 1968, they won't ever be complete. But the last count showed that all of two white people were killed, and that therefore the rest of the casualties (133 — again, at last count) were black.

It is not yet clear how many of these were black policemen; not clear how many of them were people killed by black and white policemen; and not clear how many were blacks killed by rioting blacks. That there were many of these is neither a) doubted; nor b) commented upon. Even though many newspapers featured, on page one, a picture of an automobile overturned by the rioters, not-so-neatly decapitating the (black) driver, who was not a policeman.

In short, although the disruption was ignited by resistance to a white order (that the local schools teach Afrikaans to the black natives), the principal victims were blacks. Not only blacks killed and wounded, but black enterprises burned, black hospitals and libraries destroyed.

It isn't expected that much that is sensible should come out of the United Nations, and on this occasion the Security Council didn't let us down. The Council passed, unanimously, a vote deploring the use of force in South Africa. This was done with the usual animadversions on apartheid, which are entirely deserved in any moral frame, but with an undistributed middle between a) deploring apartheid, and b) deploring the use of force to stop rioters from killing non-rioters.

One wonders what the South African police were supposed to do under the circumstances? Commit hara kiri? Seal off Sowetho and permit its inhabitants to treat each other like Cambodians?

What did we — finally — do in Watts? In order to restore the law, one uses force. President Eisenhower was willing to send paratroopers to enforce the law in Little Rock, Arkansas; and an entire armored division was ordered to stand by at the time of a major demonstration in Washington against the Vietnam War.

To denounce South Africa for using force to stop the rioting is to do the kind of thing the United Nations is very best at:

bringing discredit on itself by its hypocrisy and surrealism. It made no difference whatever to the Security Council that the charter of the United Nations specifically forbids intervention — which in the United Nations means, actually, official commentary — in the internal affairs of sovereign states. It is a curious and unintended commentary on white South Africa that its sins are thought worth denouncing, while those of black Africans are not. The easiest deduction is that when Amin kills a few thousand of his fellow citizens, or when one tribe sets out to eliminate another tribe, it isn't worth the attention of the Security Council, but that when the South African government acts to enforce its own (dismaying) laws, it is time for international indignation.

A week before the South African Resolution, Mr. Leo Anderson, a Chicago resident, was returning home with his wife and children and was stopped at the entrance to a tunnel in a black section of the city and ordered by a gang of young ruffians to pay ten dollars for the privilege of going through. The driver declined, and started forward. Whereupon a young black materialized with a pistol, shot the driver twice, wounding him, and his wife once, killing her. Driver after driver went by, noticed the bloody chaos, but did nothing, and it was 30 minutes before help arrived.

The widower, interviewed in the hospital, told a reporter that he harbors no racial resentment whatever against the killer. "It was a set of rotten people who were there at the time. They happened to be black. There are rotten whites too."

Just so. But it will be a long time before the Security Council finds any rotten blacks, and it has not even, on this occasion, found any rotten whites. It is no safer to deduce the brutality of those who enforce the law in South Africa from their use of force than it is to deduce the injustice of American society from the fact of riots at Watts: no safer than to assume that blacks are evil because of a particular act of ugliness in Chicago.

As is almost always the case, an individual spoke more wisdom, and showed more compassion, than an officially constituted tribunal. Mr. Leo Anderson should conduct seminars for the benefit of the ambassadors to the United Nations.

Thursday, July 1, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

UNITA Faction Continues Fight for Power in Angola

By Ernest Volkman

NEW YORK—The African term is "Kwacha." It has a complex meaning and is almost untranslatable, but an approximate English equivalent would be "Wakeup."

time."

"It is much more complicated than that," says J. K. Chitunda. "In fact, it has varied meanings: time to get up, rise, the sun is rising; now, time to get up and work. The word is very im-

portant to the Angolans, very symbolic."

Chitunda is acutely aware of symbolism. He is a symbol himself, the sole remaining U.S. representative of the Uniao Nacional Para Independencia Total de An-

goia, known more familiarly as UNITA. UNITA was one of the two Western-backed factions defeated by the Marxist faction in Angola's civil war following a massive infusion of Cuban troops and Soviet weapons.

From his small New York apartment Chitunda is trying to drum up American support for UNITA's continuing struggle, a hit-and-run guerrilla war against 12,000 to 15,000 Cuban troops still in Angola.

But Americans have forgotten about UNITA: Chitunda finds almost no interest in Congress or elsewhere. Almost daily he prepares communiqués and other material based on information smuggled out from UNITA-held areas in the southern part of Angola. But there seems to be no interest in the material. At the height of the civil war earlier this year, Chitunda traveled around the United States talking to various groups about UNITA. Now he hardly travels at all.

"Yes, it is clear that the Americans have forgotten us," Chitunda admits. "As far as they are concerned, the war in Angola is over. In fact, however we (UNITA) have simply changed from positional warfare to guerrilla warfare."

Although the organization fervently believes it eventually will win back Angola "from the Communists," as members say, UNITA to the outside world is more symbolic than real. Chitunda is still officially listed as having observer status at the United Nations, but the Marxist faction now controlling Angola has applied for U.N. membership and it is almost certain that Chitunda's status will be revoked.

And what will become of UNITA then? "True, it appears we will not have much," says Chitunda. "But in fact we have a great deal. We have the support of most of the Angolan people, we have the will, we know we are right . . . we have some leftover arms, and I tell you I will defeat the Cubans."

The Marxist popular movement that rules the country—the MPLA—admits it has severe problems and has hinted that the guerrilla attacks are hurting.

The MPLA was one of three movements that fought against the Portuguese when Angola was a colony. After the 1974 revolution in Portugal, Angola was given independence and the MPLA, UNITA and another pro-western faction, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), were joined in an uneasy coalition government. Both the Soviet Union and the United States intervened by supporting competing factions with arms and money. The U.S. covert operation was halted by Congress and the Popular movement later overwhelmed its opponents with Cuban help.

Its armies shattered, UNITA retreated into the Angolan interior several months ago. "I have mentioned Kwacha," says Chitunda, "and it is what keeps us going."

WASHINGTON STAR

22 JUN 1976

Crosby S. Noyes

South African riots

The bloody race riots in the black suburbs of Johannesburg have radically changed the perspective in the situation in South Africa and pretty well knocked Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's newly constructed African policy into a cocked hat.

The perspective and the policy were based on a number of assumptions. The first was that the major problem and danger spot in southern Africa was Rhodesia, where the white supremacist government of Prime Minister Ian Smith faces the virtual certainty of a disastrous war with black African guerrillas bent on establishing African rule.

The only hope of averting the war — and the possible extinction of Rhodesia's white population — is a very rapid transition to majority rule through negotiations with the black nationalist leaders. The concessions made so far by the Smith regime toward easing racial restrictions in Rhodesia are universally considered to be too little and too late to save the situation.

The policy of the Ford administration has been to line up unequivocally behind rapid transition to black rule in Rhodesia. In the course of his recent trip to Africa, Mr. Kissinger made it clear that the regime in Salisbury could count on no help from the United States in its confrontation with the African

liberation movement. "On the contrary," the secretary said, "Rhodesia will face our unrelenting opposition until a negotiated settlement is achieved."

So far as South Africa was concerned, the perspective was altogether different.

There, the white minority regime was believed to be in firm control and the black population relatively passive — an impression that the government in Pretoria eagerly encouraged. South Africa, furthermore, is a considerable military power, with modern equipment and an army of 50,000 men, backed by some 200,000 reservists.

In contrast to Rhodesia, South African whites are hardly colonialists, having settled the country more than 300 years ago, long before most of the black population arrived.

Although South Africa's policies of apartheid are condemned by all the liberal democracies, including the United States, the country's strategic importance to the major shipping routes from the Middle East has argued against intensive pressure for political and social change at a faster pace than the white South Africans themselves are willing to accept.

Indeed, Mr. Kissinger has been counting on the cooperation of the South Africans in coping with the problem of Rhodesia. In his meeting with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in West Germany this

week, the secretary had hoped to enlist the aid of Rhodesia's only major ally in bringing pressure to bear on Ian Smith's beleaguered regime, and there was at least some reason to hope that Mr. Vorster was prepared to be helpful.

The riots starting outside of Johannesburg have changed all that. Explosive pressures — directly related to South Africa's repressive race laws — have now been dramatically demonstrated: the internal vulnerability of the government in the face of a rising tide of black nationalism throughout the continent has now been starkly revealed.

It would be comforting to believe that the result of the explosion would be a heightened consciousness on the part of the South African authorities of the need for fundamental change and a speedup of essential reforms. Unfortunately, the contrary is more probable: That the riots will result in more repression, the development of a siege complex in white-ruled southern Africa, an end to efforts at accommodation and the encouragement of violence on the part of black Africans as the only means of achieving legitimate political goals.

It also represents a stinging setback for the emerging African policy of Henry Kissinger. And a singularly indigestible can of worms for a new American administration to inherit.

East Asia

WASHINGTON POST
1 JUL 1976

U.S. Criticized at U.N. On Micronesia Policy

Special to The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS, June 30—The United States came under a wide-ranging attack in the Trusteeship Council here today for its administration of the last remaining U.N. trust territory—the 2,000 Pacific Islands called Micronesia.

The Americans were in the awkward position of advocating that one group of islands in the strategic trust territory, the Marianas, be allowed to separate from the rest and become an American commonwealth, while opposing independence sought by other island groups, the Marshall and Palau districts.

A delegation of Marshall Islanders asked the U.N. Council to endorse their bid for a separate negotiation with the United States, leading to eventual independence.

George Allen, an American lawyer now living in

the Marshalls, charged that the exclusion of Marshallese employees on U.S. facilities on Kwajalein Atoll constitutes "racial discrimination comparable only to apartheid in South Africa."

Allen maintains that early this year, during a spinal meningitis epidemic at the atoll that left 12 persons dead and two children with permanent brain damage, the American doctors on the base 2½ miles away did not assist the lone Marshallese health officer because of the policy of segregated facilities.

Another petitioner, High Chief Ibedul, from the Palau district, protested a multi-billion dollar project launched by an American firm to turn that island into a large port that would serve as an oil transshipment, processing and storage depot.

Another group of Palauans, who favor the port, is expected to appear here

to appeal for separate status for their district.

Running counter to this separatist trend, which has been stimulated by economic potential but is grounded in the cultural and language differences among the various island groups, was an appeal from Roger Baldwin, of the International League for Human Rights, for the maintenance of Micronesian unity.

Baldwin and two colleagues charged that the United States was seeking the separation of the Marianas from the rest of Micronesia in a "divide and rule" tactic that is "colonial" in nature.

Council members are the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China.

Both the U.S. administration and the representatives from the Caroline Island districts of Micronesia, which contain the majority of the 114,000 population but have less economic potential than

the Marianas, Palau and the Marshalls, are seeking to have the Trusteeship Council accept the separation of the Marianas, but reaffirm the principle of territorial unity for the rest.

The United States maintains major bases in the Marianas, which would be protected under the commonwealth status. U.S. officials described as "vital and overriding the interest in retaining the missile range on Kwajalein."

The Marshallese, represented here today by a Hawaii-educated local official named Anton deBrum, argued that the "myth of Micronesian unity represents in fact an attempt to colonize the Marshalls." The U.S. plan, he said, would leave control over Marshallese affairs in the hands of the majority of Caroline Islanders.

When pressed by the British and French representatives about the depths of Marshallese commitment to independence, deBrum replied that he could envision a continuing relationship with the United States—if the price for the bases was right—but only if it involved a status separate from the rest of Micronesia.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 JUL 1976

Taiwan Issue

To the Editor:

In his June 21 Op-Ed article, Allen S. Whiting overstates the intensity of Peking's irritation with the U.S. on the Taiwan issue and underestimates the obstacles to any serious Chinese move toward the U.S.S.R. On the Taiwan issue, the Times' editorial of June 17 ("The China Knot") was much closer to the mark, but the editors could have added that Peking's attitude may also be conditioned by fear that the Nationalists might turn elsewhere for protection, namely to the U.S.S.R., if cast adrift by the U.S.

Peking's main concern about the U.S. today is precisely the question raised by Australian Prime Minister Fraser last week with Hua Kuo-feng. Fraser wondered if the U.S. now has the necessary cohesion and will to provide an effective counter to the outward thrust of Soviet power in Asia, the Indian Ocean and other regions of concern. No doubt, Hua replied that those were exactly his own sentiments since hardly a day passes that similar concerns are not expressed directly or indirectly in

Peking.

The points at issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute still relate to basic Chinese values and interests. They have to do with China's determination to pursue its own road to building socialism, to assert its own strategy for world revolution and to establish what the Chinese consider their proper role as a self-reliant nation playing an important and independent role in world affairs. Any meaningful rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. would necessitate serious compromise of these values, unless, of course, the U.S.S.R. itself had undergone a basic change in its values and aspirations. And surely a turn toward the U.S.S.R. would not be the way to speed the U.S. departure from Taiwan.

But if the alarmists are right and the consensus in Peking on the proper direction of China's basic interests is so fragile that it could be torn apart after Mao's death, this is all the more reason to approach the delicate process of normalization of relations with caution.

To hold out the promise of important results from this or that policy initiative is to risk eventual disillusionment and to jeopardize the possible gradual development of a mutually beneficial relationship.

JAMES C. GRAHAM
Potomac, Md., June 24, 1976

The writer is a former member of the Board of National Estimates, C.I.A.

ASIaweek, Hong Kong
25 June 1976

SOOTHSAYERS

The China Experts

One of the problems that bedevil Taiwan's diplomatic strategists is the difficulty in keeping up to date on what Washington is thinking and doing about China. Thus, with the third "Sino-American Conference on Mainland China" in Taipei last week (the others were held in 1971 and 1974), it was hoped that the airing of opinion by some leading U.S. Sinologists would provide a few clues. In the event, the locals wound up even more mystified than ever: the guests not only disagreed with much of what Taiwan's own China-watchers had to say, but managed to pour scorn on one another as well.

WASHINGTON POST
8 JUL 1976

Twelve Christian Workers Released

Clerics Allege Korean Police Brutality

By John Saar
Washington Post Foreign Service
SEOUL, July 7—South Ko-

rean police repeatedly punched and threatened Christian ministers and lay workers when they refused to falsely confess that their church community organization was Communist-influenced, it was alleged here today.

The charges of police brutality were made by members of the Seoul Metropolitan Community Organization soon after the release yesterday of the last three of twelve persons held for a six-week investigation.

Police gave no explanation for the original arrests or for the unexpected release of nine staffers of the organization last Saturday and the group's chairman, the Rev. Park Hyung-Kyu, with two others late last night.

Justice Minister Whang San Duk said in an interview that the prosecution was suspended to protect the freedom of religion and in consideration of the 12 prisoners' social status. He said they had "deeply repented of their past errors."

Whang said he had not received any report of police violence, and did not believe it had happened. He promised to investigate the charges.

The Rev. Park has been jailed three times since 1972 when he founded the community organization to bring medical aid and a sense of self-worth to Seoul's slum dwellers.

Well-informed sources here say the decision to halt the prosecution was influenced by an unusually strong effort on behalf of the eleven men and one woman by U.S. Ambassador Richard Snider.

An embassy spokesman declined to comment on U.S. intervention in the case. In the past, the embassy has refused to disclose any efforts

to encourage the Seoul government to respect human rights on the ground that publicity would reduce the mission's effectiveness.

Snider, who has been accused of not exerting maximum persuasion in earlier cases, "fairly banged the table on this one," a nondiplomatic source said.

Since late 1972, when Park seized wide powers via martial law, political opposition has been discouraged and opponents of the government have been arrested frequently. People who have been released from prison have frequently charged that they were mistreated by their jailers.

Sources say there was also a bitter interdepartmental struggle over the case between Korea's two largest law enforcement agencies, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the national police. The KCIA has conducted daily surveillance of the group's activities, and agency officials reportedly were outraged when the police claimed to have evidence of pro-Communist activities going on under their noses. The KCIA, which has frequently questioned and released workers of the Christian action group, won out when the public prosecutor's office ordered the police to relinquish the case.

Another factor in the police failure to release the prisoners, according to these well-placed sources, was an inability to obtain evidence for a credible conviction. Senior leaders of the Protestant churches in Korea vigorously criticized the arrests in meetings with police officials and the minister of home affairs, Kim Chi Yul. A resolution adopted by the Human Rights Commission of the Korean National Council of Churches

"rejected the government's implied charges of Communist conspiracy as groundless," accused the government of misunderstanding the church's true mission, and interpreted the arrests as "an attack . . . against the church as a whole."

"There's not a church member in Korea who would believe they were Communists," an American missionary commented.

Of the twelve people held and then released, six have told friends they were beaten up, three of them severely. They said they were punched by as many as three detectives at a time when they refused to identify the group's spiritual and organizational head, the Rev. Park, 53, as a Communist.

Lee Chul Yong, a community organizer, said he was kept bound hand and foot for three weeks and was gagged with filthy floor rags when he sang hymns. He was not given food for two days at one point.

Before they were released, all the detainees were required to sign forms promising not to disclose details of their treatment. They remained silent until all 12 were released, but spoke freely to their colleagues today. An amendment to the criminal code prohibits the disclosure of critical information to a foreign correspondent.

The police, they said, made desperate efforts to obtain or fabricate evidence. The freed prisoners said they were allowed two to four hours' sleep a night and were interrogated for up to 15 hours at a stretch.

Lee, a former street criminal converted by the Christian group some years ago, said he was offered "several million won" to testify that Park taught him communism. One million won equals \$2,000.

That diversity of outlook is the price Taipei has had to pay for its recent success in opening contacts with a wider range of American opinion leaders, rather than shunning all but staunch anti-Communists. But if the academic visitors offered no peeps into the minds of American policymakers, the Nationalists still had cause to consider the conference a success. For one thing, it attracted some 40 American scholars — including some leading liberals — and during formal sessions and informal encounters, the hosts had opportunity aplenty to press a central point: that American "derecognition" of Taiwan, for the purpose of placating Peking, was both unnecessary and undesirable.

Among the guests were Jerome Cohen and Ezra Vogel of Harvard, Robert Scalapino of Berkeley, Ralph Clough of the Brookings Institution and Ray Cline of Washington's Georgetown University. In seeking closer relations with such scholars, reports ASIaweek's P.L. Hsia, Taiwan hoped to impress upon them the seriousness of its own mainland-watchers' scholarship and thus eliminate the tendency of many foreign analysts to dismiss the locals as mere propagandists.

But while many of the American participants seemed suitably awed by the fact-gathering capacity of their Taiwan counterparts, they had scant praise for much of the analysis (a sentiment that was fully reciprocated). Most notably, the local scholars predicted that after Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death there would be such a fierce "crisis of succession" that central political authority would yield to a number of regional power centres — a sort of "new warlordism." Few of the Americans agreed with that conclusion.

The conference's liveliest session came on the last day when Thomas Robinson, associate professor of political science at Washington U., stood up to advocate early U.S. recognition of Peking via the "Japanese formula" of reducing American representation in Taipei to unofficial level. If full relations were still not consummated when Mao died, he argued, Washington might risk the emergence of a moderate Peking leadership intent on settling differences with Moscow. At such a point, declared Robinson (who joked that he'd been advised to wear a bullet-proof vest to the meeting), America's bargaining position would be badly weakened, especially since the U.S. would require Peking's support to help offset the growing strength of the Soviet Union.

The chief spokesman for the opposite viewpoint was Georgetown's Cline, a onetime boss of the State Department's Intelligence & Research Bureau and a frequent critic of Kissingerian foreign policy. Contending that Peking needs the U.S. much more than vice-versa, Cline saw no compelling reason for Washington to abrogate its defence treaty and jettison diplomatic relations with old ally Taiwan. The U.S., he said, should offer

to open an embassy in Peking without closing the one in Taipei. If Peking accepts, he said, that will be fine; if not, that will be *their* problem.

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
6 JUL 1976

Marquis Childs

A Small Island With Major Problems

So much of the news is a commodity whipped up by the media itself. That was true of a lot of the coverage of the '59 primaries reported in the old tradition of "he's up, he's down," with only a fraction of the electorate concerned enough to vote.

But the prize example of synthetic news was President Ford's economic surfeit in Puerto Rico. As image-building by way of television it served his purposes. Even as first announced, the possibility of any tangible achievement was heavily discounted and no one therefore had reason to be disappointed.

In the choice of a site—San Juan in the full blaze of summer's heat—was an irony that must have escaped the harried heads of government. As they went from one air-conditioned conference room to another under the heaviest security on this two-day excursion, the locale meant little or nothing.

Yet they might have learned something about the problems of the Third World from this curious island commonwealth. For Puerto Rico, as a dependent of the United States, is part of a balancing act that threatens from time to time to fall apart. They might have learned, too, about the role Cuba has played in the Puerto Rican dilemma.

Fidel Castro's meddling in the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is one of the reasons that the proposed reopening a year ago of

the Cuban-U.S. dialogue was aborted. While this was secondary to the massive Cuban intervention in Angola—there may be today as many as 15,000 Cuban troops in that former Portuguese colony—it was nevertheless evidence that Castro was continuing to try to make trouble for America in the Caribbean.

Last September at a solidarity congress in Havana the cause was Puerto Rican independence. And although its importance was played down the Cuban radio beamed inflammatory speeches, many of them by Puerto Rican independence delegates, to the island commonwealth.

The Cubans never miss an opportunity to raise this issue at the United Nations. They are expected to do a repeat performance in August before what is known as the Committee of 24 which concerns itself with de-colonization. These gestures mean little except as propaganda and as proof for Washington that Castro is determined to continue his trouble-making role.

Repeatedly in free elections the Puerto Ricans have voted down independence. In the last elections in 1972 the independence parties got only 4.5 per cent of the vote, with 85 per cent of potential voters going to the polls.

By any rational measurement independence would be the sheerest madness. In an island heavily overpopulated with no energy resources, suffering from a severe recession caused in

part by the quadrupling of oil prices, cutting off the massive help provided by the United States would be a form of suicide.

Given his Marxist outlook, Castro may envisage Puerto Rico as a second Angola. Cuban troops would move in to keep order. But with Cubans themselves still rationed for many essentials, the food deficit could never be made up. The island would soon become a starving poorhouse.

As a measure of American help, out of a population of 3 million, 52 per cent, or 1,558,000, are on the food stamp program. More than 200,000 are on the federal aid for families with dependent children, although the monthly payment of \$45 does not go far.

A determined drive to build up industry and tourism has raised per capita income to more than \$2,000, according to a spokesman for the island. That income is the second-highest in Latin America, exceeded only by oil-rich Venezuela. With unemployment officially at 17 per cent and tourism falling off, it will be a struggle to sustain such a level.

Even if they had had a moment to consider it, this must all have seemed irrelevant to the heads of government. Each has his own serious political-economic problems back home and each was making sure that he got filmed by the television crew that turned up from his home base. Here were the statesmen debating with their fellows about inflation and its perils together with unemployment and the dangers if the brake is pushed down too hard on the current recovery.

Puerto Rico is in a sense part of the Third World. As such it is an object lesson in the cost of sustaining living standards at anything close to the level of the industrialized nations.

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BALTIMORE SUN
8 July 1976

Unhappy Island

Americans worry about Cuban intervention in Africa and thunder about Cuba's annoying if ineffective subversion in Puerto Rico. Yet they fail to notice revolutionary change of an ominous character taking place in the Caribbean, and especially the English-speaking Caribbean. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, who was thought of as Washington's man when he took power in Guyana in 1964, is moving that South American mainland state by salami slices into a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. Prime Minister Michael Manley appears to be heading the same way in Jamaica, under cover of Draconian emergency responses to widespread violence and in the name of democratic socialism.

Small as Guyana and Jamaica are on the world scale, they are the giants of the statelets that emerged from what used to be the British West Indies. A domino theory involving the

smaller islands is not unreasonable. A substantial part of the Caribbean allied to Cuba, and looking internationally for help against expected subversion from the United States on the Chile model, would be a dismal Bicentennial present. Yet this specter is taking shape without Cuban responsibility or much American notice. The reasons for it are indigenous and tragic.

The downward spiral of Jamaica is dynamic. Poverty and joblessness breed violence, both political and criminal, which drives tourism and investment away to create greater despair. Mr. Manley seems more preoccupied with nationalizing industry than expanding it. British-style democracy has given way to one-party dictatorships in other former colonies, but this transformation, if pursued, would be injustice to Jamaica's own lusty, if not entirely violence-free, two-party tradition. The opposition Jamaica Labor

party has as great a claim on Jamaican patriotism as the People's National party of Mr. Manley. His dispute with American aluminum producers over the bauxite mines should be negotiable. The violence wracking Kingston is a tragedy for the Jamaican people. Mr. Manley's response to it might prove to be another American reaction to his policies should not add further tragedy, which would not be in any rational American interest.

WASHINGTON POST

Friday, July 2, 1976

Castro's Cuba: The Invisible Handwriting on the Wall

A Commentary

By Nicholas von Hoffman

El Presidente Gerald Ford dropped in on Puerto Rico the other day and the first thing he did was to tell El Jefe Supremo Fidel Castro, to keep his cotton-pickers off that island. If Ronald Reagan had said it everybody would be yapping about how irresponsible he is.

The Cuban threat is a geopolitical version of the miracle of the loaves and the fishes. Here is an island nation that's about 760 miles long, 50 miles thick with 8.5 million people, and to listen to American officialdom you'd think that this small gang of stogy puffers is about to conquer the world. When they're not subverting Puerto Rico we're warning them of Panama, Angola or Rhodesia. Where do they get all the troops for these escapades? Russian volunteers and left-wing Hollywood starlets who missed the charter flight when the Venceremos Brigade went home to Pasadena?

No man and no country in the world is as adept at getting the American government's goat as Castro and Cuba. We rise to the bait every time and we do it with such unvarying consistency that Castro plants rumors of new Cuban subversions in unlikely places as a pastime. Don't be surprised to read that Kissinger has warned the Maximum Leader of Cuban socialism to stop fomenting civil war in Lebanon.

In the last few years, saner heads in Washington have begun to question this ceaseless and pointless vendetta against our Caribbean neighbor. Why, they want to know, do we continue to try to embargo and starve the Cubans 13 years after their revolution? We did the same with the Russians and with the Chinese only to give it up and admit we'd made idiots of ourselves.

Given the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, it's they who have every moral right to be attempting to quarantine us. Cuba might be considered the first country in which the United States tried out what is now called neocolonialism, that is, having ostensibly free

Poster

and independent states which are in reality run by an invisible American proconsul.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
28 June 1976

U.S. accused of fouling Cuba's weather

BY OUR WASHINGTON STAFF

AMERICA twice tampered with the weather in an effort to wreck the Cuban sugar harvest and bring down the Communist regime of Dr Fidel Castro, a former scientific consultant to the Pentagon claimed at the weekend.

Mr Lowell Ponte said the CIA and the Pentagon had "seeded" wind currents that carry rain to Cuba in 1969 and 1970. The harvest did fail but it was not clear if that was a result of the project having worked.

He said he had learned of the project from staff at the Pentagon who were directly concerned with the operation, but the Pentagon yesterday denied taking part in any such scheme, saying: "We have never conducted weather modification around Cuba." A spokesman said such tactics had only been

used once in a secret operation, and that was in Vietnam. There rain was made to fall in an attempt to turn trails used by the Viet Cong into impassable swamps.

Mr Ponte, who is shortly to publish a book on weather manipulation, said the purpose of the Cuban operation was the opposite—to get the clouds to discharge their moisture before they ever got to Cuba and thus to wreck the harvest.

He said the idea was first tried out in 1969, and stepped up the next year after Dr Castro staked his reputation on a record 10-million ton sugar cane harvest.

"The CIA calculated, following Castro's statements, that failure would demoralise his people and make Cuban communism appear a failure throughout the world." When the harvest failed Dr Castro did, as the CIA had hoped, offer to resign, but later changed his mind.

Back at the turn of the century the technique wasn't perfected so we sometimes left our paw prints around. Thus, the first Cuban Constitution (Article III) had a remarkable clause in its conceding "that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for the discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris . . .". The aforesaid Treaty of Paris ended the Spanish-American War, and although it determined Cuba's fate until the coming of Castro, the Cubans neither drafted it nor signed it.

Under this intervention clause, known as the Platt Amendment, we thrice sent troops into the country. The worst was in 1906 when we sent a certain Charles Magoon of Nebraska to the governor of Cuba. The indignity of it! To be ruled over by a man named Magoon. In the America of 1906 or now, such as a Magoon should aspire to nothing higher than saloonkeeper or alderman.

Magoon was but one of a succession of Americans sent to Cuba to teach "the cheating 'manana' lot," as Theodore Roosevelt called the inhabitants of that island, how to conduct themselves in a democratic and Anglo-Saxon manner. The Cubans were bad pupils. They rioted and revolted under a procession of Quisling president who set new records for theft, peculation and diversion of funds from the public purse.

The American penetration and domination of the Cuban economy left the little island in a condition of near vassalage. A U.S. Department of Commerce publication in 1956 made the point better than any Marxist-Leninist could: "American participation exceeds 90 per cent in the telephone and electric services, about 50 per cent in public service railways and roughly 20 per cent in raw sugar produc-

tion. The Cuban branches of the United States banks are entrusted with almost one-fourth of all bank deposits. . . . The outlook for additional investment is also good." (As quoted in "Revolution in Cuba," by Herbert A. Matthews, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1975).

The American policy has been anything but empathetic. While playing down the actual history of the relations between the two countries, in public Castro has been

denominated a bandit, and in secret the scum of the Mafia were sworn into the CIA and told if their hit men scored on the Cuban leader they could have their warehouses back.

If our Presidente should decide to return to the Caribbean, next time he might forego the threats and offer El Jefe Supremo our apologies with a promise not to do it again.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE

4 JUNE 1976

6 months of political strife

Jamaicans see CIA behind bullets

By John Hatch

KINGSTON, Jamaica—"CIAga" is a common sign chalked on walls in this city of 700,000 inhabitants long known for its tropical tourist attractions but recently the target of political violence.

The term is a play on the name of Edward Seaga, leader of the opposition Jamaica Labor Party, [JLP] — the more conservative of the island's two major political factions, and the United States' Central Intelligence Agency.

Some members of the ruling People's National Party [PNP] blame the violence in the last six months on Seaga and the CIA, for two reasons.

First, the PNP won four by-elections last year and has remained popular since coming to power in 1972, despite being faced with the political adversities of oil price increases and world recession. So, Seaga as opposition leader faces near certain defeat at the next election, to be held before next February.

Second, Washington is believed to have become worried about the direction of Jamaican politics. The PNP government openly declared its objectives to be socialist and made no secret of its friendship with Cuba. Thus, it is alleged, the CIA began six months ago to focus on determining the credibility of Seaga as an alternative to Prime Minister and PNP leader Michael Manley.

IT IS SUGGESTED that Seaga, who had a reputation for using violence in earlier political battles, secured money from the CIA which he determined to

use for bullets where words failed to persuade voters.

This scenario is by no means universally accepted. But what is unquestioned is that dozens have died in the last six months in Kingston as guns have proliferated along with Molotov cocktails and arson. Many victims have been young members of the PNP. Military discipline has been instituted, and Manley and members of his government have joined an expanded Home Guard.

What alarms Jamaicans is that their country is being hit by violence of a clearly political — and evidently foreign — nature. It is not aimed at the wealthy, nor at the tourists who continue to crowd the sun-drenched beaches on the north coast seeking tropical delights. It is in the poorer parts of Kingston, and among the political protagonists, that the heat is felt.

The allegation of CIA interference has gained credence with the exposure of the agency's activities in other nations, especially in Latin America.

JAMAICA AND CUBA are natural friends. They lie only 90 miles apart and share many common problems. At Manley's invitation, Cuban engineers are building local irrigation dams in Jamaica and training Jamaican workers in their construction and use.

That is the kind of mutual aid Third World countries are increasingly seeking as an alternative to reliance on the rich industrial states for a transference of technology. Yet, it is generally accepted that such nations do not interfere in each other's political systems.

Jamaicans, with their history of turbulent political pluralism, are little interested in the conformity of communism — and this is recognized by Cubans.

Seaga and Manley agree national development is the essential objective. Seaga calls his policy nationalism; Manley speaks of democratic socialism; communism has never been an issue between them.

Manley's socialism is recognized as preserving Jamaica's democratic traditions of a free and critical press, free speech and association. The trade unions are divided between the two parties. The police, security forces, and judiciary are independent.

If Jamaicans became convinced their free choice between the parties at the next election was being subverted from outside, much of the Third World would be incensed.

AT THE SAME TIME, the real alternatives would be submerged. Seaga represents the business interests of this country and believes the national economy can grow only if government controls are removed from all but the rural sector.

Manley would seek to narrow the gap in living standards between the minority elite and the common masses until it disappears. He says government must create new jobs, insist on a minimum wage, build houses and roads, provide pensions and health services, and supply food to the needy, in addition to controlling utilities and educational institutions.

If the PNP should be defeated in the coming elections, by either constitutional or subversive means, there would be a real danger that right- and left-wing forces would engage in a death struggle to impose their brands of totalitarianism. And if they did, the chances for peace on this island and of trust in the West throughout the Third World would be dashed for many years to come.

John Hatch is a British journalist and teacher.

TIME

28 June 1976

JAMAICA

'Jah Kingdom Goes to Waste'

Recently, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley invited supporters attending the tenth annual conference of his central Kingston constituency to study closely a film called *The Rise and Fall of the CIA*, a British-made documentary about alleged agency operations in Laos, Viet Nam and Salvador Allende's Chile. "I cannot prove in a court of law that the CIA is here," Man-

ley told his audience. "What I have said is that certain strange things are happening in Jamaica which we have not seen before."

By "strange things," the Prime Minister meant random acts of violence that so far this year have led to the death of more than 100 people, mostly in the slums of West Kingston. Last week, though, Peruvian Ambassador Fernan-

do Rodriguez Oliva was stabbed to death by burglars in his home in an upper-class section of the capital.

In a stern effort to halt violence that has been causing a death a day in Jamaica, Manley's government took the extreme step of declaring a state of emergency. This move gives the Jamaican Security Force broad and tough powers to maintain law and order. Said the Prime Minister: "We have witnessed a type and scale of violence unknown in our history, terrorist activities previous to,

unknown to us which have caused fear and concern to every decent Jamaican citizen." Security forces, he insisted, had found evidence that terrorism was to be deliberately stepped up this week.

Nighttime Sounds. The Prime Minister, announcing the state of emergency, also gave a vivid example of the kind of violence he intended to stop. On the night of May 19, Manley recalled, in what has become known as the "Orange Street Massacre," a gang seeking vengeance for the stabbing of one of its members set fire to a tenement house. With gunfire the gang held firemen at bay and the occupants inside the burning building. Eight children and three adults died in the fire.

Even before the state of emergency, police and soldiers of the 8,000-man security force had been carrying out nightly cordon-and-search operations in Kingston under the country's weapons control laws (automatic life imprisonment for anyone caught with guns, grenades or explosive devices). A new addition to the nighttime sights and sounds of the city is the loud whir of an army helicopter with a powerful searchlight, hovering over an area where security forces have moved in to make a sweep.

U.S. Ambassador Sumner Gerard has protested that the CIA is not in any manner trying to upset the Jamaican government, even though Washington is less than happy about Manley's warming friendship with Fidel Castro. Gerard's denials were reinforced last week by William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Af-

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Post-Allende repression

U.S. squeamishness baffles Chile

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Sun Staff Correspondent

Santiago, Chile — The words come with a rush of puzzlement and fear that they will be misunderstood: "We thought the United States would welcome the change. We hoped all the Communists would be killed."

She toys with her coffee cup in a Valparaiso cafe, a trim, attractive, upper middle-class housewife who might be a social leader in Roland Park or Chevy Chase. Her husband, whose English is better, cringes faintly.

In Santiago, Col. Gaston Zúñiga Paredes, the military government's director of communication, echoes the first of the two thoughts. "There has been some amazement," he says, "because Chileans thought the United States would help after they threw out the Communists. There has been some surprise that the United States, instead of helping, backed away."

Doubtless there is more than a touch of disingenuousness in these attitudes, at least on Colonel Zúñiga's part. They suggest none of the com-

plexity of the U.S.-Chilean relationship since Gen. Augusto Pinochet's military junta overthrew Salvador Allende, the Marxist president, in September, 1973.

But an element of unaffected naivete, or simple ideological self-righteousness, runs through the attitudes of much of Chile's middle class and military government. All things considered, the United States has been remarkably forthcoming to the junta.

All things in this case include the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent Allende's election in 1970. And after his election with 36 per cent of the vote, its support for the democratic opposition and its barriers, in effect, to Chile in the international money market.

How much U.S. policy had to do with Allende's fall and death will be disputed for years. For Allende, paradoxically a Marxist who partook liberally of the good life, also naively assumed that enforced communism and democracy were compatible.

The result predictably was chaos. Never buttressed by a

majority, who told a House subcommittee that allegations of U.S. interference were "totally false." If American citizens are engaged privately in "destabilizing" activities, Luers added, "we are prepared to cooperate fully with the governments of the area to bring them to justice."

Prime Minister Manley is not totally convinced. "We have not said that destabilization in Jamaica is the result of deliberate top-level U.S. Government policy," he told TIME Correspondent Bernard Diederich last week. "Dr. Kissinger has said that it is not so, and that may be so. Nonetheless, what upsets people now is that assurances were being given Allende and his ambassadors up to a few weeks before [his death]—bland assurances saying 'Of course we're not doing that'—and yet we now know it was happening."

Specifically, Manley blames the violence on his right-wing political enemies who are trying to impede Jamaica's path to socialism. If, in fact, they do get help from American sources, he claims, it is partly because of his friendship with Castro (who may visit Kingston in August) and partly because Jamaica backed the pro-Soviet regime of Agostinho Neto in Angola. The U.S., argues Manley, "has been resentful of any country in the Western Hemisphere that came out in support of Neto and the Cubans against the South Africans. They have been very bitter about it."

A more plausible explanation for Jamaica's unrest is Manley's efforts to turn the island republic into a socialist state. Even the Prime Minister's sup-

porters concede that the economy is in a shambles. Unemployment is running at about 22%, and is particularly high among urban youth, who police say are guilty of most of the recent murders. The country's foreign exchange earnings, principally from bauxite, sugar and tourism, are down 40 to 60% below last year's total of \$400 million, and reserves have dropped from more than \$102 million in November to less than \$38 million. Wealthy Jamaicans have illicitly exported perhaps \$200 million abroad; some of the currency has been smuggled out in fake cigarettes, fortune cookies and pork carcasses. Says one member of an intelligence force trying to halt the financial outflow: "It has replaced the smuggling of ganja (marijuana) to Grand Cayman, Miami and Canada."

Chance of Winning. In addition, many wealthy Jamaicans have set up second residences abroad. Whether they emigrate will depend on the outcome of the next general election (probably in February). Manley's People's National Party currently has 35 seats in Parliament, to 17 for the opposition Labor Party, led by Edward Seaga. An able economist, Seaga faces the ethnic disadvantage of his Lebanese ancestry; he is light-skinned in an overwhelmingly black nation. Nonetheless, he stands a good chance of winning if there is more violence and the economy continues to stagger. Many Jamaicans are convinced that will be the case. In the sad words of a current hit by Ernie Smith, one of Kingston's top reggae singers, "As we fight one another for power and glory, jah kingdom goes to waste."

majority, of the public or in Congress, he tackled capitalism in a way that drove capitalists, technicians or anyone else who could salvage his assets out of the country.

Strikes paralyzed much of industry. By the fall of 1973 the inflation rate was somewhere about 500 to 600 per cent—no one knows for sure—and Chile was sinking under its social, economic and political burdens.

Finally the disaster brought the military out of its historic submission to civilian rule. As so often happens, the cure may be worse than the illness. What made the junta of General Pinochet, 60, an instant embarrassment to the United States was its iron repression of dissent.

Perhaps as many as 2,500 were slaughtered during the coup. The junta has suspended the majority parties of the center, abolished those of the left, suspended all political activity, locked up anyone vocally to the left of a faint rose coloration, wooed even moderate leftists out of the universities and generally has imposed on Chile an apolitical

ideology of laissez faire capitalism.

Under Allende the technocrats fled Chile. Under the junta Chile's abstract thinkers have fled.

But worst of all, to the outside world, have been the documented executions, the disappearances, and the torture conducted by DINA, the Directorate for National Intelligence—the secret police. Operated by Col. Manuel Contreras, DINA runs three camps near Santiago. It reports only to General Pinochet, and some outside analysts suspect that in the way of secret police everywhere it operates beyond even his control.

The abuses have slowly accumulated on the record. They are on the record in large part for a peculiar reason. For despite its repression, the government still admits foreign correspondents who poke around with some considerable freedom.

Their findings, and those of several international agencies, run a familiar grisly gamut. There are the persons

arrested whose bodies are found later, brutalized. There are the electrodes attached to genitals. There are the rapes by persons unseen from behind blindfolds. The list is undeniable.

Nevertheless, Alvaro Puga, a political adviser to the government, argues that none of the major U.S. publications has been willing to listen rationally to government objectives or to its explanations.

Basically, both Mr. Puga and Colonel Zuniga admit there have been abuses by physical mistreatment of prisoners. In fact, Mr. Puga says, 109 police, military men or members of DINA have been punished for abuse—including one offender sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Basically also, they deny abuse in the general pattern of arrests and imprisonment. In the general pattern of leftist activities, they portray a Communist conspiracy, supported by the Soviet Union, to take over South America.

"Chile," says Colonel Zuniga firmly, "is the only country really fighting the Communists."

Whether the colonel and his leaders really think in such simple terms is one of the frustrating questions in assessing Chile. Certainly they have been successful in suppressing anything resembling effective opposition. There are known Communists still on the job in Chile today—and

they are resolutely silent.

Punishments can be subtle. One radio editor who became too lax in self-censorship was banished to a mountain town at 12,000 feet in the Andes, an ordeal for a flatlander. He came home in the limited amnesty that honored the arrival of Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, earlier this month.

Outsiders who specialize in Chilean affairs will attempt anonymously to shed perspective on the current leadership, recognizing that perspective can be mistaken for endorsement.

"These are military technicians, unsophisticated politically, pragmatic and driven by emotional anti-Marxism," says one. "They are honest and without personal ambition in conventional terms. Their politics is utter loyalty to Chile as a state and their economics is that of William E. Simon [U.S. Treasury Secretary]. Adam Smith is alive and well in Santiago and Washington."

Somewhere between 300 and 400 political prisoners are held at any given time under extralegal state of siege terms, one reports. It is these, passing through what another calls "DINA's revolving door," who are most often subject to physical mistreatment.

About 1,500 persons are in the process of indictment and trial for recognized offenses—such as carrying or conceal-

ing arms. Perhaps 2,000 more have been tried, convicted and are serving sentences for charges growing out of the political transition.

"Theoretically," says one source, "this ties down all the corners, accounting for everybody. But in fact there is a fourth category." This is the category of those arrested but unaccounted for by DINA, which still fails in many cases to fulfill new government requirements for full accounting, for physical examination of all prisoners by doctors, and for notification of families when a member is arrested.

Some of the extralegal prisoners, an analyst says, would be a severe threat to the government by any objective standards. These are assassins and bomb-throwers of militant communism, members of the Revolutionary Left Movement. But many are victims of arbitrary judgment, and no outsiders, apparently, have a clear idea of where the lines are drawn.

The abuses and ambiguity have helped create a double standard in the appraisal of Chile by outsiders. To some on the left, Chile's repression is reprehensible, Cuba's defensible. Even some Latin governments with scarcely liberal governments are quick to attack Chile's record.

The reasons are plain, according to a foreign diplomat. First of all, Allende was widely perceived as a social

democrat, not a Communist. Then the coup, when it came, was quite bloody. Then, the source adds, "there is simple hypocrisy along with effective Communist propaganda."

For its part the U.S. is trying to walk a delicate line in its relations with Chile, joining the pressure for political reform without cutting its strategic lines. Strategic interests in the area are clear, given Chile's position along the whole southern half of South America's west coast.

The U.S., one specialist reports, "is trying to move the leaders along politically. It certainly is not trying to overthrow them or to replace them. It sees no reasonable alternatives for the short term."

That is why Mr. Kissinger's words on human rights earlier this month were so carefully framed, to avoid condemnation of Chile while keeping up the pressure for reform. Presumably that also is part of the reason credits to keep Chile's struggling economy afloat have become available.

Indeed, according to one American analyst, the dual policy seems to be working as Chile's leaders feel the international heat. The level of actual mistreatment of Chileans, he asserts, "is down considerably from a year ago, though it still is not something to trumpet from the housetops."

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Staff Quits Threatened Mexico Paper

By Marlies Simons

Special to The Washington Post

MEXICO CITY, July 8—The editorial staff and management of Mexico's leading newspaper walked off the job today, saying their only alternative was to fight it out with dissident conservatives in the cooperative enterprise who had occupied the plant earlier in the day.

The staff feels freedom of the press in Mexico is at stake.

Excelsior, the only important independent newspaper in Mexico and one of the few remaining in Latin America, has come under attack recently by elements who the editor believes are supported by the government of President Luis Echeverria. The paper often has criticized the president.

Printers and others occupying the plant said they would not allow publication until editor Julio Scherer left. They sent word that they had removed vital parts of the presses to make their point. Scherer left, saying "our decision was to avoid violence or bloodshed at any cost."

Early this morning, about 50 conservative members of the cooperative invaded the Excelsior plant and stopped the presses. The paper later appeared with a blank back page that was to have contained an editorial staff manifesto declaring that freedom of the press was being threatened.

In a later assembly of the cooperative, which lacked a quorum, the conservatives claimed that Scherer and many of the paper's top managers were fired.

The entire management and editorial staff, then convoked their own assembly with a quorum of 812 of the 1,300 members. This group called for a new and legal assembly on July 21.

Until then, they said they would not produce a paper, claiming there was no guarantee the dissenters would not sabotage its contents.

A month ago, a group apparently backed by the government illegally occupied property owned by Excelsior claiming the land is theirs.

Other newspapers and television stations have campaigned to embarrass Excelsior's editor by publishing insulting ads and picturing the land occupation as legal.